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lntroduction'
The main topic in this thesis - Competition, Complementarity and Compatibility in
the Internet - is strategic interaction between competitors and complementors in the
Internet industry. When buying Internet connectivity from an ISP2 the end-users can
communicate with other users connected to the Internet and they can access several
types of content and applications. I analyze competition between firms (ISPs) that are
selling Internet connectivity in the retail market. The end-user service may be seen as
a system that consists of several components such as local access, regional backbone
access and global backbone access. Hence, it is complementarity between these
components, and the interaction between firms selling complementary components
becomes important. Furthermore, since the Internet consists of a number of discrete
networks the quality of the interconnection or the degree of compatibility between the
networks becomes a strategic variable.3
The rest of the introduction section is organized as follows. First, I give an overview
of the technical structure in the Internet. Second, I discuss the market structure in the
Internet. Third, I give an outline ofthe thesis.
Technical Structure in the Internet
A Brief History of the Internet
In the early 1960s the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the USA initiated the
development of the technology and infrastructure behind what we today know as the
Internet. As a consequence of this effort, some of the leading academic institutions in
the USA became interconnected through an electronic communication network
(NSFNET) in 1986. The NSFNET communication technology, invented by the
American Ministry of Defence, was based on a so-called Internet Protocol (IP). This
l I am grateful to Lars Sørgard, Hans Jarle Kind and Jan Yngve Sand for useful comments on this
chapter.
2 Internet Service Provider.
3 Below, I will not distinguish between interconnection quality and compatibility.
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has become the standard for distribution of data bits from sender to receiver. At the
end of the 1980s commercial firms like IBM and MCI wanted to connect to the
Internet, and in 1993 NSF developed a plan for commercialisation and privatisation of
the Internet. Two years later NSF withdrew from the NSFNET.
In the early years of the Internet both the users and the services were relatively
homogenous. The majority of the users were found at universities and research
institutions, and the dominating services were transfers of data files and electronic
mail. A common denominator for this kind of users and the applications is that they
are relatively "patient" with regard to delays. First, these user groups typically have a
relatively low willingness to pay in terms of money compared to time. What I mean
by this is that students and researchers in many cases are more likely to accept a delay
than to pay a few dollars for an immediate transfer of a data file. Second, services like
transfers of data files and e-mail are intrinsically insensitive to delays, since they
typically do not require any active real-time cooperation between sender and receiver.
A large fraction of new user groups and new applications are more impatient or
sensitive to delays than what was the case earlier. New users in the private business
sector often prefer to pay money in order to progress in the queue rather than to wait.
Moreover, we have recently observed a large growth in the number of interactive real-
time applications. Examples of such applications are interactive video and telephony
over the Internet. The required transfer capacity also varies a lot. World Wide Web
(www) and real-time video require significantly higher transfer capacity than, for
instance, purely text based electronic mails.
The present Internet architecture is based on connectionless packet switching (see
below), where data packets are served according to the first come, first served
principle. This architecture is not particularly appropriate for serving impatient users
or for handling real-time applications. Unless price signals can be used to sort and
segment users, it will probably become increasingly difficult to offer real-time
applications and to serve impatient users over the open Internet. Impatient users and
time sensitive applications may therefore be excluded from the open Internet. This
may lead to a process where the Internet becomes segmented into several independent
networks instead of further convergence.
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A discussion of the development and history of the Internet is offered by Mackie-
Mason and Varian (1997) and Werbach (1997), while Cave and Mason (2001) give an
overview of the Internet with focus on regulation and the competitive environment.
Layered and Hierarchical Structure
In telecommunication there has traditionally been a close connection between services
and the underlying distribution system. Introduction of new services typically requires
modifications of the infrastructure, for instance through upgrading of the software in
the networks' switches. The situation is completely different within the Internet, since
the common protocols between infrastructure and applications/content make it
possible to offer new network services independent of the firms that control the
infrastructure. Therefore it has become very simple to introduce new applications and
services on the Internet, and this has presumably been a central factor behind the
success of the Internet.
Applications and content
Protocols for distribution of data
Local access Regional backbones Global backbones
Figure 1: The layered structure of the Internet.
The Internet is often described as having a layered network structure as described in
Figure 1. In the bottom layer of the Internet structure we have the physical
infrastructure, where local access is an essential component. It should be noted,
though, that the total quality of the infrastructure or distribution system does not
depend on the quality of local access alone. For instance, there is little reason to
upgrade local access to handle broadband applications if the quality of the regional
and global backbones implies that the speed of data transfers over the Internet does
not increase. A chain is not stronger than its weakest part, and local access is only one
of several components of the distribution system that must be upgraded in order to get
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high-speed Internet. In the higher layers of the Internet structure we find applications
and content.
Structure of the Distribution of Data
With regard to the basic physical lines, the Internet by and large uses the same
infrastructure as traditional telecommunication. This is true both for local access,
where the majority of the consumers uses the traditional telephone line (analogue
modem, ISDN, or xDSL), and for the major transmission channels in the regional and
global backbones. The local access lines can be considered as short cuts to the
Internet, and as such they are not part of the Internet itself. Indeed, local Internet
access through the telephone lines uses the same switching technology as traditional
telephony - circuit switching. When the user makes a conventional telephone call, or
connects the telephone line to the Internet, an end-ta-end connection with a given
capacity is established (56 kilo bites per second with an analogue modem, and 64-128
kilo bites per second with ISDN).4 This capacity is dedicated to the user as long as the
conversation (connection) lasts, and for traditional phone calls this line switched
technology is used independent of distance. Thus, a continuous end-ta-end connection
is set up whether one calls the neighbor or a person on a different continent. Hence,
the circuit switching technology is connection-oriented. On the other hand, the
Internet uses packet switched technology, where for instance an e-mail is broken
down into several smaller data packets that are sent independently from sender to
receiver. Thus, the present Internet standard implies that the packet switched
technology is connectionless.
The ex ante advantage of setting up a continuous end-ta-end connection with a given
capacity is that it is protected from possible third-party interruptions. A disadvantage
is that the utilization of the capacity is poor if the capacity requirement varies over
time during the connection. This will typically be the case within the Internet world,
for instance when a user downloads a web page, and then reads it before a new web
page is downloaded. For this kind of use, connectionless packet switching is more
effective than an end-ta-end connection, since it allows others to use the free capacity.
4 Broadband access through the telephone line (xDSL) or cable-TV has capacities of 400 kilobits per
second or more.
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The disadvantage, of course, is that this may cause interruptions and delays if there is
congestion.
The Internet is a network of networks that connects decentralized computers all
around the world. Each single computer (host) connected to the Internet has a so-
called IP address, which has clear similarities with an ordinary postal address. The IP-
address identifies the computer (host id) and which sub network (net id) the computer
is connected to. Communication between different computers on the network takes
place by sending data packets from one computer to another, and each data packet has
an address that identifies the receiver. When the packets have reached the receiver,
they are sorted and assembled such that they constitute for instance the e-mail that the
receiver sees.
The distribution of data packets from sender to receiver does also takes place by using
computers. These computers are termed routers (analogous to switches in the
telephone network) and, as indicated by the name, have the overview over the route
that the data packets will follow. Each router thus operates a routing table. Most of
these tables contain only a limited number of addresses, and data packets with
unknown addresses are sent away from the router as unknown (default routing) to
routers with a larger routing table higher up in the hierarchy. Standardized rules or
Internet protocols (IP), specify how the exchange of data takes place between each
single computer and between independent networks.
A hierarchy like the one I have described above needs a top level that does not send
away data packets as unknown (default routing). In other words, the core routers at
the top of the hierarchy must have complete routing tables with an overview (directly
or indirectly) of all the networks further down in the hierarchy. Otherwise, some
packets may end up going in indefinite loops. All core routers must be able to
communicate with each other, and they must be more or less continuously updated. A
small number of such core routers secure complete routing tables, and it is these core
routers that define the number of addresses that can be reached over the Internet. A
large number of routers with more limited routing tables are in tum connected to the
core routers. Thereby the Internet has a vertical or hierarchical address and
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distribution structure that can be used as inputs for those who operate local and
regional networks.5
Milgrom et al. (2000) argue that it may be cost efficient that just a few firms control
the core backbones and address system in the Internet. Pure cost considerations may
therefore indicate that it is optimal to allow the central Internet Backbone Providers
(IBPs), who control the core routers, to limit the number of routers that are allowed to
enter "the joint venture" of firms that operate core routers.
Market structure in the Internet
In Figure 2 I provide a very simplified illustration of the market structure of the basic
distribution system in the Internet. The ISP sells access to the Internet to the end-user,
and the function of the ISP is to act as a portal to the global Internet. The end-user
either buys Internet connection from the ISP and local access directly from a
telecommunication company (Figure 2a) or he buys both services "bundled" from the
ISP (Figure 2b). The former model used to be the most common one earlier, but lately
it has become more common to buy the bundled variant consisting of both Internet
access and local access. This is particularly true for high-speed (broadband) Internet
access. Access to the global backbone is in any case an input that local ISPs must buy
directly or indirectly from those who control the top level of the Internet (the IBPs),
and with the bundled variant the ISP must also buy local access as an input.
Supplier of access
to the global
backbone
Supplier of access
to the global
backbone
Supplier of local
Supplier of local
Fig. 2a: Separate supply of local
access and Internet access
Fig. 2b: Local access and
Internet access bundled
5 The core routers never send away packets as unknown, as distinct from the routers with more limited
routing tables. Ifthe core router receives a packet with an address that it does not recognize, the packet
will be deleted.
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Today it seems to be dominant firms that control the top level, i.e., the global
backbones, of the Internet. We also find dominant firms in the segment for local
access (where the dominating telecommunication firms have large market shares). For
the ISP segment the situation is different. In this segment there is a large number of
firms, and entry barriers are seemingly small compared to the local access segment
and the global backbone segment.
Local Internet Service Providers
Usually localiSPs operate their own local data network (regional backbones), but
these networks are to a large extent based on leased-lines in a market with relatively
tough competition. The profit opportunities for independent ISPs have proven to be
relatively small, since there are low entry barriers. Cave and Mason (2001) argue that
a main reason for this is the prevailing regulation regimes in telecommunications.
However, they maintain that we may observe increased market concentration also in
this segment along with increased penetration of broadband technology in the local
access.6
Internet Backbone Providers
The fact that the addressing within the Internet takes place within a strict hierarchy
has immediate implications for the market structure. Those who control the top level
of this distribution system and the core routers are in possession of an input that all
the other agents down in the system must have access to. In addition, since these firms
control much of the basic transmission networks, both in the USA and across the
Atlantic Ocean, one may argue that these companies control the global infrastructure
in the Internet - denoted the global backbone in Figure 1 and 2. These firms (four to
five in number) constitute what has been labelled Tier-I.
Historically, the interconnection agreements between different sub-networks in the
Internet were of the form "I bring your traffic if you bring my traffic", with no flow of
payments (peering agreements). These agreements worked well as long as the public
sector financed most of the infrastructure and the Internet was characterized by
homogeneity both on the supply and the demand side. Additionally, as discussed
above, early applications like e-mail and transfer of data files typically tolerated
6 Many ISPs also offer content, but here I will concentrate on access to the infrastructure for the end-
user.
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delays. The latter implied that neither users nor services were particularly sensitive to
small frictions in the interfaces between different networks.i The 4-5 dominating
IBPs at the top level of the Internet still have "I bring your traffic if you bring my
traffic"- agreements with each other. However, since 1997 these firms have charged
smaller IBPs and ISPs for access to the global infrastructure and addressing system in
the Internet through so-called transit agreements.
It is an important question whether the dominating IBPs have incentives to use market
power in a manner that directly hurts both smaller IBPs, localISPs and end-users. On
the one hand, there are clearly valid arguments that the top-tier firms should be
allowed to cooperate on maintenance of the top level of the Internet. Smaller IBPs
may, for instance, be tempted to overload other parts of the network rather than to
increase their own capacity (Srinagesh, 1997). Therefore it may be optimal to restrict
the number of firms that are allowed to enter into peering agreements. Put differently,
it may be socially advantageous that small Internet suppliers have to pay for complete
Internet access (Milgram et al., 2000, Besen et al., 2001). Additionally, Varian (1998)
argues that cooperation between the top-tier firms helps to secure high quality on the
global backbones in the Internet. However, Varian (1999) also argues: "The problem
with such a board would be the temptation to use it as a device for collusion". So even
if individual IBPs does not have a sufficiently dominant position to abuse its market
power towards either smaller IBPs or retailers further down the hierarchy, the top-tier
IBPs as a group may have the ability to come in such a position.
When MCI and WorldCom in 1998 applied for a permission to merge, it was
questioned whether the new company, as a dominating IBP, would be able to partly
foreclose competitors by increasing their costs (e.g., by setting a high price for
interconnection) or by lowering their demand (by reducing the quality of
interconnection). The most outspoken concern of the other IBPs was that the merged
MCI WorldCom would choose the latter strategy; offer an inferior interconnection
quality in order to gain a competitive advantage in the competition of selling inputs
(transit) to firms further down in the Internet hierarchy. In order to avoid this scenario,
7 See Srinagesh (1997), Kende (2000) and Bailey (1997) for a detailed description of the structure and
history behind the interconnection arrangements in the Internet.
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both American and European competition authorities set as a precondition for
accepting a merger that MCl's IBP activities were sold.'
Local Access Providers
The firms that sell Internet access to an end-user must have a physical connection to
the outer wall of my house (local access). For private users it is not reasonable to
believe that anyone will find it commercially profitable to build new cables into
private homes in the near future (Clark, 1999). Thereby private users will at most
have two alternatives to choose between, namely the copper cable for telephony and
cable-TV. The majority of the households in Europe use the telephone line (through
modem or ISDN) to reach the ISP. Thus, the alternatives are limited with regard to
local access, and the firms that control the local access network are in possession of a
central component. Moreover, the dominating providers of local access are also to a
large extent vertically integrated into the ISP segment. In Norway, for instance, the
incumbent telecommunication firm (Telenor) controls the most important local access
network in the country (through its copper network), and Telenor is also the largest
cable-tv provider. At the same time, Telenor is the largest retailer of Internet access.
The market power of the dominant telecommunication companies should not be
exaggerated, since they are subject to comprehensive regulation. Noteworthy, it is
only the telecommunication companies that are mandated to sell local access as an
input to independent retailers. Cable-TV companies do not face the same requirement,
and interestingly they have chosen not to sell local access as an input to independent
ISPs. Consequently, in this case broadband Internet access has to be bought directly
from the network owner. Hausman et al. (2001) analyze the implications of this
asymmetric regulation of telecommunication and the cable-TV network with focus on
the USA.
Regulation of the Internet Industry
The end-user market for Internet connectivity is currently unregulated in most
countries, while the input segment for local access is regulated both with respect to
price and quality. If the local bottleneck is eliminated, then head to head competition
8 In connection with this case, it should also be mentioned that WorldCom planned to merge with
Sprint (a major IBP) in year 2000, but that the EU stopped these plans.
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in the retail market mayensure that there is no need for regulation. Consequently,
regulation of the local access bottleneck may be sufficient to ensure competition in
the retail market. However, the fact that the end-user market is unregulated creates an
incentive for a vertically integrated provider of local access to discriminate against
rivals in the retail segments (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 2000).
The prevailing regulation regime of local access in Europe is cost-oriented, which
means that the incumbent is not allowed to charge higher access prices than those
reflecting its long-run marginal costs. The incumbent controlling the local telephone
network often uses three main arguments against cost-based regulation. The first
argument is that it is practically impossible to compute the long run marginal cost in
an industry involving large joint costs. The second argument is that the local access
network for telephony no longer constitutes a bottleneck, because cable-TV and
wireless networks are bypass opportunities for residential users. The third argument is
that cost oriented regulation will reduce the incumbent's dynamic incentives to invest
in infrastructure and product innovation. The current sector specific cost-based price
regulation for local access is often seen as a "hands-on" ex ante approach, while the
competition rules are seen as an ex post regulation approach. This distinction may be
misleading, since the current cost-based sector regulation de facto will often appear as
ex post regulation (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Hausman (1997)).
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Outline of the Thesis
In this section I briefly summarize the remaining chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 1: Strategic Investments with Spillovers, Verlicallntegration and
Foreclosure in the Broadband Access Market
by Øystein Foros
In this paper I analyze a market structure where a vertically integrated firm controls
an essential input for retail providers of Internet connectivity. The vertically
integrated firm may undertake an investment that increases the quality of the input
(upgrading to broadband). In the retail market the vertically integrated firm competes
with an independent firm that buys access as an input, and I analyse the effect of an
access price regulation on investment incentives and welfare. There is only one
available instrument for the regulator - the access price - and the regulator has limited
commitment ability regarding the access price. Hence, the access price is set after the
investment in network quality. Such a regulation may have negative effects on the
investment incentives, and I show that the total effect on consumer surplus and
welfare critically depends on whether the vertically integrated firm or the rival firm
has higher ability, to offer value-added services (broadband services) than the rival
firm.
When the rival has higher ability to offer value-added services, both firms will be
present in the market even without access price regulation. A binding regulation on
access price will reduce the cost of the most efficient firm, in this case the rival. For a
given level of investment this will obviously increase consumer surplus, since the
firm with highest ability to offer value-added services will increase its output.
However, the vertically integrated firm's investment incentive is reduced, and a lower
investment will hurt both firms. As long as the cost of investment is not too convex,
access price regulation lowers consumer surplus.
If the vertically integrated firm's retail subsidiary has the highest ability to offer
value-added services when the input quality is improved, the rival will always be
foreclosed by a high access price without access price regulation. I analyse two cases.
First, I assume that the difference in the two firms' ability to offer value-added
services is not too high. Then the rival's quantity increases when the investment
13
increases for a given access price. The conventional trade-off between increasing
competition and investment incentives is still present. I show that, similar to above, as
long as the cost of investment is not too high, the access regulation lowers consumer
surplus. Hence, with not too convex costs the downstream monopoly results in higher
consumer surplus than a regulated duopoly.
Second, I assume that the vertically integrated firm's ability to offer value-added
services is significantly higher than the rival's ability to use the improved quality of
the input. Then, for a given access price, the rival's quantity decreases when the
investment increases. In such a case an access price regulation eliminates the
vertically integrated firm's ability to use the access price as a foreclosure tool. But
now there exists an alternative tool. The vertically integrated firm may use
overinvestment as a mechanism to drive the rival out of the market. In this case the
regulator's incentives to use an access price regulation may change fundamentally. A
restrictive access price regulation gives the rival low input costs, and, hence, the
vertically integrated firm must invest more to induce the rival to exit. The regulator
can then encourage the firm to increase the investment with a restrictive access price
regulation. If the vertically integrated firm's investment in an unregulated monopoly
is too low seen from the regulator's point of view, it will also be optimal to do so.
Moreover, an access price regulation may be optimal even if it does not result in
entry.
Chapter 2: Access Pricing, Quality Degradation and Foreclosure in the
Internet (forthcoming in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, 22(1),59-
84)
by Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Lars Sørgard
In this chapter we focus on the interplay between providers of the complementary
inputs local and global access and on the timing of the interaction between the
domestic regulator and the market players. We compare a situation where the
domestic regulator credibly commits himself to a given price policy for local access
before the input suppliers choose their wholesale prices with a situation where the
domestic regulator cannot commit to such a policy. The former we refer to as ex ante
regulation, while the latter we refer to as ex post regulation.
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An increasingly larger share of the traffic on the telephone network is associated with
Internet traffic, while the share of traditional voice telephony is decreasing. Combined
with the fact that most of the Internet traffic. goes through the USA this may have
some implication for the optimal regulation of local access prices in Europe. In
particular, it should be noted that access to the global Internet backbone is an essential
input that together with the transatlantic telephone cables is controlled by a few large
American companies. Local ISPs that sell Internet connectivity to end-users have to
purchase access to the global infrastructure as an input, which is complementary to
other essential inputs. Based on this we show that a cost-based regulation of local
access possibly is detrimental to national welfare outside the USA, since it may imply
excessive profit shifting to American firms. The reason for this is simply that the
American firms may increase the price of global access if European regulators reduce
the price of local access. A regulation policy that seeks to maximize national welfare
may therefore imply that the regulator commits itself to set relatively high prices on
local access, even if this should reduce domestic competition.
The distinction between ex post and ex ante regulation is potentially important when
we consider the effects of domestic regulation of the local access price. Ex post
regulation may actually reduce welfare compared to market equilibrium. The reason
for this is that the foreign firms are aware of the fact that the regulator ex post has an
incentive to set the price of local access equal to long-run incremental costs. This in
tum gives the foreign firms incentives to set relatively high prices on access to the
global backbone. If the regulator can commit itself to set a relatively high access
price, on the other hand, the foreign firms may have incentives to set relatively low
prices. This is due to the fact that local and global access are complements; the higher
the price of one of these inputs, the greater the incentives to reduce the price of the
other input. This is the opposite ofwhat would be the case between substitutes, where
a price increase by one firm typically will be followed by a price increase also by the
other firm.
The fact that a strict price regulation may be detrimental to welfare because it leads
foreign firms to set higher prices raises the question of whether there is a need for
some kind of supranational regulation of global access prices. The problem, however,
is that many ofthese firms are vertically integrated into the end-user market. Thereby
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they may have incentives to implement quality-reducing actions towards downstream
competitors. In the case of IBPs, for instance, it seems difficult to impose quality
restrictions. We show that an international regulation may increase welfare, but only
if the global access price is set so high that the firms do not have incentives to
foreclose the rivals.
Analogous to Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000) and Dogan (2001) we assume that the
IBPs have market power when they offer global backbone access to regional ISPs. In
contrast Laffont, Marcus, Rey and Tirole ( 2001 a, 2001 b) assume that there exists
perfect competition between the IBPs.
Chapter 3: Competition and Compatibility among Internet Service Providers
(reprintfrom Information Economics and Policy, 2001,13(4),411-425)
by Øystein Foros and Bjørn Hansen
We analyze the incentives for competing ISPs to become compatible, and in the
model we assume that there are two ISPs competing in a Hotelling framework were
the services are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. The firms' locations
are exogenously given at the extremes of the Hotelling line. A two-stage game is
played by the two firms. At stage 1 they choose the degree of compatibility (or the
interconnection quality) between their networks. At stage 2 they simultaneously set
their prices (subscription fees). There are two effects when increasing the degree of
compatibility: First, the price-effect is positive for both firms even if one of the firms
have a larger market share due to vertical differentiation. The reason for this is that
higher degree of compatibility increases consumers' valuation. Second, the market-
share effect, which has opposite sign for a small and a large network. If the degree of
compatibility is imperfect, the network size may start to matter when the consumers
choose between the two ISPs, and the bigger firm will gain a competitive advantage
when the degree of compatibility is less than perfect. In the present model the price
effect dominates the market share effect as long as we have market sharing between
the two firms. Hence, as long as the cost of compatibility is not to high the ISPs have
incentives to set a high interconnection quality, because this reduces the intensity of
the price competition.
Our result that vertically differentiated firms do not differ in their incentives with
respect to compatibility is in contrast to the result in Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000).
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Cremer et al. extend the model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) in order to analyze
compatibility incentives in a context with competition between two !BPs that have
each their base of installed customers. They show that if one IBP has a larger base of
installed customers than the other, the bigger firm will always have lower incentives
to become compatible compared to the smaller rival. Our paper and the paper by
Cremer et al. have similar timing structure, but Cremer et al. assume Cournot
competition while we assume competition il la Hotelling in stage 2. Roson (2002)
compares our paper and the paper by Cremer, Rey and Tirole. He argues that the
driving force behind the different results with respect to compatibility incentives is
that the market size is fixed in our paper while the market size is variable in Cremer et
al. (2000). However, as far as I can see, the fixed market size in our model is not the
most important determinant for the result that both firms agree upon the degree of
compatibility in our model. The main difference between our model and Cremer et al.
in this respect is the following. In our paper the degree of vertical differentiation
between the firms is independent of the degree of compatibility. In contrast, in
Cremer et al. the degree of vertical differentiation is a function of the degree of
compatibility, such that if there is complete compatibility, there will be no vertical
differentiation (quality difference) between the firms. If we use the same assumption
as Cremer et al., the firm with a quality advantage would have lower incentives to
become compatible than the rival in our paper too,"
Chapter 4: Price Competition and Interconnection Quality in the Market for
Digital Network Services
by Øystein Foros
I combine elements from Ulph and Vulkan (2000) and Foros and Hansen (2001) - the
previous article in this thesis. Ulph and Vulkan (2000) show in a one-stage game
without network effects that there are two effects of using first-degree price
discrimination under Hotelling competition. The first is the effect of the conventional
monopoly analysis of first-degree price discrimination - the enhanced surplus
extraction effect. The second effect is that the firms will compete consumer by
9 Other analysis that focus on the relationship between IBPs include Milgrom et al. (2000), Besen et al.
(200 l), Laffont et al. (2001 a, 2001 b), and Little and Wright (200 l).
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consumer when they use first-degree price discrimination - the intensified
competition effect.
In the first part of the paper the pricing mechanisms are exogenously given, and I
compare the following three cases; (i) both firms set a linear price, (ii) both firms use
first-degree price discrimination, and (iii) one firm sets a linear price and one firm
uses first-degree price discrimination. I analyse a two-stage game where the firms
choose the degree of compatibility prior to the price competition. The timing structure
is similar to Foros and Hansen (2001), but I investigate the effects on the
compatibility choice of different pricing mechanisms. I show that when the firms use
symmetric pricing mechanisms they will agree upon complete compatibility as long
as the cost of a compatibility agreement is not too high. In contrast, if the firms use
asymmetric price mechanisms both firms will choose low compatibility even if the
compatibility agreements are costless.
In contrast to the existing literature, that focuses on the fact that the larger firm has
lower incentives to become compatible than the smaller one (e.g. Katz and Shapiro
(1985) and Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000)), low degree of compatibility may be a
result of asymmetric pricing mechanisms. Moreover, I show that the network effects
will intensify competition such that the price will be set below costs for the consumers
that are relatively indifferent between the two suppliers (i.e. consumers located in the
middle of the Hotelling line). The observation that network services are sold below
costs is usually explained by penetration pricing, where a firm may find it profitable
to set the price below costs in one period in order to obtain a critical mass.
In the second part of the paper I endogenize the choice of pricing mechanism - i.e.
whether the firms will implement first-degree price discrimination mechanisms or not.
When the costs of compatibility are negligible, I find that there will be multiple
equilibria. However, as long as the firms are able to coordinate on the Pareto-superior
outcome, both firms set linear prices and complete compatibility. This will be the case
regardless of whether pricing mechanism is set prior to compatibility or the two
choices are taken simultaneously. When the cost of compatibility is high, such that the
firms always choose to be incompatible, the outcome where both firms use price
discrimination may be a unique equilibrium.
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Chapter 5: The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and
Geographical Coverage (forthcoming Journal of Regulatory Economics)
by Øystein Foros and Hans Jarle Kind
Broadband access is the last mile of the telecommunication network, and it is an
essential component in order to offer broadband Internet connectivity. A key
technological feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to
connect consumers in rurallocations than in urban locations. In an unregulated market
we should therefore expect that the price of access to broadband would be higher in
rural locations than in urban locations. This is true independent of whether the market
is served by a monopoly or by several competing firms. There are political concerns
that peripheral locations will be harmed unless broadband access providers are
required to charge the same price for the same service in all locations that they cover
(uniform prices). However, even though there may be implicit or explicit political
requirements of uniform prices, the actual price level will hardly be regulated.
Instead, as in other industries, governments seek to prevent unduly high prices by
inviting several firms to compete. Some implications of this policy mix are discussed
in this paper.
First, it should be noted that the socially optimal regional coverage may fall if there is
a requirement of uniform pricing. The intuition for this runs as follows: The fact that
it is relatively inexpensive to serve consumers in locations with a high population
density indicates that also the access price should be low. However, a low price
induces too high demand in peripheral locations, where the real costs of providing
broadband access are high. In order to reduce the magnitude of the latter effect, it is
socially optimal not to serve some of the least populated areas. This clearly indicates
that uniform pricing may be a poor regional policy.
Second, increased competition need not improve welfare if there is a requirement of
uniform pricing. While a monopolist will still have incentives to set the same regional
coverage as the social planner, the coverage level decreases if there is competition.
Competition reduces prices, but herein lies, in a sense, also the problem: due to the
convexity of the cost function, the lower market price makes it less profitable to serve
peripheral locations. Competition therefore implies that the regional coverage falls to
a sub-optimal level, and this negative welfare effect is more likely to dominate the
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larger the number of firms that offer broadband access. Consequently, welfare may be
lower with free entry than if the market is served by a monopolist.
The fact that it is relatively more expensive to serve rural areas than urban areas is not
unique for the broadband access technology. There is a similar cost structure also for,
e.g., postal services and third generation mobile telephone systems (UMTS in
Europe). In some countries (like France, Norway and Sweden) the governments have
specified a minimum regional coverage by the firms that are granted UMTS licenses,
and proposals have been advanced to specify similar requirements for firms providing
broadband access. In an extension of the basic model we therefore assume that the
government is able to set a binding coverage requirement prior to downstream
competition between the firms, and show that this has a positive effect on aggregate
consumer surplus. More surprisingly, this policy may also increase the profit level of
the firms. The reason for this is that the regulator, by acting as a first-mover, solves a
co-ordination problem; the oligopolistic firms would prefer the same regional
coverage as the one chosen by a hypothetical monopolist, but this does not constitute
an equilibrium in a free market economy. Thus, by requiring the firms to build out to
larger areas the government may actually be able to increase both the profitability of
the firms and the geographical coverage. This suggests that a requirement of uniform
prices alone may be bad policy; it should be combined with a requirement of
geographical coverage too.
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Abstract
We analyse competition between two firms (ISPs) in the retail market for broadband access. One of the firms is
vertically integrated and controls the input market for local access. The vertically integrated firm undertakes an
investment that increases the quality of the input (upgrading to broadband). The retailers' ability to offer value-
added services when the 'input quality is improved differs. We analyse the effect of an access price regulation
that is set after the investment. The access price regulation may have negative effects on investment incentives,
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interplay between a facility-based vertically
integrated firm and an independent competitor in the retail market for broadband Internet
connectivity. The latter firm buys local access as an input from the former firm. The vertically
integrated firm undertakes an investment (broadband upgrades) that increases the quality of
the input. We assume that the regulator has only one instrument available, an access price
regulation for the input sold to the independent rival.l The retail market is assumed to be
unregulated.' Furthermore, we assume that the access price is set after the investment but
prior to retail market competition since the regulator has limited commitment ability. Both the
timing structure and the one-sided regulation of the input segment correspond to the dominant
regulatory paradigm in the EU and the USA (Laffont and Tirole, 2000, Hausman, 1997, and
Cave and Prosperetti, 2001). Installation of fiber in the local access network will be a
substantial, lumpy, and irreversible investment, and the economic life of the investment will
be longer than the regulation contract used for access prices (Hausman, 1997)_3
The access price regulation may reduce investment incentives, and the main message of this
paper is that the total welfare effect of access price regulation critically depends on which
firm has the highest ability to transform input to output. The quality of the input component
sold from the integrated firm is the same for both retailers, but the retailers may differ in their
ability to offer value-added services (broadband services such as interactive video)." Except
for the case where the independent firm has the highest ability to use the improved input
quality, the integrated firm will foreclose the rival from the market through the access price in
an unregulated environment. However, this is not a sufficient condition to ensure that an
access price regulation improves consumer surplus and total welfare. If the retailers do not
differ too much with respect to their ability to offer value-added services when the input
l See Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Armstrong (2001) for comprehensive overviews of access price theory and
practice. Cave and Mason (2001) give an extensive overview of the market structure and regulation in the
Internet.
2 See Laffont and Tirole (2000) for a discussion.
3 Price cap regulations in telecommunication do not exceed five years, and other types of access price regulation
are usually set for a shorter period. In contrast to the present paper, the literature on price caps typically focuses
on incentives for cost-reducing activities within the regulatory contract.
4 The independent firm may be anything from the geeks in the garage to AOL Time Warner. Compared to the
facility-based vertically integrated firm, those firms' ability to offer value-added services will obviously vary a
lot. The integrated firm's retailer may have an advantage in using the improved input quality due to economies
of scope from integration. In contrast, ifthe independent retailer is a firm like AOL Time Warner, it may have an
advantage compared to the integrated firm due to its experience from other markets.
26
quality is improved, we show that access price regulation reduces the vertically integrated
firm' s investment incentives. An access price regulation lowers consumer surplus and total
welfare as long as the cost of investment is not too convex. If the vertically integrated firm's
ability to offer value-added services is much higher than the independent rival, an increase in
the investment will reduce the quantity offered by the independent retailer. An access price
regulation still eliminates the vertically integrated firm's ability to use the access price as a
foreclosure tool, but now the integrated firm may use overinvestment as an alternative tool to
drive the rival out of the market.
Today the majority of residential consumers use their telephone lines for the last mile of
narrowband Internet connectivity, and by upgrading their local networks the
telecommunication providers are able to increase the speed of communication.' The high up-
front investments of new wire line facilities, and the possibility of increasing the capacity and
quality of existing local telephony and cable-tv networks, indicate that telephone companies
and the cable-tv-companies that already have installed wires to homes, will control the
segment for broadband local access to residential consumers (Mackie-Mason, 1999).6 In the
current regulation only the telephone access provider is mandated to supply local access as an
input to non-facility based rivals in the retail market. Therefore, the telephony incumbent has
been the only provider of local access as an input to independent ISPs7. Hence, given the
existing asymmetry in regulation of the telecommunication and the cable-tv technologies (see
Hausman et al., 2001), the present model only fits for services offered by the
telecommunication incumbents.8
5 Measured by bits per second (bps). A conventional voice telephone call needs approximately 10 kilo-bps. The
bandwidth requirement for broadband services will vary a lot, and it also varies between incoming and outgoing
capacity. Compression technologies may reduce the bandwidth requirements considerably, but in order to
support e.g. two interactive high-quality tv channels several mega-bps are needed. Current standard modem
technology gives access speed of 56 kbps. In Europe, however, the penetration of ISDN is higher. ISDN access
speed is no more than 128kbps. The upgrading technologies both for cable-tv and telephone lines should give
access speed from a few hundred kbps to 10-20 mbps.
6 With focus on the US market several analysts have argued that the cable-tv-providers have an advantage over
the local telephone providers in supplying broadband Internet access (see e.g. Mackie-Mason, 1999, and
Faulhaber and Hogendorn, 2000). The situation seems to be different in Europe (Roche et al., 2001). There may
be several reasons for this difference. First, there is high penetration of cable-tv in the US compared to many
European countries. Second, and probably more important, the historical separation between local providers and
long distance providers oftelephony in the US between 1984 and 1996 (the AT&T break-up in 1984).
7 Internet Service Providers.
8 However, since the cable-tv providers face an analogous cost structure, the analysis will be relevant for
broadband access using cable-tv technology ifthe cable-tv providers are required to offer broadband access as a
wholesale product.
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We assume that the investment in higher speed of communication may be seen as an
unambiguous improvement of quality." The closer to homes the fiber is installed, the higher is
the quality.l" The trade-off between the distance the existing lines are used and the network
quality (speed) implies that the upgrading costs are convex in speed of communication.
In figure 1 we illustrate the Internet as a layered network with the physical network as the
bottom layer. Local access is obviously an essential input component for the ISPs. The
functions of the retail ISPs are to combine the components' local access, regional backbone
capacity and global backbone capacity, and they act as a kind of portal to the applications and
content in the Internet.
Applications and content
I Regional backbones
'--------'
Global backbones
Protocols for distribution of data
Local access
Figure 1: The layered structure of the Internet.
As described by Cave and Mason (2001) and Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000), the retail ISPs
must choose their regional and global backbone capacity before they serve the end users. This
implies capacity constraints that limit the number of consumers that can be served. Il With
respect to timing in our model it is reasonable to assume that the investment choice of speed
of communication in the access network is taken prior to the ISPs' choice of local and global
9 First, an increase in speed of communication gives access to new broadband services (e.g. interactive audio and
video). Second, consumers' value from conventional Internet services like web-browsing and e-mail increases
when the downloading speed increases. Third, today's dial-up Internet connectivity is only connected when the
user makes a phone call to her Internet Service Provider OSP). The broadband Internet connectivity systems are
designed to be available all the time ("always on").
10 There may be horizontal differentiation in this market (see Foros and Hansen, 2001). However, we make this
assumption in order to strengthen the foreclosure incentives of the vertically integrated firm in absence of access
price regulation.
Il Although the total number of retail ISPs is large, the market is quite concentrated since the largest providers
are controlling a large part of the market. Cave and Mason (2001) argue that the current narrowband dial-up
access limits the economies of scale in the ISP-segment. In the ISPs' local backbones the subscribers' traffic is
combined and carried over shared lines, and the ISPs use statistical aggregation in order to reduce the investment
in capacity. However, the capacity limits in the narrowband access are constraining the economies of scale from
traffic aggregation. The situation will be different with broadband access technologies, and this will probably
also increase the concentration in the ISP-segment (Cave and Mason, 2001). The regional ISPs usually have
long-term contracts with the providers of transatlantic-lines and access to the core global backbones (Cremer,
Rey and Tirole, 2000). To some extent, this will also give capacity constraints in the end-user market.
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backbone capacity. The interplay between local retail ISPs and the upstream providers of
global access will not be addressed in the present paper.
Our paper is related to the literature on strategic R&D investments with spillovers.V In
contrast to our model, there is no opportunity for access pricing by the investing firms in this
literature. The literature on R&D investments assumes that the investment leads to a reduction
in costs, and that there is a spillover that also reduces rivals costS.13
Rey and Tirole (1997) analyse the incentives for foreclosure by a vertically integrated firm
that controls an input bottleneck in an unregulated market, while Laffont and Tirole (2000)
discuss the incentives for non-price discrimination under access price regulation. Several
recent papers analyse non-price foreclosure in telecommunications and the Internet. Similar to
Economides (1998) we assume an exogeneously given market structure where an integrated
firm controls the input-segment, and there is an unregulated Cournot duopol in the retail
segment. Economides (1998) shows that the integrated firm will always use non-price
foreclosure towards the retail rival. This result contrasts with Weisman (1995, 1998), Sibley
and Weisman (1998), Weisman and Kang (2001) and Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2002), who
find that that the vertically integrated firm will be less inclined to degrade the quality of the
input if the profit margin is high in the input segment. In all these papers the foreclosure
activity is assumed to degrade the quality of the input sold to the rivals. In contrast, in our
model there is no opportunity to unilaterally reduce the quality of the input sold to the rival.
The quality level of the input is the same for both retailers. However, if the vertically
integrated firm has significantly higher ability to offer value-added services than the rival, the
integrated firm may commit itself to be more aggressive in the retail market by overinvesting
in network quality improvement.
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Foros and Kind (2002) analyse the broadband access
market with focus on the choice of target market (where to upgrade to broadband), while the
coverage decision is not analysed in the present paper. Another distinction from the present
12 Spence (1984) models spillovers from the investment, but he assumes that the firms are symmetric in their
ability to invest. The seminal paper on strategic R&D-investments and spillovers is D' Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988).
13 Investments that create positive demand side effects are not considered in this literature. Our formulation of
the demand side spillover is analogous to Wey (1999), who examines symmetric firms' incentives to invest in
compatibility under different degrees of co-operation. Note that the investment in network quality in the present
paper may be equivalent to Katz and Shapiro (1985) who see the network quality as the number of expected
consumers (see discussion below).
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paper is that these two papers develop models of competition among several facility-based
broadband access providers, while we analyse the interplay between a facility-based provider
and a non-facility-based rival. Hausman, Sidak, and Singer (2001) analyse the asymmetric
regulation of telecommunication providers and cable-tv providers regarding broadband
access. Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) analyse the merged AOL Time Warner's incentive to
engage into two types of non-price foreclosure in the broadband access market."
The article is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we give
some concluding remarks.
2 The model
In figure 2 we illustrate the stylised market structure analysed in the present paper. In the
retail market for Internet connectivity there is competition between a vertically integrated
firm's subsidiary and an independent ISP, ISP A and ISP B, respectively. The vertically
integrated firm controls the local access component. The broadband Internet connectivity is
sold by the two ISPs to end-users at a fixed subscription fee independent of actual usage (the
number of packets actually sent and received) and time connected. This also corresponds with
what we see in the market place for broadband Internet connectivity.i ' Hence, the ISPs face a
downward sloping demand curve. When the subscription fee is reduced (for given quality),
more consumers will subscribe. The usage by the infra-marginal consumers is, however, not
affected.I6 The access input price charged by the facility-based firm will be a fee for each
broadband subscriber served by the rival ISP (ISP B) over the vertical integrated firm's local
network facilities.
14 Rubinfeid and Singer (2001) show that AOL Time Warner has both the ability and incentive to engage into
non-price foreclosure. In contrast to our model, they do not consider investment incentives and access pricing,
and they assume that the foreclosure activity will reduce the quality of the component offered to the rival.
15 This is in contrast to the current narrowband Internet connectivity through modem where the user pays a time-
dependent price while he is connected. However, the current billing systems do not charge the users for their
actual usage of bandwidth.
16 Thus, we implicitly assume that the direct network effects are insignificant. In other words, for a given speed
of communication in the local loop, the willingness to pay is not affected by the number of consumers
subscribing to broadband in the same area. This assumption seems realistic if the user is mostly downloading
information from the US. However, if the user' s main use of broadband Internet connectivity is to have video-
conferences with neighbours this assumption is rarely fulfilled.
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Figure 2: The market structure
When the network quality is improved, the demand curves for both retailers shift outwards,
such that the willingness to pay for subscription increases for all potential consumers. If the
firms differ in their ability to use the quality improvement of the input, the market shares of
the firms will be affected.
We model a three-stage game with the following timing structure:
• Stage O:The vertically integrated firm chooses the investment level x.
• Stage 1: The vertically integrated firm or the regulator chooses the access price w to the
rival.
• Stage 2: The two retail firms compete it la Cournot.
As mentioned above, we focus on how "fat" pipes to homes the vertically integrated firm
chooses, and we do not consider the choice oftarget market (where to upgrade to broadband).
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Foros and Kind (2002) analyse the choice of target
market for a given quality level. The choice of coverage may in fact be set street-by-street,
and therefore be taken after the investment choice considered here. However, as long as the
integrated firm is obligated to offer broadband access as a wholesale product to the
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independent ISP in the entire target market, this will not alter the aspects analysed in the
present paper. 17
We assume Cournot competition in the retail market, and the quantity firms dump in the retail
market is interpreted as the number of subscriptions they sell. An assumption of Coumot
competition seems reasonable, since the retailers face capacity constraints in the regional and
the global backbones (see above and the discussion by Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and
Cremer et al. (2000)).18
Demand side
The investment at stage O is given by x. We see this investment as a quality improvement of
the local access input that increases the consumers' willingness to pay for broadband Internet
connectivity. How much the input quality improvement increases consumers' willingness to
pay for Internet connectivity depends on the retail firms' ability to transform input to output.
Hence, we have a demand side spillover from the local access provider to the retailers:
Subscript 1 and 2 indicate the facility-based and the non-facility-based firm, respectively. The
parameters PI and fJ2 are the demand side spillover from the facility-based firm to its own
subsidiary and the independent ISP, respectively." If fJI > P2' the vertically integrated firm
has higher ability to offer a value-added service from the investment than the non-facility
I7 However, an obligation to offer the input in the entire target market combined with an access price regulation
will probably reduce the coverage where the integrated fum chooses to upgrade to broadband. The reason for
this is that it reduces the revenue, but not the costs from serving a given region.
18 Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) assume that there is a capacity-constrained price game in the retail market
for broadband access, and that the conditions for the Kreps-Scheinkman result are fulfilled in their model. They
model a three-stage game where the coverage decision is taken in stage 1, stage 2 is the backbone capacity
choice, and in stage 3 firms choose prices. Hence, the investment choice analysed in the present paper may be
seen as a stage prior to the model analysed by Faulhaber and Hogendom. The two last stages of their game are
shown to be equivalent to a one-stage Cournot game. The result of Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) that a two-stage
game of capacity choice and then prices is the same as a one-stage Cournot game rests on very strong
assumptions. However, since there are rigid capacity constraints we assume that the Coumot competition
assumption seems more realistic than a Bertrand game in the retail market (see the discussion in Tirole, 1988,
chapter 5). A necessary condition to ensure the Kreps-Scheinkman conditions in our context is that the ISPs
simultaneously set the backbone capacity in a stage 2a, and that they thereafter compete in prices in a stage 2b.
19 The spillover is analogous to the spillover effect from R&D investment in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), among others. They assume process innovation, while we assume product innovation.
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based firm. In contrast, if P2 > PI' the non-facility based firm has the highest ability to
increase consumers' willingness to pay. We assume that PJ32 E[O,l].
The consumers have unit demands. We assume that the consumers are heterogenous in their
basic willingness to pay for Internet connectivity, but that they are homogenous in their
valuation of the improved network quality. Hence, consumers valuation of ISP i 's service is s
+ PiX, and s is distributed uniformly among the consumers. The consumer with the highest
willingness to pay has s equal to a. The demand structure is analogous to Katz and Shapiro
(1985) where the network quality depends on the number of expected consumers connected to
firm i.20
When Pi is the price charged by ISP i, a consumer of type s buys from ISP i if s + PiX - Pi>
S + P; X - P j (where i * j). If s + PiX - P I <O for both retailers, the consumer of type s will
not buy from any of them.
Thus, the inverse demand functions faced by the firms are:
PI =a, -ql -q2
P2 = a2 -ql -'q2
Note that the parameters Plxand P2X do not affect the slope of the inverse demand
functions, so that an increase in X implies parallel shifts in the demand functions. If P2 * PI'
there will be different magnitudes in the demand shifts.
Total production is Q = q, + q2 and net consumer surplus is:
cs = al - PI q + a2 - P2 q
2 I 2 2
In absence of the investment we assume that the services offered by the firms are identical.
For the existing network quality (absence of the investment), the ISPs offer access to
conventional PC-centric services like www and e-mail. For these services there exist known
20 In the Katz and Shapiro-model consumers value service i at S + v( q: ), where q: is the consumers'
expectations of the size of firm j' s network.
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and accepted standards, but the situation may change when new technology is irnplemented.i'
When the access network quality is upgraded, the ISPs may offer new TV-centric interactive
broadband services that are very different from conventional PC-centric services. Then, there
may be differences in their ability to offer such services due to economies of scope from
integration and/or different experience. As long as PI = P2 the end user services from the two
ISPs will be identical also when the investment is positive (x>O). Then the investment
increases the quality level of the retailers' end-user services by the same level. In contrast, if
fli > fl), then there will be a quality differential between the two retailers' services, and ISP i
will offer a higher quality than ISP j (where i, j= 1,2).
Supply side
Regarding the vertical integrated firm's cost structure in the upstream segment for local
access, we assume that cost per user is a constant marginal cost c. This cost is the same
irrespective of whether its own downstream subsidiary or the rival is serving the end-user. We
assume that the infrastructure quality, i.e. the investment level, does not have any effect on
the marginal cost c. The facility-based firm faces a quadratic network investment cost with
respect to investment, in higher speed (bandwidth) in the localloop, given by Cl (x) = (/JX2 /2.
The investment cost x is not related to each user; the investment is for every potential user.
For simplicity, the marginal costs of buying all other inputs than local access (regional and
global backbone capacity) are assumed to be the same for the two retailers, and normalised to
zero.
The profit functions for the firms are given by:
The vertically integrated firm is active in both the upstream and the retail segment, while the
non-facility based firm earns profit only in the retail segment. The parameter w is the access
price charged by the facility-based firm in the upstream segment.
Throughout we make the following assumption
21 See e.g. discussion by Shapiro and Varian (1998).
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Assumption 1:
The first two constraints state that each firm should have a non-negative profit. The third term
says that the vertically integrated firm must have a non-negative price cost margin on its sale
to the independent firm in the retail segment. The last term states that the investment must be
non- negative.
Welfare
The welfare function:
W =cs + Jr I + Jr 2
A benchmark
Let us consider a market context in absence of the investment in quality improvement (x=O).
In an unregulated market the facility-based firm chooses the access price in the upstream
market at stage 1. In a regulated market the regulator chooses the access price at stage 1. At
stage 2 the firms compete a la Cournot. In this context the results can be summarised in the
following lemma:
Lemma 1: If the vertically integrated firm does not invest in quality improvement (x=O), the
regulator sets the access price equal to marginal cost. If the access price is unregulated, the
vertically integrated firm sets an access price that forecloses the rival from the market. The
consumer surplus and total welfare level are higher under the access regulation regime
compared to the unregulated regime.
2.1 Retail market competition
We solve the model by backward induction and assume Cournot competition between the two
firms (the ISPs) in the retail market for broadband Internet connectivity.
Equilibrium quantities in the competitive segment are:
q; =[(a-c)+(w-c)+x(2PI-P2)]/3
q; =[(a-c)-2(w-c)+x(2P2 -PI)]/3
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Until otherwise stated, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: 2P, - Pj ~ Owhere i,} = 1,2,i"*}
Assumption 2 ensures that the difference in ability to offer value-added services between the
retail firms is not too high. When 2PI - fl2 ~ O, the rival's quantity is non-decreasing by the
investment in x for given access price w. Hence, the vertically integrated firm cannot use the
investment as an alternative foreclosure under access price regulation. In section 2.5 we
modify this assumption and assume 2fl2 - flI < O. Then the vertically integrated firm may use
overinvestment as an alternative foreclosure tool under access price regulation.
2.2 Unregulated access price
The vertically integrated firm sets the access price at stage 1, and stage 2 is as above.
2.2.1 Stage 1:
The objective function for the facility-based firm at stage 1 is:
The first order condition with respect to w gives the equilibrium access price at stage l:
If we insert for w * into the equilibrium quantities, we have the following:
q~ =[S(a-c)+x(7PI-2P2)]110
Proposition 1: Let us assume no regulation of the access price. The condition fll > PI is
necessary and sufficient to ensure that the downstream rival is active in the market.
From Lemma 1 we know that in absence of the investment (x=O) the independent firm is
foreclosed from the market. In contrast, we see that under investment in quality improvement
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(x>O) the independent retail firm will be active in the market if it has higher ability to use the
improved input quality such that /32 > /31 .
2.2.2 Stage O:
Foreclosure:
From Proposition I it follows that as long as PI ~ P2' the vertically integrated firm will use
the access price in the next stage to practice foreclosure towards the rival (firm 2). Hence, in
the case where it is optimal to practice foreclosure it chooses the investment level as a
downstream monopoly. Downstream monopoly quantity is q,: = O.5[a - c + /3IX], and the
objective function for the facility-based firm when it sets x as a downstream monopolist is
Jr~ = (qnY - 0.5tpX2 . Superscript m indicates downstream monopoly.
The first order condition with respect to x gives the following investment level:
The second order condition is fulfilled as long as A,:, >0.22 Inserting for x: gives the
following equilibrium quantity:
• (a-c)(/)
qm = 2(/)- /3i
Market sharing:
From Proposition I we know that both retail firms are active as long as P2 > /31' The
objective function for the facility-based firm when it sets x is:
max zr, =(ql)2 +(W-C)q2 -0.5tpX2
x
We insert for w", q; and q;. Then the first order condition with respect to x gives the
following investment level:
22 At the investment stage (stage O) the second order condition ensures that the cost parameter (/) is sufficiently
high, such that the investing firm will not make an infinite investment in quality improvement.
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The second order condition is fulfilled as long as A* >O. Comparing the investment level
under foreclosure (i.e. /31~ /32) with the market sharing equilibrium (/32 > /31)' we find the
following (see appendix):
Lemma 2: Let us assume no regulation of the access price. For a given level of /31 the
investment will be higher under market sharing (i.e. /32> /31) than under foreclosure, (i.e.
/31~ /32) as long as the second order conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, the investment and
the rival 's quantity increase with the rival 's ability to use the quality improvement when
/32> /31 ' i.e. that dx' / d/32>O and dq; / d/32 >O .
Without access price regulation, the vertically integrated firm may imitate the strategy in the
foreclosure case in the market sharing case as well. Hence, when the vertically integrated firm
chooses to serve the rival, this means that the profit by doing so is higher than the monopoly
outcome. When the rival is more efficient in using the improved quality of local
access,/32 > /31' the consumers have higher willingness to pay for the service from ISP 2 than
that from ISP l. Hence, it will be optimal to let the rival be active in the market in order to
capture some of the rent from ISP 2. The access price will, however, be set such that the
quantity offered by ISP 2 will be low in order to dampen the competition. Inserting for
x * gives the following total quantity:
The reason why the vertically integrated firm does not outsource the retail market to the more
efficient rival is the assumption of a linear access price. In contrast, if the vertically integrated
firm can use a two-part tariff for access, it will set a unit access price equal to the marginal
cost c, and then capture the monopoly profit of the more efficient rival (ISP 2) through the
fixed fee. In other words, ifthe network owner offers the two-part tariff T(q2) = Jr; + cq2' the
retail rival (ISP 2) makes no profit, and the upstream monopolist will achieve the same
outcome as if ISP 2 were its own subsidiary (see e.g. Rey and Tirole, 1997). In the present
paper we use the linear price assumption since this seems to be the business model the
majority of the telecommunications incumbents use in their wholesale service for broadband
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(see discussion by Petkovic and De Coster, 2000). So why is that the network owners do not
outsource their retail activity through non-linear pricing? First, it may be due to economies of
scope such that J31> J32' Second, outsourcing the retail market activity may imply that the
network owner does not retain the bargaining power needed to offer such a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the retail monopolist (ISP2). Third, if the wholesale segment is regulated, while the
retail segment is not (see also footnote 24 below), the network owner may not want to
outsource the unregulated activity.
2.3 Access price regulation
The government may regulate w to maximise welfare. In principle, the regulator can act as a
first-mover and set w before the facility-based firm sets x. Such a commitment to ex ante
regulation may, however, not be credible. We assume that the regulator has no ability to
regulate the access price ex ante of the investment, and, hence, the only difference in the game
from the complete unregulated regime is that the regulator decides the access price at stage 1
instead of the vertically integrated firm.
2.3.1 Stage 1:
The welfare function may be written as
( + )2 2W = ql q2 +q2 +q2 +(w-c)q _ qJX
2 2 I 2 2
The first term is the consumer surplus. The second term is the profit by the independent firm.
The last three terms are the vertically integrated firm' s profit.
The regulator sets the access price wafter the investment in x has taken place. The first order
condition with respect to w gives the regulated access price marginr '
w-c=-(a-c)+x(4J31-5J32)
When (w - c) <O, it is a violation of the constraint that w ~ c. Then we have the following
result (given the assumption that w ~ c):
23 The second order condition is fulfilled.
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Proposition 2: Let us assume regulation of the access price. A necessary and sufficient
condition to ensure that it is optimal for the regulator to set access price equal to marginal
cost, (wr=c), is -(a-c)+x(4Pl-SP2) <O.
In this section we assume that the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2 is
fulfilled, such that optimal regulated accessprice will be set to marginal cost (wr = c) at stage
1. Superscript r indicates regulated access price.i"
Inserting for w=c into the equilibrium quantities from stage 2 gives:
Qr =[2(a-c)+x(Pl +P2)]/3
2.3.2 Stage O:
Now the facility-based firm has no revenue from the upstream market, and the objective
function for the facility-based firm is:
The first order condition with respect to x gives the following investment level:
Inserting for x' into Qr gives:
24 Note that if the regulator were allowed to set the access price below the marginal cost (w<c), it would have
done that in order to correct for the imperfect competition in the retail market. If the regulator may use a two-part
tariff, it could set w<c, and still ensure through the fixed fee that the upstream unit of the integrated firm has
non-negative profit. In this case, the regulator could use a unit-price w below marginal cost c in order to correct
for the imperfect competition in the retail market.
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From Lemma 2 we know that under market sharing in the unregulated case the investment
level increases when /32 increases. In contrast to the unregulated case, we now see that the
investment level decreases in the rival's ability to offer value-added services as the input
quality is improved, since dx' / d/32 <O (see proof of Proposition 3 in appendix). Since the
facility-based firm has no revenue from its upstream sale, it sees the advantage of the non-
facility-based firm from the investment as a pure spillover. The higher the non-facility based
firm's ability to use the investment, the higher the spillover from the investment to the rival.
Not surprisingly, the higher the spillover, the lower the incentives to make an investment.
Moreover, from Lemma 2 we know that without regulation the rival' s quantity increases with
/32 under market sharing. Under access price regulation we find that:
The first term is positive and indicates that for a given investment level, the rival's quantity
increases when /32 increases. The second term indicates that an increase in /32 will have an
effect on the investment level and that this in turn will affect the quantity offered by the rival.
We know that dx' / d/32 < O and in this section we assume that (2/32 - /31) > O. Hence, the
second term is negative. This is due to the fact that for the vertically integrated firm the
parameter /32 is now seen as a pure spillover, which reduces the investment incentives. And
therefore, when the spillover increases, the incentives to invest will be reduced. The total
effect on the rival's quantity is then ambiguous.
Related to the quantity offered by the vertically integrated firm's retailer, we have that the
higher the spillover, the lower the retail quantity sold from the facility-based firm (such that
dq; / d/32 < O ). There are two effects leading to this result. First, the higher the spillover is,
the lower is the investment. When the investment is reduced, the facility-based firm lowers its
retail quantity. Second, since the quantities offered by the two rivals are strategic substitutes,
the facility-based firm reacts to an increase in the quantity from the rival by reducing its own
quantity (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). The second effect may be positive or
negative (see above), but the total effect on the vertically integrated firm's quantity from an
increase in /32 is negative.
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2.4 Comparison of results with and without access price regulation
The motivation behind an access price regulation is to prevent foreclosure and increase
competition such that welfare increases. Industry profit will be higher without regulation than
with regulation. Hence, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to intervene with an access
price regulation is that the consumer surplus increases compared to the case without
regulation. In order to compare the levels of consumer surplus with and without regulation we
must make a distinction between the case of foreclosure and the case of market sharing in the
unregulated market.
Foreclosure without regulation:
For simplicity we nowmake the following assumption:
In the access price regulation equilibrium, the vertically integrated firm has no profit from the
input segment. From assumption 2 we have that /32 ~ 0.5. Moreover, we assume that the cost
parameter rp is so high that the second order conditions are fulfilled, i.e. rp> rpc,,! =0.5 in this
case.
We have the following results for investment and consumer surplus with and without
regulation (see appendix):
Proposition 3: In the case where fl2 ~ fll == l we have the following results regarding
investment and consumer surplus:
i. the investment level is lower with than without access price regulation, i.e. that
r • OX -xm < .
ii. the consumer surplus is lower with than without regulation as long as the investment
cost is not too convex (such that q; +q; < q: ).
Hence, the parameter rp must be above a critical value to ensure that regulation improves
consumer surplus. Similarly, since industry profit is lower with than without regulation, we
find that the total welfare is lower with than without regulation when the investment cost is
not too convex. The critical value of rp that ensures that access price regulation improves
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welfare is higher than the critical value of (/J that ensures that regulation increases consumer
surplus.
In this case the vertically integrated firm has higher ability to transform input into output than
the rival. Then, if it is allowed to do so, it will prevent the rival from entering the market
through the access price. In order to ensure entry the regulator may then impose an access
price regulation that prevents the vertically integrated firm from practising foreclosure. The
regulator faces a classic trade-off between triggering competition and dampening investment
incentives. Moreover, this trade-off implies that it may be better if the rival has significantly
lower ability to offer value-added services than the vertically integrated firm since this will
reduce the spillover from the investment. Put differently, the closer fl2 is to J31, the higher (/J
has to be to ensure that the consumer surplus is higher with than without regulation. Thus we
have:
Corollary 1: In the case where 0.5< fl2 ~ flI == l, a lower fl2 makes it more likely that
consumer surplus is higher with than without access price regulation.
This gives rise to a paradox. It is more likely that it is optimal for the regulator to ensure entry
by access price regulation if firm 2 has low ability to offer value-added services compared to
the vertically integrated firm. Usually, we see that the potential entrants are arguing in the
opposite direction. They argue that the regulator should encourage entry since they have at
least the same ability to offer value-added services as the incumbent. Put differently, in the
present model it may be better for the regulator to allow for an inefficient entrant than having
an efficient retail monopoly.
Market sharing without regulation:
Both firms are active in the market also in the market equilibrium, and we make the following
assumption:
We compare the results with and without regulation when the rival has the highest ability to
transform the input to output, and we still assume that (/J > (/Jerit =0.5. Then we have the
following results (see appendix):
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Proposition 4: In the case where fli < /32 == 1 we have the following results regarding
investment and consumer surplus:
i. the investment level is lower with than without access price regulation, i.e. that
x' -x' < O .
ii. the consumer surplus is lower with than without regulation as long as the investment
cost is not too convex (such that q; +q; < q; + q;) .
As in the previous case total welfare is also lower with than without regulation when the
investment cost is not too convex.
For fli close to 0.5 the welfare loss from dampened competition in the case without access
price regulation will be high. The loss from dampened competition, for a given investment
level, in the unregulated regime may be separated into two effects. First, there will be a loss
due to the fact that total quantity is reduced when the rival pays an access price higher than
the marginal cost. This loss is higher the lower fli is compared to fl2 (which is equal to one).
Second, there will be a loss due to the fact that the less effective firm 1 will serve most of the
market. For a given investment level, these two competition effects will imply that the
consumer surplus and total welfare may be enhanced by access price regulation. However,
access price regulation will reduce the investment incentives of the vertically integrated firm.
For fli =0.5 the investment is zero. However, for fli close to 0.5 the pro-competitive effects of
regulation dominate the negative investment incentives effect even if the cost parameter cp is
low. As in the previous case (Corollary 1) it is more likely that the consumer surplus is
higher under access price regulation compared to the case without regulation if the difference
between the firms' ability to offer value-added services is large.
2.5 Access price regulation and non-price foreclosure
In this section we analyse whether the vertically integrated firm may have incentives to
overinvest as an alternative foreclosure tool when assumption 2 is altered. Until now we have
assumed that the rival firm's quantity increases when the investment increases for a given
access price (assumption 2). In contrast, we now assume that 2fl2 - fli <O, such that the rival
will reduce its quantity when the investment increases for a given access price (since
dq; / dx <O in stage 2). For simplicity, we make the following assumption:
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Assumption 3: /31 = 1 > 2/32 > O
At stage Othe vertically integrated firm sets x, and at stage 1 the vertically integrated firm or
the regulator sets the access price. We know that for low values of f32, it may be optimal for
the regulator to set the access price above marginal cost (see above). For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the optimal regulated access price at stage 1 is w ~ c. At stage 2
the firms compete å la Coumot when both firms are active in the market. The strategic
investment game has the timing structure analysed by Dixit (1980).
The stage 2 quantities given that w ~ c are q~= (a - 2c +w + x(2 - /32)) / 3 and
q; = (a + c - 2w + X(2f32 -1)) /3. We analyse whether the vertically integrated firm (the first-
mover) chooses to invest to foreclose the rival (deterrence of entry) or to share the market
with the rival (accommodation of entry).
Blockaded entry
The monopoly investment given assumption 3 is x;, = (a - c) / (2rp -1) . If we insert x;, into
q; we find that entry IS blockaded with the monopoly investment when
/3c =f32 ~(a-c)(1-·rp)+(w-c)(2rp-1)/(a-c). The question is whether the vertically
integrated firm will overinvest in x when f!_c < f3l ~ 0.5 .
Entry deterrence through non-price foreclosure:
The effect of the investment x on the rival' s profit is
The first term is the direct effect of x on the rival's profit, and it is positive. The second term
is the strategic effect, which will be negative. An increase in x increases the second stage
choice of q., Since the quantities offered by the two firms are strategic substitutes, an
increase in ql willlower the profit margin for ISP 2.
When assumption 3 is met (2/32 -l <O), the strategic effect dominates the direct effect. To
foreclose the rival the vertically integrated firm should overinvest such that q{ = O
(superscript/indicates foreclosure by overinvestment):
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l l -a+2w-cq2 =0:::>X =----2{32-1
For x=O we assume that both firms are active in the market, such that a - 2w + c> O. Then it
follows that for P2 < 0.5:
dx! = 2 <O
2{3?-1
and
dx' -2(-a+2w-c)
-= >0
dP2 (2P2 _1)2
For a lower local access price, the vertically integrated firm's response is to increase the
investment if it wants to deter entry. The higher P2 (but lower than 0.5), the higher the
investment must be to enhance a given reduction in the rival's quantity.
When the rival is foreclosed, the vertically integrated firm sets the monopoly quantity in stage
2. Inserting for xl we find that q( =[(a-c)(p2 -1)+(w -c)]/(2P2 -1). For P2< 0.5 we
see that:
dq{ 1= <O
dW 2P2-1
Hence, a restrictive access price regulation may be effective even if no inputs are sold to the
rival. When the access price increases, the vertically integrated firm must overinvest less
compared to the monopoly investment level. If we insert for investment level and quantity
offered by the vertically integrated firm, we find the profit and the welfare functions under
foreclosure:
WI = Jf{ + 0.5( q{ )2
Now it can be shown that:
46
dWI (a - C)(3P2 - 3+ 2<p)+ (W - c)(3 - 4<p)=dW (2132 _1)2
When this is negative, we see that an access price regulation may be effective even if the rival
is still foreclosed from the market. The reason is that an access price regulation forces the
vertically integrated firm to increase the investment if it wants to foreclose the rival. The
investment is an investment in quality, and we know that a monopolist may have too high or
too low incentives to offer quality seen from the social planner' s point of view (Spence,
1975).
We now check that in this particular setting the monopolist offers too low quality
(investment) seen from the regulator's point of view. Given entry deterrence, we have non-
price foreclosure such that q{ = q; = O . The vertically integrated firm chooses the monopoly
quantity in stage 2, i.e. q;' = (a - c + x) /2. As long as q2 = O, the welfare level will be given
by W = (3q]2- qJX2)/2. Thus we have dW / dx = (3q] (dq, / dx) - qJX). We know that without
access price regulation x: = (a - c) / (2<p- 1) . Inserting for we find that
dW/dx _. =(a-c)<p/(2(2<p-l))>0.
X-Xm
Even if q{ = q; = O , the welfare will increase if the regulator through a binding access price
regulation gives the vertically integrated firm an incentive to increase the investment
compared to x:,.
Proposition 5: Let us assume that p] == 1 > 2P2 > O and that there is a binding access price
regulation. Then we have the following results:
i. The vertically integrated firm overinvests compared to the monopoly equilibrium
without access price regulation, i.e. xl - x: > O .
ii. When the unconstrained monopoly underinvests seen from the regulator 's point of
view, access price regulation increases welfare since it forces the vertically integrated
firm to invest more.
iii. Jf the rival has a low ability to offer value-added services compared to the vertically
integrated firm, the rival will be foreclosed from the market both with and without
access price regulation, i.e. q{ = q; = O .
Ifthe vertically integrated firm chooses not to foreclose the rival (accommodation of entry) it
will set x to maximise its own profit. We interpret f3c as the critical value for whether
foreclosure is optimal or not. Hence we have three intervals analogous to Dixit (1980):
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1. Blockaded entry when zi, :s; ft: The rival is blocked from entry by the monopoly
investment level <.
11. Deterrence of entry when pc < P2 < fl" < 0.5: The vertically integrated firm
overinvests to foreclose the rival.
111. Accommodation of entry when 0.5> P2 ~ pc: Then it is more profitable for the
vertically integrated firm to set x that maximises it's own profit, even if the rival is
active in the market.
We see that the outcome may be foreclosure even if the access price is regulated. This is in
contrast to the previous sections where both firms were active in the market under access
price regulation. Note that the main difference from the previous case is that PI > 2,82. The
literature on non-price foreclosure typically focuses on the detrimental impact on welfare
when an access price regulation gives incentives to extend the untapped market power by
non-price methods. In contrast, in our context, it may increase welfare.
3 Some concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed a market structure where a vertically integrated firm controls
an essential input for retail providers of Internet connectivity. The vertically integrated firm
may undertake an investment that increases the quality of the input (upgrading to broadband).
In an unregulated retail market the vertically integrated firm competes with an independent
firm that buys access as an input. We analyse the effect of an access price regulation that is
imposed on the vertically integrated firm. Since an upgrade of the local access network to
broadband is an irreversible investment, we assume that the regulator has limited commitment
ability with respect to the access price. Hence, the access price is set after the investment, but
before retail competition.
We compare the access price regulation regime with the outcome without regulation. The
total effect on consumer surplus and welfare critically depends on whether the vertically
integrated firm has higher ability to offer value-added services (broadband services) than the
rival firm. If the retailers do not differ too much with respect to their ability to offer value-
added services, when the input is improved, we show that access price regulation reduces the
vertically integrated firm's investment incentives. Furthermore, an access price regulation
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lowers consumer surplus and total welfare as long as the cost of investment is not too convex.
In contrast, if the vertically integrated firm's ability to offer value-added services is much
higher than that of the independent rival, an increase in the investment level will reduce the
quantity offered by the independent retailer. The vertically integrated firm may then use
overinvestment as an alternative tool to drive the rival out of the market.
In our model the regulated access price will be set equal to or close to the marginal cost.
Hence, compared to the case without access price regulation the regulator removes most of
the vertically integrated firm's cost advantage in the retail market. If the retailers' ability to
offer value-added services is quite similar, then the independent firm will have higher profit
than the facility-based firm since the latter has to cover the investment costs. Put differently,
the access price regulation may imply a second-mover advantage. In the present paper we
have not focused on entry, but this feature of the regulation will probably discourage facility-
based entry. In particular this will be true if we incorporate uncertainty in the analysis. The
non-facility-based firm mayenter the market later, and, furthermore, does not need to make
the irreversible investment.
The timing structure seems to correspond to the current regulatory paradigm both in the EU
and the USA. This paradigm mandates that the access price should be set to the long-run
incremental costs (LRIC). At first glance, this may include the investments in e.g. broadband
upgrades, while we show that the regulator will set the access price equal to the marginal cost
as long as the retailers do not differ too much in their ability to offer value-added services.
The main feature is, however, that the determination of the long-run incremental costs is
highly discretionary and that the decision is taken after the investment is made. Hence, its
impact on incentives to invest before the discretionary decision on the access price will be
analogous to the case analysed in the present paper. Hausman (1997) argues that FCC's
measure of LRIC ignores the existence of technological progress that is reducing the prices
and increasing the quality of the components in a broadband access network. Hence, LRIC
implies an access price corresponding to the most efficient components available at the time
the access price is set, and this will not cover the investment costs under a rapidly changing
technology. Uncertainty is not formerly analysed in the present model, but there is obviously
a significant probability of failure when a firm invests in a broadband access network, and this
will make the problem of investment incentives even more important. The current LRIC
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approach does not cover the costs of unsuccessful services.f Cave and Prosperetti (2001)
focus on the situation in the EU, and they argue that the incumbents do not have sufficient
incentives to upgrade to broadband access, since they anticipate that they will be forced to
offer access at cost-based prices.
If there was no ability to improve the network quality through the investment, a regulated
access price close to or equal to marginal costs will improve welfare compared to the case
without an access price regulation. This indicates that the current regulation regime in EU and
the USA may be better than no regulation if static efficiency was the only goal for the
regulator. In contrast, when there is an investment decision before the access price regulation
is decided, the benchmark without access price regulation may imply higher welfare, but the
conclusion is ambiguous. Obviously, the regulator may alter the outcome by non-linear
wholesale prices, price regulation in the retail market, and line-of business restrictions, but the
basic challenge seems to be the choice of rules versus discretion in the governments' policy.
When the policymaker has the opportunity to set the access price discretionary after the
investment, it will set the access price close to marginal cost (or LRIC). When the decision is
taken after the investment, this is the best thing to do for the regulator, given the current
situation. It is not a rysult of non-optimal behaviour from the regulator. If the regulator wishes
to realise the outcome in the case without access price regulation, it has to credibly commit to
a policy rule before the investment that prevents the regulator from using the discretionary
. l' 26access pnce regu ation.
25 See Hausman (1997) for further discussion on these issues.
26 The classic paper on time inconsistency and rules versus discretion is Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
A necessary and sufficient condition for market sharing is now that P2 > PI .
Proof of Proposition 3:
The higher ability the non-facility-based firm has to use the investment, the lower is the
investment level with access price regulation:
dx' = 2(a - c) [A' +4(2P - P )2) < O
dP2 (A')2 I 2
The higher ability the non-facility-based firm has to use the investment, the lower is the
consumer surplus with access price regulation:
1. We have dx' I dP2 <O. Hence, it is sufficient to ensure x' - x,: <Ofor P2 = 05. For
P2 =O.5wehavethat x' -x;, =-(a-c)/3A: <O.
11. We have that dQ' I dP2 < O for P2 E[O.5,l] . Hence, let us insert for P2 = 0.5. Then
we have Q' - q: = (a - c)[ 3lp2- 4.5lp+ 1.5]I A' A: which is negative for lperll< lp < 1
and positive for lp> I.QED
Proof of Proposition 4:
1. x'-x·=(a-c)[2(2PI-I)A·-5PIA']IA'A·. Hence to check xr-x';::O we see
whether [2(2PI -1)A' -5PIAr];:: O. This requires that lp ~ 2(2P~ - 3PI + l) 15 which
will never be fulfilled for PI E[0.5,1]and lp> lpCrlt= 0.5.
u. Qr -Q' =(a-c)[A'(6lp+2(2PI-1)(l-PI))-Ar(5lp-3p~ +5PI-2)]1 Ar A'. Let us
check whether[A' (6lp+2(2PI -1)(1- PI)) - Ar (5lp - 3P~ + 5PI - 2)];:: O. When
solving the inequality with respect to lp we find that: lp;:: HPI (3PI -1) +2).
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Moreover we see that the restriction on cp to ensure Q' - Q* ~ O is stronger for higher
Pl since :~ > O for Pl E[O.5,l] QED.
55

Chapter 2
57

Access Pricing, Quality Degradation,
and Foreclosure in the Internet*
Øystein Foros,
Hans Jarle Kind
and
Lars Sørgard
Abstract: Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get
complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the inter-
play between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a
domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to
domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The opti-
mal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly
the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access
price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict
between international and domestic regulation policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During the last decade the Internet has become an important industry, for example
measured in the number of people using services such as email and web-browsing.
Although we can learn a lot about this new industry by applying standard results
from economics, there are some idiosyncratic characteristics of the Internet industry
that call for a closer examination. For example, Internet connectivity may be seen
as a composite good that is produced by the complementary inputs local access
and global access. The local access network is typically dominated by a domestic
telecommunication company, and the global access network - called the Internet
backbone - is dominated by a limited number of US companies. While the providers
of local access have historically been regulated both on price and quality in their
home country, the providers of global access have so far not been regulated.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interplay between the firms III
the global and the local network concerning price and quality setting, and analyze
possible implications of this interplay for the public regulation policy. We show
that a strict regulation of the access prices may be detrimental to welfare, and in
particular we demonstrate that in our model the price of local access should be set
above cost if foreign firms have market power.
Since the Internet is rather new, there are relatively few studies in the literature
of this particular industry. Inspired by Mackie-Mason and Varian (1994, 1995a,
1995b), there exist some analyses of the congestion problem in the Internet and
price setting to end users without market power. Neither access pricing nor the
quality of interconnection between networks are important topics in those studies.
More in line with our focus, though, are Cremer et al. (2000), Milgrom et al. (2000),
Economides (1998a, 1998b) and Sibley and Weisman (1998). The two former study
the Internet backbone market, while Economides and Sibley and Weisman focus
on an upstream monopolist's incentives to foreclose rival downstream firms through
quality degradation. An important distinction between our study and theirs is that
we are concerned about the interplay between the local and global access network.
In our model a dominant firm provides access to the global network, while the
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incumbent telecommunication firm provides local access in a particular country. The
end-users are served by two Internet service providers, and one of them is owned
by the domestic telecommunication firm in charge of the local access network. In
the first version of our model we assume that the second end-user provider is an
independent firm. We show that in this case the integrated local telecommunication
firm would find it profitable to set a high local access price to the independent
end-user provider and thereby to monopolize the end-user market (foreclosure). If
the global access provider's price setting is exogenously determined, we find that a
regulator maximizing domestic welfare should set the local access price equal to long
run marginal costs. In such a way it triggers competition in the end-user market.
This reproduces the well-known cost-oriented price regulation paradigm, and serves
as a benchmark for our analysis.'
Results change dramatically if the global access price is endogenous. A restrictive
regulation policy, as described above, is now detrimental to domestic welfare. The
same is true if the regulator cannot credibly commit itself to a certain access price,
and ends up by setting price equal to marginal costs. Such a low local access price
would imply that the provider of global access could gain a larger share of the
market's profit potential by setting a high access price. Hence, a reduction of the
local access price is partly replaced by an increase in the global access price and
thereby a profit shift out of the country. If the regulator could commit itself to a
public policy, often denoted ex ante regulation, the best it could do would possibly
be to not intervene. By doing so, it prevents any profit shift out of the country.
Next, we consider the case where the provider of global access has acquired
the independent end-user provider. Now the end-user providers are in a symmet-
ric position, since each of them controls an essential input both of them need. Not
surprisingly, we find that foreclosure will not take place in equilibrium. More surpris-
ingly, we find that if the regulator could behave credibly it would set an access price
below the one it would prefer if the provider of global access had not acquired the
end-user. Hence, an end-user provider owned by the foreign global access provider
lOur main results will not be altered if we allow for a regulated price on local access below
marginal costs (see section 3). See also Laffont and Tirole (2000) for a discussion.
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should be given more favorable terms than an independent and locally owned end-
user provider. The reason is that the global access provider's response to a lower
local access price is now distinctly different, because its main response to a lower
access price is to act more aggressively in the end-user market. Thereby consumer
surplus increases.
We extend the model further by assuming that the provider of global access has
the ability to degrade the quality of the input sold to the locally-owned end-user
provider. If there is no regulation of access prices, we find that the global access
provider decides not to practice quality degradation. The reason is that any quality
degradation would harm the global access provider's potential for profit extraction
from the end-user provider who is integrated with the provider of local access.
However, there might be a price cap on the global access price, for example due to
WTO-agreements that reduce the scope for firms to abuse their international market
power. If such a price cap is sufficiently restrictive, the global access provider's profits
from serving the locally owned end-user provider are limited. Then the global access
provider may have incentives to foreclose it by practicing quality degradation. The
domestic regulator, though, would rather have both end-user providers active in the
market to ensure rivalry in the output market. The regulator's best choice may then
be to set a higher local access price than the provider of local access itself would
have done. By doing so it encourages the global access provider not to practice
foreclosure. However, for a sufficiently low global access price it is not possible for
the regulator to prevent the global access provider from practicing foreclosure.
Finally, note that there is a potential conflict between international and domestic
public policy. First, a restrictive price cap on global access would, as noted above,
result in foreclosure even if the local access price is regulated. This is detrimental to
domestic welfare, and the country would have been better offwithout any regulation
of the global access price. Second, a price cap on the global access price may result
in a less restrictive price cap on the local access price, and may even in some cases
result in a higher end-user price. Such a response from the domestic regulator would
shift profits from the providers of global access to the providers of local access.
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2 THE INTERNET
For our purpose, Internet connectivity sold to end-users in Europe can be seen as
a composite good that consists of one domestic input (local access into homes)
and one global input (access to the Internet backbone in the US). These inputs
are supplied by Local Access Providers (LAPs) and Internet Backbone Providers
(IBPs), respectively. Internet connectivity is sold to the end-users from a regional
Internet Service Provider (ISP), who needs to buy local access to consumers from
the LAP and global Internet access from an IBP.2
The market structure is dominated by a few firms in both the.local and the global
access network. Regarding local access, the "last mile into homes", the local tele-
phone lines and the cable-tv lines are the alternatives for private users (Clark, 1999).
Obviously, local access has to be offered locally. Due to their dominant position, the
LAPs are typically subject to regulation of price and quality for local access as an
input component. In the EU, for instance, the evolution of the regulatory regime
has led to commitment to a restrictive practice, often denoted ex ante regulation,
towards the LAPs.
In contrast, there has so far been no regulation of the global access input supplied
by the IBPs. A few US firms provide connection to the global backbone to regional
ISPs all over the world." It should be noted that global access is much more essential
for Internet connectivity than for conventional telephone services. While only a
relatively small portion of world wide telephone calls go to or from the US, the
majority of the Internet traffic has to go through the US. For the location of Internet
facilities we thus have a clear asymmetry between the US and the rest of the world.
Even if no IBP separately is in position to use market power, a group of co-
2Between the bottleneck components local access and core backbone access there is a chain
of intermediates. We do not consider these intermedites segments, since their potential for using
market power seems to be limited.
3Access to the top-level of global infrastructure is controlled by US firms such as MCI World-
Corn, Sprint, Genuity (formerly GTE), and AT&T. The only non-American firm operating a
top-level backbone is Cable &Wireless, who bought MCl's backbone operation before the MCI-
WorldCom merger. See Cremer et al. (2000) and Kende (2000) for an overview.
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operating IBPs may be in position to do so (Cremer et ai, 2000, Milgrom et ai,
2000). In addition to giving access to information located on servers in the US, the
input from the IBPs also secures access to the core routing structure and access to
all Internet addresses in the world (Milgrom et ai, 2000). A limited number of core
IBPs co-operate in creation of a consistent routing structure. The full routing tables
are a part of the input sold to regional ISPs, and they define the addresses that can
be reached. When the IBPs co-operate in coordinating their core routers, it would
be a temptation to use it as a collusive device (Varian, 1999). The controlover the
core routers (with full routing tables) distincts the IBPs from other ISPs that are
controlling regional backbones.
Recently, we have witnessed a more active role played by the core IBPs. While
they still have cost-free interconnection among themselves, they now charge smaller
regional ISPs for access to their global infrastructure and core routing services. In
other words, the smaller regional ISPs have become customers (or resellers ) of the
core IBPs facilities and services." We have also observed that IBPs have integrated
vertically into the retail market for Internet connectivity (the ISP segment) in Eu-
rope.
3 SOME PRELIMINARIES
Let us consider the stylized market contexts illustrated in figures la and lb. The
ISPs buy local access and global access as inputs from the LAP and the IBP, re-
spectively. Throughout the paper we assume that (i) one IBP provides global access
and one LAP provides local access, (ii) ISP A and ISP B compete in the market
for Internet connectivity sold to end-users, and (iii) the LAP is vertically integrated
and operates ISP A as its subsidiary. Since the ISPs have to choose capacity in
the regional backbone network as well as in the transatlantic transport network we
4An example of this is UUNET (an MCI World Com subsidiary), who ended the cost-free in-
terconnection regime in 1997 and started to charge smaller ISPs for access to their backbone. See
Mackie-Mason and Varian (1997) and Werbach (1997) for a summary of the internet's history.
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will model downstream competition as a Cournot game." For simplicity, we further
assume that there is no horizontal differentiation between the two services offered
by the ISPs. However, it should be noted that neither of these assumptions are
essential for our main results (see discussion in Section 7).
In section 4 we assume that the non-integrated IBP sells global access as an input
to both ISP A and ISP B. This market structure is denoted VS (vertical separation),
and it is illustrated by figure la. In section 5 we assume that the IBP vertically
integrates into the retail market and operates ISP B as its subsidiary, see figure lb.
This market structure is denoted VI (vertical integration). In section 6 we apply
the same structure as in section 5, but we allow the IBP to engage in non-price
discrimination (quality reduction) towards ISP A.
I LAP I
t .
i liSP A IIIISP B I
L__yJ I
I END USERS
(a)
Global market
rr:~"'p Local marke
11 ;
!liSP A II liSP B I
L.. \:J ---.7 .J
I END USERS I
(b)
Figure 1: The market structure
Demand side
5Downstream ISPs usually operate their own regional backbones in the territories they serve,
while they sign long-term contracts for transatlantic capacity. Hence, it seems appropriate to see
the competition between the ISPs as a capacity constrained price game.
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Let consumer demand for Internet services be given by
(1)
where p is the price, and qA and qe denote the quantities from ISP A and ISP B,
respectively. The consumer surplus may consequently be written as
GS = (ex - p)(qA + qB)/2. (2)
Supply side
The profits for the downstream firms (the ISPs) are
(i = A, B) (3)
where Wl and wg are the prices charged by the LAP and the IBP, respectively.
Upstream profits for the LAP and the IBP are given by
(4)
and
(5)
where Cl and cg are the respective long run marginal costs.
Since the LAP is vertically integrated, it is useful to express its aggregate profit
level as
1_+Jr LAP - JrLAP Jr A· (6)
If the IBP is vertically integrated, the market structure denoted VI, we have
(7)
Domestic welfare
Domestic welfare is measured as the sum of consumer surplus and domestic
profits (Jr D);
W=GS+JrD· (8)
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In the case where ISP B is a domestic independent firm we have JrD = JriAP + JrB,
while JrD = JriAP if ISP B is owned by the foreign IBP.
A benchmark: VS with exogenously given global access price
As a benchmark, let us consider the model illustrated in figure la (VS). For the
moment, we will assume that the IBP charges an exogenously given price wg• If it
is normalized to zero, it can be interpreted as the old regime where the IBPs did
not charge the regional ISPs for global access (see Chapter 2).
Rewriting equation (6) we can express the profit level of the integrated LAP as
. JriAP = (p - wg - Cl)qA + (Wl - Cl)qB. (9)
We assume that the LAP first chooses un, and that ISP A and ISP B subsequently
compete in quantities. Solving the game by backward induction, we start with the
quantity setting by the ISPs. Using equations (1), (3) and (9) we find that the first
order conditions 8JriAP / 8qA = Oand 8JrB /8qB = Oimply
(10)
and
q~ = (a + Cl - 2Wl - wg) / (3Ø) . (11)
At stage 1 the LAP determines the price Wl that it will charge from ISP B.
Differentiating (9) with respect to ui, we find that
W7 = (a + Cl - wg) /2. (12)
From equations (11) and (12) it is thus clear that the LAP chooses an access price
Wl such that qB = O(and JrB = O), and is thereby able to act as a monopolist in the
downstream market. Hence, it exploits its controlover the local access to deter the
rival downstream firm from being active.
The fact that the LAP becomes a monopolist may obviously have negative wel-
fare effects, and indicates that there is a role for public policy. The government
maximizes welfare with respect to Wl subject to the constraints
(13)
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The first two constraints state that each domestic firm should have a non-negative
profit, and the last inequality says that the LAP must have a non-negative price-cost
margin on its sale to ISP B.
Imperfect downstream competition is the only distortion when the global access
price is exogenous. Hence, the domestic regulator can achieve a first-best outcome
through a restrictive regulation of the local access price (and possibly subsidize the
local access provider). The first-best outcome is one where the consumer price for
Internet connectivity is equal to long-run marginal costs, p = Cl+wg• Since the ISPs
use a positive mark-up, the regulator thus needs to set the local access price below
marginal costs (WI < Cl) in order to reach this equilibrium. However, the restriction
WI 2: Cl seems appropriate in our context, since the regulation policy in both the
EU and the US typically allows firms to set prices such that their long-run marginal
costs are covered. This implies that the local access price should be set equal to
marginal cost, since dW / dWI < Ofor WI = Cl . It should be noted that the restriction
WI 2: Cl does not affect any of the results qualitatively. In fact, a central message
of this article is that in some cases it may be optimal for the regulator to set the
access price strictly above marginal costs (WI > Cl).
By regulating the local access price the regulator prevents the LAP from achiev-
ing a monopoly position. It is straight forward to show that the welfare level is now
higher than the one without regulation.
Our results so far can be summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Let us assume a VS market structure and that wg is exogenous. If no
regulation, then the LAP sets the local access price so high that ISP B is foreclosed.
If regulation, a regulator that maximizes domestic welfare sets WI = Cl, and both
ISPs are active.
In the benchmark wg has been exogenous, which is consistent with the fact that
wg has been equal to zero until recently. Lately, however, the IBPs have begun
to charge the ISPs for connectivity to the backbone, and presumably this pricing
behaviour will become more widespread along with the increased commercialization
of the Internet [see, e.g., Frieden (1999) and Cremer et al. (2000)]. In the following
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sections we analyze the effect of an endogenously determined price wg from the IBP.
4 VERTICAL SEPARATION
Also in this section we have a market structure as illustrated in figure la, where the
IBP is vertically separated from the ISPs. The only difference from the benchmark
presented in the previous section is that the IBP acts as a monopolist that sets the
global access price wg endogenously. In the benchmark case a lower price WI of local
access reduced the marginal cost of ISP B, and thus led to increased competition
and higher output. Therefore it was optimal for the domestic regulator to set a
restrictive price cap on local access. Below, we show that this need not be the case
when wg is endogenous. The reason is that in addition to the direct effect on ISP B's
costs, a reduction of WI allows the IEP to charge a higher price wg of access to the
backbone. In this case the regulator therefore faces a trade-off between stimulating
to downstream competition and preventing profit shifting from the domestic market
to the foreign upstream firm. The problem of the domestic regulator is that there
are now two disto~tions, but only one policy instrument available (the local access
price). Not surprisingly, domestic price regulation is therefore possibly less effective
than when wg is exogenous. To show this, we will first analyze the outcome in an
unregulated market economy.
Equilibrium
We will assume that prices and quantities are determined in a non-cooperative
two-stage game. At stage one the LAP and the foreign IEP simultaneously set the
access prices WI and wg, respectively, while there is Cournot competition in quantities
between ISP A and ISP E at stage 2. The latter assumption implies that qA and q'B
are still given by equations (10) and (11).
To find the equilibrium value of wg, we insert qA and q'B into (5) and differentiate
with respect to wg. Taking WI as given, we have
Wg(WI) = (2a + 2cg - WI - Cl) /4. (14)
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In a similar way, we find that
(15)
In the appendix we prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 1: Let us assume a VS market structure and no regulation. Then
the LAP sets ui, such that q'B= o.
The LAP thus uses its controlover the essential domestic input (access to the
local network) to practice foreclosure against the competing downstream firm, ISP
B. Thereby the LAP is able to retain its monopoly power over the consumers. Note
that this result is identical to the result found when the global access price was
exogenous (see Lemma 1). It thus illustrates that strategic behaviour by the global
access provider does not change the LAP's strategy of monopolization.
Domestic public policy
In principle, the government can act as a first mover when it regulates the local
access price un. This means that it sets Wl before the IBP sets wg• However, such
a commitment to ex ante regulation may not be credible. If it is not a credible
commitment, we can model public policy as if ui, and wg were set simultaneously.
In the following we analyze both cases, and we start with the latter.
No credible commitment
In this case we have a two-stage game, where the regulator and the IBP choose
Wl and wg at stage one and the integrated LAP and ISP B choose quantities at stage
two. We then have the following results (see the Appendix):
Proposition 2: Let us assume a VS market structure and that the regulator and
the IBP set simultaneously respectively ui; and wg
(i) The regulator then sets Wl = Cl, and
(ii) the welfare level is lower with than without regulation.
Since the regulator and the IBP act simultaneously, the regulator is not able to
influence the IBP's choice of wg• For any given choice of wg, the regulator's best
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choice is to set access price equal to marginal costs and thereby eliminate the dead
weight loss following from a local access price above marginal costs. The regulated
price of local access is thus equal to long-run marginal costs, as is the case when wg
is exogenous (see Lemma 1).
It can be shown that consumers are better off and domestic producers worse off
following regulation. Since part (ii) in Proposition 2 states that regulation is detri-
mental to domestic welfare, then the reduction in domestic profits is only partially
passed on to the domestic consumers. The reason is that part of the initial domestic
profit is shifted to the IBP. The IBP anticipates that the regulator sets access price
equal to marginal costs, and its best choice is then to set a higher access price to the
backbone than what is the case without regulation. Put differently, regulation low-
ers domestic profits and permits the IBP to extract more profits from the domestic
market.
Credible commitment
Let us now take for granted that the government succeeds with ex ante regulation.
Then we have the following game:
· Stage 1: The regulator determines the price WI
· Stage 2: The IBP determines the price wg
· Stage 3: The LAP and ISP B set the quantities qA and qB
We have the following result (see the Appendix):
Proposition 3: Let us assume a VS market structure and that the regulator can
set WI in a credible way. It would then choose not to regulate WI.
We see that if the regulator can credibly commit itself, it prefers not to regulate
at all. The result in Proposition 3 follows from our result reported in Proposition 2.
A binding price cap on WI would imply that the IBP raises its access price wg, thereby
shifting profits from the domestic producers to the foreign producer. To avoid such a
profit shift, the regulator is better off by not intervening in the market and thus by al-
lowing the domestic producers to capture a large portion of the total profit in the do- .
mestic market.
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5 VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Let us now focus on the market structure illustrated in figure lb. We assume that
both the LAP and the IBP have integrated vertically into the ISP segment, and
that ISP B is a subsidiary of the IBP (while ISP A is still owned by the LAP).
In the previous section the domestic regulator faces a trade-off in setting the
local access price, since a lower WI not only reduces the costs of ISP B but also
increases wg. The higher wg in turn increases the costs of both ISP A and ISP B.
So what changes when the IBP integrates into the downstream market? The main
difference is that an increase in wg affects only ISP A's costs. Hence, the problem
that a reduction of WI increases wg becomes less serious.
If the IBP is vertically integrated, we may write its profit level as [c.f. equation
(7)]
(16)
The profit level of the integrated LAP is still given by (9), and Cournot compe-
tition generates the following equilibrium quantities:
q~ = (a + WI - 2Cl + cg - 2wg) /(3(3), (17)
and
q~ = (a + wg - 2cg + Cl - 2wI) /(3(3). (18)
Equilibrium
In the first stage of this game the integrated LAP and the integrated IBP set
the prices WI and wg. Inserting for (17) and (18) into (9) and (16), we find that
d1T'i,AP/dwi = Oand d7r~BP/dwg = Oimply that
WI(Wg) = [5(a + Cl) - wg - 4cg] /10 (19)
and
Wg(Wt) = [5(a + cg) - WI - 4cL]/10. (20)
Then we have the following result (see the Appendix):
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Proposition 4: Let us assume a VI market structure and no regulation. Then
WI and wg are set such that q: > 0, where i = A, B.
We see that in this case both ISPs offer positive quantities. This is in contrast
to the result stated in Lemma 2, where only the LAP was assumed to be vertically
integrated and it foreclosed the ISP B. To understand the distinction between these
two outcomes, note that now both the ISPs have access to an essential facility and
in that respect they are symmetric. From the LAP's point of view, the ISP B is
now a low cost producer. It faces a low marginal cost, since cg < wg. The LAP then
finds it beneficial to serve the low cost producer rather than foreclose it.
Domestic public policy
If regulation is not a credible commitment, it follows from the previous analysis
that the regulator would end up with a regulated local access price equal to marginal
costs in this case as well. More interestingly, though, is the case where regulation is
a credible commitment. In that case the regulator sets WI at stage 1, the integrated
IBP sets wg at stage 2 and qA and qB are set at stage 3.
Proposition 5: Let us assume a VI market structure and that the regulator can
set WI in a credible way. Then it sets WI < wi, and domestic welfare increases.
At first glance, this may come as a surprise. A low local access price is beneficial
for the IBP, the foreign owner of the ISP B, and may thus shift profits out of the
country. However, the IBP's response to a lower local access price is now distinctly
different from what was the case with vertical separation. First, the detrimental
effect on the IBP's access price, Wg, is now more limited. The reason is that this
access price is now only affecting the ISP A's sale, while under vertical separation
it affected both ISPs' sales. Second, the integrated IBP now responds to lower local
access price by acting more aggressively in the output market. This is beneficial for
the consumers, and explains why the regulator decides to set a lower local access
price than what the domestic LAP would have set.
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6 QUALITY REDUCTION
Above we have seen that it may not be optimal for the regulator to use cost-based
prices on local access, because that may lead to higher prices on global access and
increased profit shifting. This raises the question of whether there is a need for a
global price regulation.
So far we have assumed that the bottleneck owners' only choice variable is price.
However, a price regulation of the access price may induce foreclosure through non-
price discrimination (see Laffont and Tirole, 2000). In particular, if the integrated
IBP meets a price cap on wg it may engage in non-price discrimination by reducing
the quality of the input sold to the local incumbent's subsidiary ISP A. As shown in
Economides (1998a, 1998b), it can be profitable to do so, and thereby put its rival
in a disadvantageous position." An LAP who meets a price cap on local access, may
also have incentives to practise foreclosure through non-price discrimination." Since
the prevailing regulation regime in Europe typically has an ambition to regulate
both price and quality on local access, we will, however, not consider this possibil-
ity. On the other hand, it seems difficult to implement quality requirements on the
backbone providers. For example, it is almost impossible for an international regu-
latory authority to decide whether an integrated firm such as MCI Worldcom offers•.
new functionality based on technological advantage to its own retail subsidiaries or
practices quality degradation on input sold to the rivals.f
In line with Economides (1998a, 1998b), we let f 2:: O be a "quality reduction
parameter" which is such that one unit increase in f reduces the consumers' will-
ingness to pay by one unit. In this case ISP A faces a parallel downward shift in its
demand curve.
..'_".
By including the quality reduction parameter we can write the profit level of the
6See also Bergman (2000) and Economides (2000) for a note and comment on Economides
(1998a).
7For further discussions and examples, see Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Economides (1998b).
8The Microsoft case gives an illustration of the problems in such a context, see, e.g., Economides
(1998b)
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LAP as
(21)
Without any loss of insight we will assume that no costs are incurred for the
integrated IBP when it reduces the quality of the input to ISP A. Therefore 7r~BP
is still given by (16), and with Cournot competition in quantities at the last stage
of the game we have
qÅ = (et + ui; + cg - 2Cl - 2wg - 2f) /(3(3), (22)
and
q~ = (et + Cl+ wg + f - 2Wl - 2cg) /(3(3). (23)
Differentiating (16) with respect to f we find
(24)
which means that d27r~BP/dP > O for any given values of Wl and wg• Setting
d7r~BP/df = Othus gives us a minimum value of 7r~BP' and therefore we must look
at extreme values .of f to find the IBP's best choice.
There are two extreme values of f. It cannot be negative, so there is a lower
bound at jlb = o. The upper bound is given by
(25)
because then qA = Ofrom equation (22). There is no reason to set f > I", because
ISP A is deterred from entering the market already at f = i-. Moreover, note that
if wg is unregulated, the IBP does not need the non-price foreclosure instrument I,
it can always use wg as a substitute.
Equilibrium
From the above, it follows that the IBP either sets f = Oand imposes no quality
reduction at all, or sets f = i" and deters ISP A from entering the market. In the
former case, we have the vertical integration equilibrium reported in the previous
section. In the latter case, the LAP maximizes 7riAP = (Wl - Cl)qB with respect to
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ui; at stage 1 and the integrated IBP maximizes KJBP = (p - ui; - cg )qB with respect
to qB at stage 2. By comparing these two outcomes, we find that the IBP chooses to
impose quality reduction if and only if the access price to the backbone is set below
some critical value w~.9 Letting w; denote the access price that the IBP would have
chosen in an unregulated market, we have the following result (see the Appendix):
Proposition 6: Let us assume a VI market structure, that there is no regulation,
and the lB? has the option to reduce quality when serving IS? A. Then the lB? will
choose
(i) not to impose quality reduction if w~:::; wg :::; w;,
(ii) to impose quality reduction if Wg < w~ and thereby foreclose ISP A.
Note that for endogenously determined wg our result is in contrast to the result
found in Economides (1998a, 1998b). He found that quality reduction would always
be used to foreclose its downstream rivals. In his model, there is only one provider
of an essential facility. Obviously, then, the provider of the essential facility can
benefit from putting its downstream rival at a disadvantage by reducing the quality
of its input. In our setting, though, quality reduction will not exclude the rival from
being partly active in the market, since the rival provides the integrated IBP with
local access. Then the integrated IBP is better off by providing the rival with high
quality input and extracting profits from the rival through its access price wg than
by foreclosing the LAP's subsidiary ISP A if wg > w~.
As indicated, one important reason why foreclosure through quality reduction
would not be profitable is that it would prevent the IBP from extracting profits from
the integrated LAP. If so, it could be of interest to examine how any regulation of
wg, for example as a result of international public policy, may affect the IBP's choice
of quality reduction. As shown in part (ii) of the Proposition, the IBP will prefer
9Weisman (1995) and Sibley and Weisman (1998), who analyze whether a monopolist subject
to price-cap regulation has incentives to increase the costs of rivals to its vertically related affiliate,
find a similar result. They argue that these incentives may be weak unless the affiliate makes a
sufficiently large share of the firm's total profit. See also Reiffen (1998) and Weisman (1998) for
further discussions.
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foreclosure if wg is sufficiently low. A low global access price implies that the IBP
earns only a limited price-cost margin on its deliveries to ISP A, and therefore the
IBP is better off by foreclosing ISP A. Note that exclusion of ISP A is not a goal per
se, but only a means to transfer market power from the regulated global bottleneck
to the retail segment.
Domestic public policy
In line with the previous sections, we assume that the regulator can credibly
commit itself to a certain local access price. Then we have that the regulator sets
WI at stage 1, the IBP sets f at stage 2, and ISP B (and ISP A if no foreclosure)
sets quantities at stage 3.
Proposition 7: Let us assume a VI market structure, the lB? has the option to
reduce quality when serving IS? A, and the regulator can set WI in a credible way.
Then
(i) if Wg < w~, the regulator sets WI < wi and there is foreclosure,
(ii) if w~< Wg < w~, the regulator sets WI > wi and there is no foreclosure, and
(ii) if w~ < Wg :::; w;, the regulator sets WI < wi and there is no foreclosure.
Due to the IBP's ability to practice foreclosure the public policy becomes rel-
atively complex. On the one hand, the regulator prefers a low access price WI in
order to increase consumer surplus. On the other hand, a low value of WI implies
that the IBP earns a large price-cost margin on its own sales. This tends to make
it more profitable for the IBP to practice foreclosure, and thereby to dampen the
rivalry in the end-user market. In figure 2 we have illustrated our results with a nu-
merical example. The dotted lines show how the regulator's choice of WI is affected
by the global access price wg, while the solid lines show how the choice of the LAP
is affected.
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Figure 2: Regulator's or the LAP's choice of WI (with a = 1, Cl = Cg = O)
By setting a high local access price the regulator makes the alternative to fore-
closure less attractive for the IBP. If wg is sufficiently low, the IBP earns such a
small profit on its sale to the ISP A that it is not possible for the regulator to pre-
vent the IBP from engaging in foreclosure. However, for an intermediate value of
wg the regulator sets such a high local access price that the IBP decides to switch
from foreclosure to no foreclosure. In fact, for some values of Wg the regulator sets
a higher local access price than the one the LAP would have chosen. Finally, if wg
is high the IBP would have chosen no foreclosure anyway. Then the regulator sets
a lower access price than the LAP would have done, as was the case in the previous
section where foreclosure was not an option.
It may seem as a surprise that for intermediate values of wg the regulator sets
a higher local access price than the LAP would set, since a high local access price
would, all else equal, result in a high price in the output market. However, the
welfare gain from a high access price is that it prevents foreclosure of ISP A and
thereby ensures rivalry between the ISPs in the output market.
International versus domestic public policy
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An exogenously determined wg can, as argued above, be interpreted as a price
cap enforced due to international coordination of public policy. A natural question,
then, is how international and domestic public policy interact. Let wI denote the
regulator's choice of local access price. We have the following result:
Proposition 8: Let us assume a VI market structure, the IBP has the option
to reduce quality when serving ISP A, and the domestic regulator can set wI in a
credible way.
(i) A price cap on wg would reduce domestic welfare if Wg ::; w~, and otherwise
increase domestic welfare.
(ii) aWL/awg = o if Wg < w~, and aWL/awg < o if Wg > w~.
(iii) ap/awg = o if Wg < w~, ap/awg < o if w~ < Wg < wZ, and ap/awg > O if
Wg > wZ·
A restriction on the global access price would limit the IBP's ability to extract
profits from the market in question, and thus be beneficial for the domestic country.
We see that this is true if wg ~ w~. However, an even more restrictive price cap
than that on global access would result in foreclosure and thereby higher price in
the output market. In such a case the domestic country would be worse off than
what would have been the case if there was no price cap on global access. Hence,
an international regulation of global access price increases domestic welfare only if
the global access price is not set below a certain threshold level. See figure 3, where
we use a numerical example to illustrate how the global access price affects prices
and domestic welfare.
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Finally, note the potential conflict between international and domestic public
policy. First, for high values of wg a more restrictive price cap on global access
results in a less restrictive price cap on local access, but end-user price falls. To
understand this, note that a lower global access price shifts profits from the global
access providers to the domestic country, The regulator maximizing domestic welfare
finds it profitable to let both domestic consumers and domestic producers benefit
from the profit shift. It partly offsets the reduction in wg by increasing WI. Second,
and even more detrimental to the interest of the global access provider, for inter-
mediate levels of wg a more restrictive global access price increases both the local
access price and the end-user price. The reason is that the domestic regulator now
responds to a reduction in wg by increasing WI substantially, thereby preventing the
IBP from practicing foreclosure. This suggests that more restrictive international
regulation may be partly offset, and in some cases even more than offset, by less
restrictive domestic regulation.
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7 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLU-
SION
Domestic telecommunication firms have historically had a very dominant position in
many countries. No surprise, then, that many of these firms have been facing a re-
strictive regulatory regime in their home country. In particular, some countries have
enforced a cost-oriented price regulation for access sold to rivals in the downstream
market. In this article we have shown that such a public policy might be misguided
in a situation where inputs are provided by both local and foreign firms, which is the
case in, for example, the market for Internet. A restrictive policy towards domestic
firms may result in a larger profit potential for foreign firms and thereby a profit
shift out of the country. The reverse may also be true, where a more restrictive
international regulation may trigger a less restrictive domestic public policy and
thereby a profit shift to the domestic country.
In this paper we have assumed that there is Cournot competition between the
ISPs, and that there is no horizontal product differentiation. We have tested the
robustness of our results with respect to these assumptions by analyzing Bertrand
competition and differentiated products under vertical separation and vertical inte-
gratien. The main results are still valid, except for some minor differences in the
case of vertical separation. First, with horizontally differentiated products the local
access provider will obviously not want a complete foreclosure of the rival, since
there are some extra profits that can be extracted from the market by serving the
rival. Second, recall that in the case with Cournot competition and identical prod-
ucts the local access provider would prefer to foreclose its downstream rival, and the
regulator would choose not to regulate. With Bertrand competition and differenti-
ated products the regulator may interfere. When products are close substitutes the
regulator would set a higher access price than the local access provider would prefer.
By doing so it would force the backbone provider to reduce its global access price.
If the products are very differentiated, on the other hand, the regulator would set
a lower local access price than the local access provider would prefer. The reason
for this is that the downstream market is less competitive the larger the extent of
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product differentiation, and therefore a lower local access price is needed to avoid
excessively high consumer prices.
We have not analyzed the implications of Bertrand competition and horizontal
product differentiation in the context where the integrated backbone provider can
use quality reduction as an alternative foreclosure tool, so this may be an interesting
extension. However, we would expect that the main results survive also in this
case. The reason is that the IBP's trade-off between reducing its upstream profit
and increasing its downstream profit when degrading the rival's quality on global
backbone access will be the same. Our conjecture is that the key difference is that
the rival will be only partly foreclosed if the ISPs supply differentiated services.
In the last section of the paper we assumed that the price of access to the global
backbone is regulated, but we did not provide any discussion of how this is done.
An interesting extension of the model would thus be to analyze a regulation game
between a domestic and a foreign government. On the basis of our linear model we
have shown that a too restrictive price cap may be detrimental to welfare, a case
that both governments should have incentives to avoid. For a less restrictive price
cap, however, there is likely to be a conflict of interests between the governments.
In particular, the domestic government may prefer a relatively low global access
price and a relatively high local access price, while the preferences of the foreign
government are the opposite. It is therefore not obvious what will be the outcome
of a regulation game. In fact, it is possible that we end up with a prisoner's dilemma,
where both the local access price and the global access price are high.
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9 APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
We can use equations (14) and (15) to find that wi = (20 + 5Cl - 2cg) /7 and
w; = [3(0 - Cl) + 4cg] /7. Inserting this into equations (10) and (11) it follows that
q'A = Q* = 2(0 - Cl - cg)/(7(3) and q'B = O. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) The quantities q'A and q'B are given by equations (10) and (11). Differentiating
national welfare W from equation (8) with respect to ui, implies that Wl = 2Cl+Wg-O
when dW/dwl = o. But this value of Wl is a violation of the constraint that WI ~ Cl,
c.f. equation (13). The regulator will therefore set wl = Cl.
(ii) Inserting wl = Cl into equation (14) we have that w; = (o + cg - Cl) /2.
From equations (10) and (11) it thus follows that q'A = q'B = (o - Cl - cg) /(6(3)
and Q* = (o - Cl - cg) /(3(3). Inserting for the equilibrium values of wi, w; and Q*
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from the proof of Proposition 1 into the welfare function (8) we find that with no
regulation welfare is the following:
(26)
In a similar way, we find that with regulation welfare equals:
sa 6 2W = 54,8(ex - Cl - Cg) . (27)
It is thus evident from equations (26) and (27) that W* > WSO. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium quantities qA_ and q'B are still given by (10) and (11). At the
second stage of this game the IBP takes WI as given, and maximizes 'lr/BP with
respect to wg. This generates the same reaction function Wg(WI) as in equation (14).
Inserting this into the welfare function, equation (8), and differentiating with respect
to WI we find that
Wr = (ex + Cl - cg)/2 (28)
when dW/dwl = Q. By comparing equations (15) and (28), and noting that wg >
Cg, we see that the regulator prefers a higher price than the domestic monopolist.
However, WI > wi is not feasible since it would imply that ISP B sells a negative
quantity. Hence, the regulator decides not to regulate WI. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We can use equations (19) and (20) to find that wi = [45(ex - cg) + 54cl] /99 and
w; = [45(ex - Cl) + 54cg] /99, respectively. Inserting into (17) and (18) we thus find
Q* = 4(ex - Cl - cg)/ (11,8) and qA_ = q'B = 0.5Q* if Cl = cg. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
The reaction function Wg(WI) and the equilibrium quantities qA_ and q'B are given
from equations (20), (17) and (18), respectively. The regulator maximizes W =
CS+'lriAP [c.f. equation (8)] with respect to WI. Solving this maximization problem
we find that
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WI = [35(a - cg) + 64ci] /99. (29)
This price chosen by the regulator is smaller than the one preferred by the LAP
(provided that a - Cl - cg > O,which is the only interesting case). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let us first examine the case where wg is endogenous, such that wg = w;. If no
foreclosure, we have the equilibrium values reported in the proof of Proposition 4.
Inserting those into the IBP's profit function we have that
1=0 14 2
7fIBP = 121,8(a - Cl - Cg) . (30)
If foreclosure, qA = O and wg is non-existing since there are no deliveries from IBP
to ISP A. Then it can be shown that wi = (a-cg+cl)/2 and qB = (a-cg-cl)/(4,8).
Inserting the equilibrimn values into the IBP's profit function, we have that
1>0 1 ( )2
7fIBP= 16,8 a-Cl-cg . (31)
Then it can easily be checked that 7ff~~> 7ff~~,which implies that quality
reduction is not profitable for the IBP.
Let us now assume that wg is exogenous, i.e., wg < w;. If foreclosure, wg plays
no role. Hence, 7ff~~is as stated above. If no foreclosure, the IBP's profit for a
given wg is now as follows:
7ff~~= (wg - cg)(25(a - Cl) + 2cg - 27wg)/(50,8) (32)
N it b h th t 1=0 1>0·f c t F h .ow l can es own, a 7fIBP > 7fIBP l Wg < Wg < Wg• urt ermore, It can
be shown that w~ > w;. Then we have that 7ff~~> 7ff~~if
Wg < [50(a - Cl) + 58cg - 5J46(a - Cl - Cg)] /108 - w~ (33)
Foreclosure is then profitable for the IBP if wg < w~. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
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Suppose that the IBP practices foreclosure (f > O). For a given level of WI, the
IBP's profit is:
1>0 () 1 ( )2Jr/BP WI = 4,8 a-Wl-cg .
If no foreclosure, for exogenous wg and WI the IBP's profit equals:
(34)
Jr{~~ = 9~ [(a + 5wg + 2cI - 7cg - 4wl)a - (5wg - 4CI + 5cg - WI)Wg + y]
where Y = (Cl - 4WI)CI + (cg + 2CI)Cg + (4wI - 5cg)wz. Now it can be shown that
Jr{~~ > Jr{~~ if wg < wg < w~, and that w~ > w;. Then the relevant value of Wg,
where the IBP is indifferent between foreclosure and no foreclosure for a given level
(35)
of un, is the following:
W~ = [5(a + Cg) + 2CI - 7wz] /10 - w~(wz). (36)
Solving with respect to un, we have that the IBP is indifferent if the regulator sets
the following local access price:
(37)
However, for sufficiently high Wz the IBP decides not to serve its own subsidiary ISP
B in the no foreclosure situation (no foreclosure of ISP A). From (18) we find that
qb ~ O if
Wz 2: (a + wg - 2cg + Cl) /2 - wP(wg). (38)
Hence, if foreclosure is not possible at ui; = wp, then it is not possible at all. By
comparison, we find that wf(wg) ~ wP(wg) if:
(39)
For wg < w~, it is thus not possible by setting a high ui, to force the IBP not to
foreclosure.
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Let us now consider the case where w~ < wg < W~(WI). We know from Proposition
6 that in such a case the IBP would prefer foreclosure. Given foreclosure, the
regulator maximizes welfare by setting wI = (a - cg + 2cz)/3. The welfare is in this
case equal to:
(40)
Alternatively, the regulator could set WI so that the IBP prefers no foreclosure
rather than foreclosure. If no foreclosure, we have the welfare specified in (8). If we
now plug in equilibrium quantities from (17) and (18), as well as the critical value of
the local access price to ensure no foreclosure, wi (Wg), we have the following welfare:
1
Wf=o = 98,8 [31a2 - 62acl - 12awg + 31cr + 12clWg - 51w; + X] (41)
where X = -50acg - 32c; + 50CgCl+ 114cgwg. Then we have that Wf=o > Wf>o if:
[22(a - Cl) - 51wg + 29cg][2(a - Cl) + 3wg - 5cg] > O, (42)
and it can be shown that Wf=o > Wf>o if:
Wg < [22(a - Cl) + 29cg] /51 = w;, (43)
where w~ denotes the value of wg for which the regulator is indifferent between
foreclosure and no foreclosure. Let us compare this critical value with the value
where the IBP is indifferent between foreclosure and no foreclosure, given that the
regulator sets the optimal WI for the case of no foreclosure. We plug the regulator's
choice of WI in the case of no foreclosure into w~ (WI). It can be shown that in such
a case it is unprofitable for the IBP to engage in foreclosure if
Wg > (a - Cl + 2cg) /3 _ w~. (44)
By comparison, we have that w~ > w;. It implies that when wg is close to w~, the
regulator would prefer to set a local access price such that the IBP's best choice is
no foreclosure. Then we have shown that the regulator sets WI so that no foreclosure
occurs for w~ < wg < w~.
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Let us now consider the case when wg is close to w;. In this case it can be
shown that if the regulator sets its optimal access price in the case of no foreclosure,
the IBP would choose no foreclosure. Could the regulator then prefer to set WI so
low that the IBP chooses foreclosure? We check for wg = w;. We plug in for the
equilibrium values of qA and qB, the regulator's choice of WI and the IBP's choice of
wg• We find that the welfare is the following if no foreclosure:
I-O 37 ( )2W - = - ex - Cl - Cg •198
(45)
Alternatively, the regulator could set WI so that the IBP prefers foreclosure rather
than no foreclosure. If foreclosure, we have the welfare specified in (8) for a given
WI. In this case the critical value of the local access price to ensure no foreclosure,
wf, is equal to Cl. Then we have the following welfare if foreclosure:
(46)
Now it can easily be shown that WI=o > WI>o. This implies that the regulator will
not prefer foreclosure if no regulation of wg, and it follows straightforward that it
would neither prefer foreclosure for lower wg•
Finally, let us check how wg affects the regulator's choice of WI. First, let us find
the value of wg where the regulator would set WI identical to the one chosen by the
LAP. wf(wg) denotes the price the regulator has to set to make the IBP indifferent
between foreclosure and no foreclosure, while WI(Wg) shown in (19) is the LAP's
choice of access price given no foreclosure. We have that wf(wg) = WI(Wg) if
(47)
However, the LAP's local access price may increase following a shift from no
foreclosure to foreclosure. Comparing (19), the LAP's price for a given wg and no
foreclosure, with the LAP's price if foreclosure (WI = (ex - Cl - cg)/2), we have that
the LAP sets a higher price if foreclosure than if no foreclosure if:
Wg > lOcI + cg = w; (48)
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It can be shown that W;l §w;. IfW;l > w;, then the LAP's price would increase
as a result of a shift from no foreclosure to foreclosure. If so, we have to compare
wl(wg) with LAP's price if foreclosure. We have that those two prices are identical
when:
(49)
Then we have the following definition of the critical value where the regulator and
the LAP would set identical price:
w~ = { :;: othe~Wise
It can easily be checked that wi < wi if wg > w; and that wi < wi if w; < wg < w;.
If wg < w;, the IBP practices foreclosure and the LAP would set wi = (0'.-cg-cl)/2
and the regulator would set wi = (O'. - cg + 2Cl)/3. Then we have that wi > wi if
(50)
O'. - cg - Cl > O, the only interesting case. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 8
From Proposition 7 we know that W = 6~(a-cl-Cg)2 when wg < w~.1f wg = w;,
then for WI = wf it can be shown that W = l~~,6(a - Cl - Cg)2, which is higher that
the welfare when wg < w~.
If wg < w~, then the IBP chooses foreclosure and the regulator's choice of WI is
unaffected by wg. If w~ < wg < w;, then we have that
8Wf(Wg)/8Wg = -10/7. (51)
If w; < wg ~ w;, then it can be shown that the regulator's choice of WI for a
given wg is the following:
Wl(Wg) = [135a -75cg + 178cl - 60wgJ /313, (52)
and it follows straight forward that:
8Wf(wg)/8Wg = -60/313. (53)
Finally, let us ~heck how wg affects end-user price. If wg < w~, then wg has no
effect on end-user price. If w~ < wg < w;, then we plug wf into (17) and (18) into
(1) and find that
8p/8wg = -1/7. (54)
If w; < wg ~ w;, then we plug wi from the proof of Proposition 5 into (17) and
(18) and (17) and (18) into (1) and find that
8p/8wg = 1/3. (55)
Q.E.D.
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Abstract
We consider a two-stage game between two competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
The firms offer access to the Internet. Access is assumed to be vertically and horizontally
differentiated. Our model exhibits network externalities. In the first stage the two ISPs
choose the level of compatibility (i.e. quality of a direct interconnect link between the two
networks). In the second stage the two ISPs compete a-la Hotelling. We find that the ISPs
can reduce the stage 2 competitive pressure by increasing compatibility due to the network
externality. The firms will thus agree upon a high compatibility at stage 1.When it is costly
to invest in compatibility, we find that the firms overinvest, as compared to the welfare
maximising investment level. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.v. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Compatibility; Internet; Competition; Duopoly
JEL Classification: Ll3; L96; L41
1. Introduction
We consider competition between two ISPs (Internet Service Providers)
operating in the same geographical area. The product from these service providers
is basically access to the Internet, and the ISPs operate their own local network.
Internet access is assumed to be horizontally and vertically differentiated from the
customer's point of view. Furthermore we assume that there are positive
consumption externalities.
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Competition is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage the ISPs
determine the quality of interconnection. This choice of interconnection quality
can be considered as a choice of compatibility between the networks. In the second
stage, for given compatibility, the two firms compete il la Hotelling in attracting
customers.
The motivation for the paper is the observation that ISPs competing in the same
geographic area typically offer higher quality for on-net communication as
compared to off-net communication. Roughly, on-net communication refers to
traffic between computers/customers connected to the same ISP, while off-net
communication is between computers/ customers connected to different networks,
e.g. communication between customers subscribing to competing ISPs. Some
analysts are arguing that competing ISPs have become more willing to establish
private interconnection arrangements. It is however hard to verify this observation
because ISPs typically have a non-disclosure policy with respect to the
lagreements .
The majority of the literature on Internet economics focuses on the US-market.
In contrast, our paper is motivated by the situation for competing ISPs outside
USA. Previously, the attention in the ISP-markets outside USA has been directed
to the quality of the connection to the US 2. The quality of local communication
between competing ISPs was rather unimportant since the majority of the Internet
content was in the US. The situation is, however, altered, and the portion of the
Internet-traffic where both the sender and the receiver are located in the same area
is increasing. This tendency is probably due to new customer-types and new
services in the Internet. In non-English speaking countries content intended for the
mass-market must be produced locally or translated. Furthermore, for new
broadband interactive services, such as telemedicine, tele-education, and video
conferencing, a relatively larger portion of the communication is probably between
customers in the same geographical area as compared to what is the case for
conventional Internet services such as web-browsing. Thus, the importance of
local interconnection as a strategic variable has increased.
Utility from network participation depends on the number of potential com-
munication partners and the quality of this communication. For given market
shares, the customer' s willingness to pay is increasing in interconnection quality. It
is not obvious, however, that competing firms will choose a high quality. In the
presence of network externalities, customers will ceteris paribus consider it more
advantageous to choose the larger ISP if the chosen quality of interconnection is
I The quality in the network is determined by the ratio between capacity and load. The load is
varying on a very short time scale. Thus it is hard to observe the quality differential between off and on
net traffic from the outside. A customer of a particular ISP will however gain experience over time with
particular routes and thus be in a position to assess the quality differential.
2 Baake and Wichmann (1998) are focusing on the German market, Ergas (2000) and Little et al.
(2000) analyze the Australian market, while Mueller et al. (1997) describe the situation in Hong Kong.
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reduced. A large ISP may accordingly choose a low interconnection quality in
order to increase its market share.
Following several recent studies of the competition in the telecommunication
market, e.g. Laffont et al. (1998a,b), we assume that firms offer horizontally
differentiated goods. The motivation for this horizontal differentiation is receiving
little attention in the literature. In our setting, product differentiation in the
horizontal dimension may be given several interpretations. Customers of ISPs are
typically buying some complementary products to the Internet access. Private
customers connect to the ISP via the telephone line, the television cable or the
mobile phone system. Most ISPs are owned by, or, are in co-operation with a
supplier of local access, such as cable-TV or local telephony operators. This is one
source of horizontal differentiation, since e.g., cable-TV-access suppliers can offer
the best incoming capacity, while local telephony companies have more ex-
perience with switching technologies and two-way communications. A customer
mainly looking for interactive-TV and secondly internet connectivity, will proba-
bly prefer the service from an ISP that is a subsidiary of a cable-TV provider. In
contrast, for horne-office internet connectivity the customer may prefer a
subsidiary of a telephone provider. Customers with preferences for mobility
choose mobile wireless access although the capacity is lower than for, e.g.
cable-TV access.
Another source of horizontal differentiation is the alliances between ISPs and
content providers. The ISPs may choose to specialize in offering high quality of
some services and thus attracting customers preferring these services. In the
AOL- Time Warner merger a hot topic has been whether vertical integration of a
content company (Time Warner) and an ISP (AOL) may create incentives to
foreclose rivals from accessing some services ("a walled garden strategy").
1.1. Related literature
There are to our knowledge few papers explicitly considering ISP competition
and compatibility choice, but Cremer et al. (2000) and Mason (1999) are notable
examples3.
We are here following Cremer et al. (2000) by modelling network externalities
such that customers benefit from an increase in network size, and furthermore, the
positive network effect is a function of the degree of compatibility. In contrast to
the model in the present paper, Cremer et al. (2000) is assuming that the firms
have installed bases and are engaged in Cournot-type competition where the
providers compete in attracting new consumers. They find that the firms may have
incentives to degrade interconnection quality under market sharing equilibrium.
3 Other papers looking into ISP competition are DangNguyen and Penard (1999) and Baake and
Wichmann (1998). Furthermore, there are some papers looking into congestion control for ISPs under
competition, see e.g. Gibbons et al. (2000) and Mason (2000).
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This result is in contrast to the results in the present paper and is driven by
asymmetries in the installed bases. Thus, in a market with consumer lock-in as in
the Cremer et al. model, a large firm may choose a low interconnection quality,
whereas in a market with mobile consumers, as in the present paper, a large firm
will choose a high interconnection quality.
Mason (1999) models ISP-competition with both horizontal and vertical
differentiation, and furthermore, with a timing structure similar to our' s. In line
with our results, Mason finds that compatibility results in reduced competitive
pressure. However, in his paper the firms choose between perfect compatibility
and incompatibility at stage 1, and hence, he does not see the positive externality
as continuous function of compatibility". Consequently it is not straightforward to
consider questions of over-investment in compatibility in the Mason model.
The strategic effect of interconnection quality does also have many similarities
with the strategic effect of interconnect price (for given quality) in telephony
networks. In telephony networks, the positive externality effect of having many
subscribers on competing networks is reduced when the price of making calls
across networks increase. In the limiting case with extremely high price of making
off-net calls, the telephony subscriber will be indifferent as to the size of the
competing network. A high interconnection price will accordingly have similar
strategic effects as a low interconnection quality", Both in the telephony
interconnection models as well as the present paper, network externalities drives
the strategic effect of interconnect quality",
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of
the network structure. In Section 3 we present our model. Finally, in Section 4 we
conclude.
2. A brief overview of the network structure
In Fig. 1 we give an illustration of the competition between the ISPs and the
choice of compatibility (or interconnection quality). We assume that two ISPs
compete in a given market, and we suppose that for communication between own
customers (on-net traffic) the ISPs is offering a quality guarantee of k. If there is
4 The Mason (1999) model exhibits both vertical and horizontal heterogeneity in consumer
preferences. The relative weight of vertical and horizontal aspects is parameterised. In the extreme case
with only horizontal consumer heterogeneity, Mason obtains similar result as in the present paper with
respect to compatibility.
5 See Laffont et al. (1998a,b), and Armstrong (1998). Furthermore, in Laffont and Tirole (2000) it is
provided an extensive overview of interconnection strategy related to telecommunication.
6 Such externalities were first given a theoretical treatment by Rohlfs (1974). The strategic effect of
network externalities on competition was recognized by Katz and Shapiro (1985). As pointed out by
Katz and Shapiro, externalities and the choice of compatibility are closely related.
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Fig. l. The interconnection structure.
no private interconnection agreement between the ISPs, no such quality guarantee
is given for off-net traffic. Off-net communication between ISP A and ISP B will
be sent through a public interconnection point, and the quality level is equal to
off-net communication with other destinations in the global Internet Backbone (see
Fig. 1). Let the' quality of off-net traffic through the public interconnection point
be Is. (where Is. < k). We assume that this public interconnection point is adminis-
trated and controlled by a non-commercial third party 7• The quality level at the
public interconnection point is assumed to be outside the control of both ISP A and
ISP B8•
ISP A and ISP B do, however, have the opportunity to invest in a direct link
between their networks, i.e. they can invest in a direct interconnect point. If they
do, the quality level related to communication between ISP A and ISP B is k,
where Is. < k < k (see Fig. 1). The aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives
competing ISPs have to implement such direct interconnection. The issue will
probably be more important when local access networks are upgraded to high-
speed internet communication (broadband) and new bandwidth-demanding ser-
vices that tolerate minor delays (real time services as interactive video) are offered.
7 Bailey and McKnight (1997) described four interconnection models where exchange point
described here refers to what they called Third-Party Administrator. The other categories are Peer-to-
Peer Bilateral, Hierarchical Bilateral, and Co-operative Agreement.
8 The frequently observed bottleneck problems in public interconnection points in both Europe and
the US (see e.g. Kende, 2000) are indications that single ISPs not are able to increase the quality of its
services over the public interconnection points. This is probably due to both coordination and free rider
problems.
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The quality offered in the open internet (the quality level g) cannot deliver these
. 9services .
In this paper we will not consider the interplay between the regional ISPs we
have in mind and the backbone providers controlling the core global infrastructure
(the Internet backbone)!". Furthermore, we do not focus on the interplay between
ISPs selling internet connectivity and the providers of local access (the last mile
into homes). However, as mentioned above, the ISPs and the local access
providers are often vertically integrated.
The non-disclosure practice related to private interconnection agreements makes
it impossible to know exactly the number of such contracts between competing
ISPs Il. In the US private interconnection agreements are common between the
core Internet backbone providers. Also the regional ISPs in Europe have private
interconnection agreements with backbone providers at a higher level and in other
countries. However, until now, the competing ISPs seem to have been reluctant to
implement direct interconnection links in Europe. The non-disclosure characteris-
tic makes it difficult to say whether this trend is changing, but several analysts
argue that private interconnection seem to be more common also outside the US 12.
3. The model
The preferences of customers are assumed to be distributed uniformly with
density l on a line of length l. The two firms (a and b) are located at the extremes
of this unit line, firm a is at x" = O and firm b is at Xb = 1. The unit cost for each
firm is c, and the customers have unit demands. The location of preferences on the
unit line indicates the most preferred network type for each customer.
Net utility for a customer located at X connected to supplier i is accordingly:
U, = Vi - tlx - Xii + f3 . (ni + kn) - Pi where i,j = a, b i =1= j
The first term is a fixed advantage Vi of being connected to network. We define
O; = Vi - vj• As long O; =O there is no vertical differentiation, while the services
are vertically differentiated when Bi =1= O.The second term is the disutility from not
9 Interactive services may be among the most profitable services in the Internet. One reason for the
profitability of interactive services is that they are less prone to personal arbitrage and reselling than
services tolerating some delays (Choi et al., 1997). Another reason is that customers have higher
willingness to pay for new information. This will be especially true for strategic information such as
stock exchange rates (Shapiro and Varian, 1998).
10 See Cremer et al. (2000) on the interplay between Internet Backbone Providers.
II See Kende (2000) and Gareiss (1999). Kende (2000) gives a comprehensive description of the
interconnection agreements between the core backbone providers, and he indicates that as much as 80%
of the internet traffic in the US goes through private interconnection points.
12 See Chinoy and Solo (1997) and Cawley (1997). In Gareiss (1999) there is an overview of private
interconnections agreements.
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consuming the most preferred network type (the transportation cost in the standard
Hotelling model). The third term is a utility term depending upon the number of
on-net and off-net customers (ni and nj respectively) equal to 13, (ni + kn), where
13 :>O and ke [k, 1]. 13 is measuring the network externality. For 13 =O consumers
are indifferent with the respect to the size of the two networks. The parameter k
can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of the interconnect arrangement.
When the quality of interconnect equals unity, customers are indifferent as to the
distribution of off-net and on-net customers since on- and off-net traffic have
identical quality. This is opposed to a situation where k < 1. Then, all other things
being equal, a customer will prefer a network with many customers. When k =k
the quality equals the quality available via the Internet (the public interconnection
point in Fig. 1), whereas k >k implies that the two ISPs have agreed upon
establishing an interconnect arrangement (the private interconnection point in Fig.
1) with superior quality. The fourth term, Pi is the per period price charged for ISP
subscription 13. The customers' utility functions are accordingly linear in consump-
tion of the network service and money.
We make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1. We assume that each of the customers along the interval [0,1]
value the products sufficiently high such that they always prefer to subscribe to
one or the other network. Thus, the fixed advantage v i of being connected to either
network is sufficiently large.
Assumption 2. There exist one customer in market equilibrium located at x, where
O<x < l, who is indifferent between consuming the network service from the two
firms. Thus the valuation differential 0i between products of the two firms is
sufficiently low such that: IOil < 3(t - 13(1 - k)).
We will later demonstrate that Assumption 2 indeed is necessary to obtain a
shared market equilibrium. Notice in particular that Assumption 2 implies that
t> f3( 1 - k). If this property is violated equilibrium can be characterized by
cornering even in "symmetric" cases with 0i = O and Pi =Pj because the network
externality is dominating the transportation cost'"
We define (Xi as the market share of firm i. Assumptions 1 and 2 are then
13 Thus, we do not consider any form for usage-based pricing. At first glance, this assumption is
more realistic for internet connectivity in the US where fiat-rate pricing is the norm for local access.
However, we are also observing fiat-rate pricing in Europe, in particular for broadband internet
connectivity. For a discussion of the usage-based regime in Europe related to Internet access, see e.g.
Cave and Crowther (1999).
14 Assume that almost all customers along the unit line, for some reason, are connected to supplier a.
The marginal customer with the longest distance to travel to supplier a, will compare the offer from the
two suppliers and he will choose supplier a (and the market will accordingly be characterised by
cornering) if: 13(1 +~O) - t > 13(0 +~). Thus t> 13(1 -~) is ruling out the possibility of market
cornering in such symmetric cases.
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implying that ni = ai' nj = 1 - ai. For a given price vector, the location of
preferences x E (0,1) for the consumer satisfying Ua = U; is determining the
market shares. By defining (T= 1/(2(t - 13(1 - k))) we can write the market shares
of firm i:
(T is a function of k where (T(k) > 0, (T(1) = 1/2t, (T' (k) < O. Notice that
Assumption 2 assures that (T> O. The market share functions are very similar to
the market share functions in a standard Hotelling model and if k = 1 and/or
13 = 0, the expression for market shares are identical to what we obtain in a
standard Hotelling model with unit demand (i.e. a model without network
externalities). In the standard Hotelling model, the parameter (T is interpreted as a
measure of product substitutability. The products become closer substitutes if the
transportation cost, t, between the two products is reduced. From our definition of
(T it also follows that the products become closer substitutes, in the eyes of the
consumers, if the quality of the link between the two networks is reduced. We can
accordingly expect that an increase in the cost of transport and an increase in the
quality of the link between the two networks to have similar effects upon prices
and profits.
3.1. The two-stage game
We are considering a two-stage game. In the first stage the two ISPs set the
interconnection quality k such that 15. <: k <: 1. In the second stage, the two ISP
simultaneously set their prices for a given k.
3.1.1. Stage 2
In stage 2 the firms set their prices simultaneously, and firm i is choosing Pi so
as to maximize profits given by:
Combining the first order conditions for firm i and j yields:
1 8i
Pi = 2(T +"3+ C and
We will have a shared market equilibrium if and only if ai E (0,1) which is
satisfied under Assumption 2.
Inserting equilibrium prices and market shares as well as the definition of (T in
the profit function and rearranging yields:
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(t - f3(l - k)) 0i o;
71j(O,k) = 2 +3+ 18(t - f3(1 - k)) (1)
When k = 1 and/ or f3 = O, this profit function is identical to the one we obtain in
a conventional Hotelling model with unit demand.
3.1.2. Stage 1
At stage 1 of the game the two firms decide whether to set up an interconnect
arrangement or not. As already stated, stage 2 profit is a function of the quality of
interconnection. Direct differentiation of the profit function (1) with respect to k
yields:
a 71j(O,k) 1 ( o~)
ak =2f3 1 - 9(t - f3(1 _ k))2 (2)
By definition we have ~ = - Bi' and thus we get:
a1T. an;
ak' = ak 'tik
We readily see that the firms do not have conflicting interests with respect to
network compatibility, implying that the two firms always agree upon the optimal
interconnection quality-level k. Consequently, there is no need for an assumption
ensuring that the firm with the lowest incentives for quality has a veto in setting k.
The condition for having a shared market equilibrium is IOil <: 3(t - f3(1 - k))
(Assumption 2). This condition implies that the large bracket above is positive.
Thus in any shared market equilibrium profits of both firms increase in inter-
connect quality.
The effect upon profits from changing interconnect quality can be decomposed
into a price and a market share (or volume) effect by differentiating: 71j= ai(Pi -
c):
The first term is the market share effect and the second term is the price effect.
By inserting the definition of if in the equilibrium price and differentiating with
respect to k we obtain: api / ak = f3. The price effect is accordingly positive for
both firms. This is opposed to the market share effect. When Oi =rf O, market shares
are functions of interconnect quality. By substituting for if in the equilibrium
market shares and differentiating we obtain:
aai - 0;f3
ak - 6(t - f3(l - k))2
(3)
The market share effect is positive for the firm selling the inferior service and
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thus it is negative for the firm selling the superior service. The negative market
share effect for the firm selling the superior product is however dominated by the
positive price effect as demonstrated above.
3.J.2.J. Cost free interconnection quality
Assume it is costless to improve the quality of interconnect. As demonstrated
above, the differentiated profit function is everywhere increasing in k for both
firms. Thus the firms have no incentives to damage the quality of the link between
the two networks and furthermore, if possible, they have a mutual interest in
improving the quality of this link. Then, both on-net and off-net traffic have the
same quality level k = k = 1.
Prices and profits increasing in the quality of the link between the two networks
are due to two effects. First, for given market shares willingness to pay is
increasing from all customers as the quality is increased. Second, when the quality
of the link is increased the competition between the two suppliers becomes less
aggressive 15. When comparing the conventional Hotelling model with our model
featuring network externalities, the argument can be put the other way around:
When the networks offer less than perfect connectivity (k < 1) then the firms will
compete more aggressively than what the conventional Hotelling model predicts.
3.J.2.2. Convex costs of interconnection quality
The assumption above that firms can increase interconnection quality without
incurring costs is clearly an unrealistic assumption since both router and
transmission capacity is costly in the market place. Furthermore there will be
transaction cost of writing a contract and there will typically be costs of mutual
monitoring. We can thus add realism to our model by taking into account that
interconnection is costly. Then the shape of the interconnection cost function will
affect the optimal solution. A necessary condition for an interior solution (k E
(li,l)) is that the interconnect cost function is convex.
One can argue that it is reasonable to expect the interconnection cost to be
convex, since, as interconnect quality increase, the complexity of the contract the
two firms can write becomes large. As the quality of interconnect increase, the
joint network of the two suppliers become more like a common facility where the
firms have ample opportunities of opportunistic behavior. Firms will typically be
reluctant to agree upon interconnection unless the contract prohibits opportunistic
behavior. In order to observe and verify that the contract indeed is fulfilled, costly
mutual monitoring is required.
In the following we will assume the cost of investing in interconnect quality in
15 The best response functions ("reaction functions") in stage 2 of the game is: Pi = R(p) = Ht-
J -
f3( l - k) + Pj + ei + c). An increase in k will result in parallel shifts outwards for these best response
functions and the firms does indeed become less aggressive as the quality of interconnect increase. We
can furthermore see R' = 0.5, we are thus considering a stable Nash equilibrium.
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order to increase the quality of interconnect k above Is:. is I= I(k), where 1(15.) = O,
I' >O, I">O limk~1 I(k) = 00 and limk~k+ I'(k) = O. Assume now that the two
firms are forming an input joint venture where they equally share the cost of
investing in interconnect quality. Each firm will then maximize the stage 2 profit
minus the share of the interconnect cost the firm has to pay in stage 1. Thus the
two firms will solve identical optimization problems and agree upon a interconnect
quality level kd characterized by:
e = arg max( 77i«(},k) -1I(k)).
Thus the investment joint venture investment level is characterized by:
f3(}2I'(k) - f3 - i
- 9(t - f3(1 - k))2
For (}i # O the profit functions are convex in k. With our assumptions we have
77' (k) > I' (k) and 77' (1) < I' (1). Thus there exist at least one k E (k,l) satisfying
the first order conditions. For (}i =Othere is one and only one k satisfying the first
order condition. The second order conditions are satisfied and this solution is
indeed optimal. For (}# Owe cannot rule out the possibility that there is more than
one k satisfying the first order condition. A sufficient condition for a single unique
solution is that the marginal profit curve and the marginal investment curve cross
only once. We will in the following assume that the marginal curves cross only
once.
We can compare this equilibrium quality level with the socially optimal quality.
The first best interconnect quality, k*, is defined as the quality level that is
maximizing customer gross surplus minus total production cost. Consider, for
simplicity, the model in the absence of vertical differentiation (i.e. (}i = O). First
best is then evidently characterized by sharing customers evenly among the two
firms since the unit cost of serving customers in the two firms are identical and
customers are distributed uniformlyon the interval, Then average distance from
the most preferred brand is 0.25. Inserting this average distance as well as the
optimal market shares in the utility function yields the following welfare function:
k* = arg max]u, - 0.25t + 0.5f3 . (1 + k) - c - I(k)].
The first best investment level is then characterized by:
0.5f3 = I'(k)
This is in contrast to the investment level in the input joint venture. In the absence
of vertical differentiation the optimal investment level for the input joint venture
is: f3 = I' (k). An input joint venture will thus choose a quality level of the
interconnect arrangement exceeding the socially optimal level. In the Appendix we
demonstrate that we obtain a similar over investment result in the model under
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vertical differentiation as well. The intuition behind the over investment result is
the following: There are two effects leading to the firms' stage 2 profits increasing
in interconnect quality: The first effect is that for given market shares willingness
to pay is increasing from all customers as the quality is increased. The second
effect is that when the quality of the link is increased, the competition between the
two suppliers becomes less aggressive. Only the first effect is a social gain. Thus
the input joint venture is over-investing in interconnect quality in order to reduce
the stage 2 competitive pressure.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the incentives for an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) to strategically degrade the interconnection quality with the competitors. We
have modeled this in a game where two firms choose the quality of interconnection
before they compete over market shares ei la Hotelling. In the case where there is
no vertical differentiation, the firms split the market equally, and they have no
incentives to degrade interconnection quality. Moreover, when interconnection is
costly the firms will over-invest in interconnection quality as compared to the first
best quality level.
We have also demonstrated that if the products from the two firms also are
vertically differentiated, then the firm providing the superior product will have the
larger market share, When the necessary conditions for a shared market equilib-
rium is fulfilled, the firms will agree upon the optimal interconnection quality.
Furthermore, if interconnection quality is costly, the firms will agree upon a
quality of interconnect exceeding the welfare maximizing quality level.
Finally it is not straightforward to compare the model results with the
interconnection policy in the market place due to the non-disclosure policy.
Representatives in the industry do however make statements indicating that
competing ISPs do interconnect in cases where the two firms in question are
sufficiently symmetric. Such observations are lending support to the results of the
present paper.
Acknowledgements
For helpful discussions and comments, we thank two anonymous referees, the
editor, Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen, Bjorn Rupp, Jan Yngve Sand and seminar
participants at the 2nd Berlin Internet Economics Workshop, at the EARIE 99
conference, and at Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Adminis-
tration.
106
o. Foros, B. Hansen / Information Economics and Policy /3 (2001) 411 -425 423
Appendix A. Welfare maximizing interconnect investments
Consumers with preferences to the left of some point a join network a. Since
the individual transport cost is tx, and the distribution of consumers is uniform
along the line, the sum of travelling costs for all consumers joining the networks
are 112a2t and 1/2(1- a)2t for network a and b respectively. In stage 2 of the
game the social welfare function is:
W(k) =max[a{va - ~at + f3(a + k(1 - a)) - c}a -
+ (1 - a){vb - t(1 - a)t + f3(1 - a + ka) - c}]
The welfare maximizing market share a* is thus:
1 0a
a* = - + ----=-----
2 2(t - 2f3(1 - k))
It can be shown that the market share of the firm selling the superior product will
be to small in market equilibrium as compared to the welfare maximising market
share. In special cases, the welfare maximising solution is to let the firm selling the
superior product serve the entire market whereas both firms are active in the
market equilibrium Notice that this results not is specific to our model featuring
networkexternalities. With .the parameter value f3 = 0, the model does not exhibit
network externalities (and thus there is no effect upon utility by improving
interconnect quality). Then the welfare maximising market share is: a* = 1/2 +
OJ2t whereas market equilibrium is characterised by: a* = 1/2 + 0aI6t. Thus the
market share of the firm selling the superior product is to small.
The stage 1 socially optimal investment level is:
k* = arg max(W(k) - lek))
FoC: W' =1'
By applying the envelope theorem on W(k):
2
åW * * f3 f30 a- = 2f3a*( 1 - a*) = 2f3a a = - - ..:;__--::-
åk (l b 2 2(t - 2f3(1 - k))2
In cases where the welfare maximizing network is characterized by market
sharing, the following condition is fulfilled: t - 2f3(1 - k) > loJ Both the
numerator and denominator are then positive and in such cases welfare is
everywhere increasing in interconnect quality. The welfare maximizing inter-
connect quality is found by solving: k* = arg max(W(k) - lek)). The first order
condition is accordingly:
sw f3 f302
åk - l'(k) = O¢::}2 - 2(t _ 2f3(;' _ k)/ = I'(k)
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The input joint venture will accordingly over-invest in interconnect quality when:
f302, f3 f302___ __:._--:-> - - (/ <=>
f3 - 9(t - f3(1 - k))2 2 2(t - 2f3(l - k))2
f3 7( 1 1)- + f30- - >0
2 i 2(t - 2f3(l - k))2 9(t - f3(l - k))2
A sufficient condition is then that the large bracket is positive. This is the case
since:
2(t - 2f3( 1 - k))2 < 9(t - f3( 1 - k))2
0< 7t2 - 10,8t(l - k) + ,8\1 - k)2
= 7t2 - lOf3t(l - k) - 8f32(l - k)2 + 9f32(l - k)2
0< (t - 2f3(1 - k))(7t + 4f3(1 - k)) +9f3\1 - k)2
~
+ +
It is only socially optimal to set up a direct link between the two networks if both
networks have a positive market share, this is the case when (t - 2f3(1 - k)) > loJ
Thus the first bracket has to be positive. An input joint venture will accordingly
over invest in interconnect quality under product differentiation as well as in the
absence of vertical differentiation.
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Abstract
We consider competition between two providers of digital network services. The
services are horizontally differentiated, and consumers' willingness to pay depends
upon the compatibility between the two providers. Asymmetry in size is often used as
an explanation of why we see that competing providers do not agree upon
compatibility between their networks. In this paper we show that asymmetry m
pricing mechanism can reduce the providers' incentives to become compatible. In
particular, we show that if one firm uses first-degree price discrimination, while the
rival sets a linear price, the degree of compatibility will be lower than if both firms
use the same pricing mechanism. When the pricing mechanisms are set endogenously
by the firms, we show that both firms prefer the combination of complete
compatibility and linear pricing to all other possible outcomes as long as the cost of
compatibility is not too high.
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Introduction
In the Internet and other digital communication networks (e.g. mobile networks)
personalisation technologies may give the providers more flexibility with respect to
pricing mechanism. The providers may even have the ability to use first-degree price
discrimination - or "one-to-one marketing" as the strategy is often called in the
marketing literature. l In the retail markets for mobile telephony or Internet services
the existence of direct and indirect network effects implies that consumers' valuation
of the services increases with the degree of compatibility - the interconnection quality
between the providers.i Several analysts argue that person-to-person communication
will be the "killer-application" also in the future networks, such as 3rd generation
mobile systems (see e.g. Odlyzco, 2001). A hot topic both in the Internet and in
telecommunication is then whether some providers will use a "walled garden
strategy" and choose to set higher quality for on-net communication than for off-net
communication.' We have complete compatibility when on-net quality equals off-net
quality, while we have incomplete compatibility if on-net quality is higher than off-
net quality of communication.
The quality of communication may be given several interpretations. First, it may be
transmission capacity, such that a low capacity in the interconnection point may give
a higher degree of delay and congestion for off-net communication than for on-net
communication. Second, incompatible proprietary systems may create a quality
difference. One example is in the Japanese mobile market where each of the three
I See Shapiro and Varian (1998) and Varian (2001).
2 Katz and Shapiro (1994), Economides (1996) and Shapiro and Varian (1998), among others, give a
classification of direct and indirect network effects. The seminal paper on network externalities is
Rohlfs (1974).
3 On-net communication refers to traffic between computers/consumers connected to the same
provider, while off-net communication is between computers/consumers connected to different
networks, e.g. communication between consumers subscribing to competing firms.
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providers is operating incompatible systems. The largest provider, DoCoMo, has
success with its mobile internet service I-Mode (25 million subscribers, August 2001),
but the services and content available to I-Mode subscribers are not available to
subscribers of the rival providers (see The Economist, October 13th, 2001).4
Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyse the choice of compatibility of two competing firms
in a static model, and they show that the smaller firm has higher incentives to become
compatible than the larger rival. Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000) are adopting the Katz
and Shapiro-model and analyse the competition between Internet backbone providers
with asymmetric installed bases. They show that a firm with a large installed base
may have incentives to reduce the degree of compatibility towards its smaller rivals.
While both Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000) assume
Cournot competition, Foros and Hansen (2001) model competition fl la Hotelling and
analyse the choice of compatibility between two ISPs5. When the two ISPs set a linear
price, and compatibility agreements are costless, they show that the ISPs will set
complete compatibility since this will dampen the competitive pressure between the
rivals.6 In this p~per we show that in a duopoly the choice of compatibility depends
on whether one or both of the firms use price discrimination in the retail market. Ulph
and Vulkan (2000a) show that in a market without network effects the incentives to
use first-degree price discrimination are dampened in competitive markets since it
intensifies competition. We also observe that some firms seem to be unwilling to use
price discrimination and they are offering a linear price to all even if they have a lot of
information about the individual willingness to pay.'
We combine elements from Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) and Foros and Hansen (2001).
Both these papers are extensions of Hotelling (1929). Similar to Ulph and Vulkan
4 Rubinfeid and Singer (2001) analyse whether the merged AOL Time Warner has incentive to use
different types of walled garden strategies in the broadband access market.
5 Internet Service Providers.
6 Other papers analysing Hotelling-competition between providers of internet access and compatibility
are Dogan (2000) and Mason (1999).
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(2000a) and Foros and Hansen (2001) the services are assumed to be horizontally
differentiated." Analogous to Foros and Hansen (2001), but in contrast to Ulph and
Vulkan (2000a), we assume that network effects imply that consumers' willingness to
pay depends upon the compatibility between the two firms."
Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) show in a one-stage game without network effects that there
are two effects of using first-degree price discrimination under Hotelling
competition." The first is the effect of the conventional monopoly analysis of first-
degree price discrimination - the enhanced surplus extraction effect. The second, as
mentioned above, is that the firms will compete consumer by consumer when they use
first-degree price discrimination - the intensified competition effect.11
In the first part of our paper the pricing mechanisms are exogenously given, and we
compare the following three cases; (i) both firms set a linear price, (ii) both firms use
first-degree price discrimination, and (iii) one firm sets a linear price and one firm
uses first-degree price discrimination. We analyse a two-stage game where the firms
choose the degree of compatibility prior to the price competition. The timing structure
is similar to Foros and Hansen (2001), but we investigate the effects on the
compatibility choice of different pricing mechanisms. We show that:
7 See e.g. Shapiro and Varian (1998), Varian (2001), Bakos (2001) and Borenstein and Saloner (2001)
for discussions and applications ofprice discrimination in the Internet.
8 We assume horizontal differentiation similar to several recent studies of the competition in the
telecommunication market, e.g. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, 1998b). See Foros and Hansen (2001)
and Ulph and Vulkan (2000a, 2000b) for a motivation of the assumption of horizontally differentiated
goods in our context.
9 By modelling competition å la Hote Iling the market size (the number of consumers) is given. Hence
the model is more realistic for mature markets, such as the market for Internet services and mobile
telephony in the Scandinavian countries, than for markets where the providers' main focus is to attract
new consumers to the industry.
10 In an extension, Ulph and Vulkan (2000b), they assume that the providers also have the ability to
mass customisation of the services.
II They show that as long as the transport costs are not too convex, the intensified competition effect
dominates the enhanced surplus extraction effect. Hence, in such case the firms prefer to use linear
prices rather than first-degree price discrimination. However, the worst case for the firms is to use
linear pricing when the rival uses first-degree price discrimination.
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1. When the firms use symmetric pncmg mechanisms, they will agree upon
complete compatibility as long as the cost of a compatibility agreement is not
too high.
11. When the firms use asymmetric price mechanisms, both firms will choose low
compatibility even if the compatibility agreements are costless.
When the degree of compatibility increases, the consumers' willingness to pay
increases. Furthermore, an increase in the degree of compatibility implies that the
advantage from having a large market share decreases. If the firms agree upon
complete compatibility, the consumers are indifferent with respect to firms' market
shares when they choose between the two firms' services. Hence, in order to dampen
the competitive pressure firms that are using symmetric pricing mechanisms choose to
set complete compatibility. In contrast, when only one of the firms uses price
discrimination, the market share to the firm that uses price discrimination increases
when compatibility is reduced. Hence, the firm that uses price discrimination prefers
to degrade off-net quality in order to gain an advantage from a larger market share
than the rival. The firm that is using a linear price will have zero profit independent
of off-net quality-when the rival uses price discrimination.
Hence, in contrast to the existing literature, which is focusing on that the larger firm
has lower incentives to become compatible than the smaller one (e.g. Katz and
Shapiro (1985) and Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000)), low degree of compatibility may
be a result of asymmetric pricing mechanisms. Moreover, we show that the network
effects will intensify competition such that the price will be set below costs for the
consumers that are relatively indifferent between the two suppliers (i.e. consumers
located in the middle of the Hotelling line). The observation of network services sold
below costs is usually explained by penetration pricing, where a firm may find it
profitable to set the price below costs in one period in order to obtain a critical mass.
Thereby, the firm can obtain larger profit in subsequent periods (see Shapiro and
Varian (1998) for examples). In contrast, given that the firms choose not to be
compatible, we show that price below costs to some consumers may be the result in a
simple static model with network effects. When the services offered by the two
providers are not completely compatible, the consumers' valuation of the service from
. - .
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one provider increases when one more consumer buys the same service. Hence, to
consumers relatively indifferent between the services, the providers may be willing to
sell their services even when they do not cover their costs. The reason is that the
provider then can extract larger surplus from the other consumers it serves.
In the second part of the paper we endogenize the pricing mechanism choice - i.e.
whether the firms will implement first-degree price discrimination mechanisms or not.
When the costs of compatibility are negligible, we find that there will be multiple
equilibria. However, as long as the firms are able to coordinate on the Pareto-superior
outcome, both firms set linear prices and complete compatibility. This will be the case
regardless of whether pricing mechanism is set prior to compatibility or the two
choices are taken simultaneously. When the cost of compatibility is high, such that the
firms always choose to be incompatible, the outcome where both firms use price
discrimination may be a unique equilibrium.
The model
In our basic model we assume that the pricing mechanism is exogenously given, and
we analyse the following two-stage game:
Stage 1: The firms set the degree of compatibility between their networks.
Stage 2: The firms compete it la Hotelling. Here we compare three cases: (i) both
firms use a linear price, (ii) both firms use first-degree price discrimination, and (iii)
only one firm uses first-degree price discrimination.
In the next section we analyse the case where also the pncmg mechanism IS
endogenously set by the firms.
The supply side
We consider a case where two firms (a and b) offer a service differentiated along the
unit interval it la Hotelling. The locations of the firms are fixed at the extremes of this
unit line. Firm a is located at x=O and firm b is located at x= 1. Each firm offers a
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single service. At stage 1 the firms choose the degree of compatibility or the quality k
of off-net communication, such that O= k ~ k ~ k = 1. The quality of on-net
-
communication k = 1 is fixed. Furthermore, the quality of off-net communication
without any agreement between the firms is k=0 ("a walled garden strategy") ..
We assume that the firms have the ability to employ technologies that allow them to
practice first-degree price discrimination (see Ulph and Vulkan, 2000a). If they use
first-degree price discrimination, they compete for each individual consumer with the
price schedule Pi(X) where i=a.b. Ifthey do not use first-degree price discrimination,
they set a linear price for all x such that Pi (x) = Pl' The marginal cost of producing
one unit of the service is c, and c is independent of the degree of compatibility. At
stage 1 the cost of compatibility (off-net quality) is F. We assume that F is
independent of the degree of compatibility, such that as long as k>O the investment in
interconnection quality is I(k) = F, where F~ 0.12
The demand side
The preferences of consumers are assumed to be distributed uniformly with density 1
on a line of length 1. The location of preferences on the unit line indicates the most
preferred network type for each consumer. Net utility for a consumer located at x
connected to supplier a is (analogous for firm b):
The two first terms are similar to the conventional Hotelling model, where the first
term is a fixed advantage v of being connected to the network. The second term is the
disutility from not consuming the most preferred network type (the transportation cost
in the standard Hotelling model). The transportation cost is proportional to the
12 For convex investment cost such that 1'(k»O and I"(k»O, see Foros and Hansen (2001). If we
introduce costs associated with increasing off-net quality we may have an interior solution with respect
to off-net quality. However, this will not change our results qualitatively.
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distance from the firms. Hence, for a consumer located in x the transportation cost to
firm a is tx and the transportation cost to firm b is t(1-x). When the parameter t is
high, then the consumers' tastes differ significantly. In contrast, when t is reduced, the
services become closer substitutes.
The third term, fl(na + knb), is a utility term that depends on the number of on-net
and off-net consumers. Firm a serves the portion na of the consumers, while firm b
serves the portion nb of the consumers. The parameter f3 is indicating how important
the quality-adjusted network size is. A high f3 will be the case if the main attribute of
the network is to facilitate people-to-people communication.l'' If fl is low, then the
consumers do not care so much about how many other people that are connected to
the networks. A low fl may be realistic if the main attribute of the services offered is
to give access to the open Intemet.14 Furthermore, we see that the consumers' net
utility is increasing in k. The fourth term is the price, and the consumers' utility
functions are accordingly linear in consumption of the network service and money.
We make the following three assumptions:
Assumption 1: We assume that each of the consumers along the interval [0,1] value
the products sufficiently high such that they always prefer to subscribe to one or the
other network. Thus, the fixed advantage v of being connected to either network is
sufficiently large such that na +n, = 1.
Assumption 2: There exists one consumer in market equilibrium located at x, where O
< x < J, who is indifferent between consuming the network service from the two firms.
Assumption 3: Equilibrium quality of off-net communication (the level of k) is equal
to the level chosen by the firm that values off-net quality the least.
13 As mentioned above, indirect network effects may also have similar effects.
14 This may also be realistic for services offered bye-commerce providers in competition with bricks
and mortar firms. Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) focus on e-commerce, and hence it may be realistic in their
context to assume that the consumers' preferences for people-to-people communication are negligible.
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Assumption l ensures that there will be no uncovered interval in the middle of the
Hotelling line, called market coverage. Assumption 2 ensures market sharing so that
both firms are active in the market. Assumption 3 means that if firm a prefers k= 1
while firm b prefers k=O, the equilibrium will be k=0.15 In the first part, where pricing
mechanism is exogenously given, the firms always agree on the off-net quality level.
Hence, assumption 3 is not binding.
In the appendix we show that in order to ensure Assumption 2, we have to have some
restrictions on the parameters t, /] and k. In particular, we show that a sufficient, but
not necessary, condition for this assumption is that t > 2/](1- k). Furthermore, we
show that the restrictions are stronger when one or both of the firms use price
discrimination compared to the situation where both firms use linear pricing.
We define a generalised price for the consumer located in x of buying from firm a
(analogous for firm b):
The consumer located in x buys from the firm with the lowest generalised price. By
denoting this price p(x)we have the following:
p(x) = min[pa (x), Ph (x)]
Benchmark: Both firms set a linear price
In this section we reproduce the results in Foros and Hansen (2001). Assumptions l
and 2 imply that Pa = Pb .16
Stage 2:
15 This is similar to Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000) and Foros and Hansen (200 l).
16 The generalised price for firm a (analogous for firm b) is now Pa = P a + tx - /] (na + knb) .
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The demand for firm a is given by na = x = 0.5 - (Pa - Pb)/(2(t - P(1- k))
(analogous for firm b). Hence, the profit for firm a:
Ha= (Pa - c)[O.S- (Pa - Pb)/(2(t - /3(1- k))]
The first order conditions give the following equilibrium price and quantity:
p:=p;=c+t-P(1-k) and n:=n;=O.S
Stage 1:
From the above we note that the equilibrium price increases with k ( ap / ak >O). This
is due to the fact that an increase in k increases the consumers' willingness to pay and
dampens the competitive pressure.
By inserting stage 2 equilibrium price into the profit function of firm a we have the
following:
(2) Ha =(t-P(1-k))/2
We then see that aHa / ak > O and a2Ha / ae = O, and firm a (and analogous for firm
b) sets k= J as long as:
We summarise the results where both firms set a linear price in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: When both firms set a linear price, the price competition is less aggressive
the higher the degree of compatibility is between the firms. Hence, as long as the fixed
cost of an agreement on compatibility is not too high, the firms will set the same
quality for on-net and off-net communication.
Both firms use first-degree price discrimination
In a context where both firms use first-degree price discrimination we will see a
Bertrand game for every consumer. Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) show that without
network effects, the price will be set equal to c for the marginal consumer. Hence, for
122
the marginal consumer, which in this case is located in the mid-point, the
conventional Bertrand solution gives price equal to marginal costs without network
effects.
Stage 2:
With network effects, and given that the quality of on-net communication is higher
than the quality of off-net communication, the competition will be even harder since
the firms will have a gain from the infra-marginal consumers when they capture the
marginal consumer. Firm a will capture an extra revenue [P(I- k)nJ from its na
consumers when it captures one more consumer. Hence, to the marginal consumer,
firm a is willing to set the price Pa(x) = C - f3(1- k)na.
Let us focus on the competition for a consumer located at O < x < 0.5, in which case
firm a has an advantage in serving consumer x. The generalised price from firm b is
Ph (x) = Ph (x) + t(l- x) - f3(nh + kna). In order to capture the consumer, firm a has to
ensure that Pa(x) ~ Ph (x). Inserting for Pa(x) and Ph (x) gives:
Firm b is willing to charge a price equal to or higher than Ph(X) = c - j3(I- k)nb, and
if we insert for this we have:
Hence, in the interval O~ x ~ 0.5 firm a sets the following price schedule:
Pa(x) = C +t(1- 2x) + j3(I-k)(na - 2nb)-&
The parameter e has a positive arbitrary small value. Both firms are willing to set the
price P, (x) = c - j3(I- k)ni to serve the marginal consumer. Hence, by inserting for
na = x and nb = 1-x we find n: = n; = 0.5, which means that the marginal
consumer is located in the mid-point. The price to the marginal consumer is then
p;(0.5) = c - 0.5j3(1- k).
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Proposition 1: Assume that both firms use first-degree price discrimination, that
there are network effects, and that the quality of off-net communication is lower than
the quality of on-net communication, i.e. k < l. In this case the price to the consumers
located in the middle of the unit line will be below marginal cost.
Hence, we can give an alternative explanation of the observation that some consumers
are offered network services below costs. Even in a static game consumers that are
relatively indifferent between competing services may be offered a price below costs.
Moreover, Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) show that without network effects, the price to
the consumers consuming their most preferred service will be equal to the price in the
previous case where both firms use a linear price. This result does not hold with
network effects if k < l. Now, we see that as long as n: = n; = 0.5, the price to the
consumer located at x=O is p:CO)=c+t-0.5P(1-k) while the linear price was
P: =c+t-P(1-k).
Stage 1:
Using na = nh = 0.5, we find the profit for firm a (analogous for firm b):
(3) tra = (t - P(l- k))/ 4
Comparing equations (2) and (3) we see that the profit when both firms use price
discrimination is one-half of the profit when both firms set linear prices.l ' Analogous
to the previous case we have that atr a / ak >O and a2 tr a / ae = O. Hence, the firms set
k= l as long as:
17 This result is similar to the case without network effects analyzed by Ulph and Vulkan (2000a).
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Only one of the firms uses first-degree price discrimination
Now the two competing firms use different pricing mechanisms. We assume that firm
a sets a per-consumer price Pa(x) and firm b sets the linear price Pb ~ c.
Stage 2:
A consumer located in x buys from firm a as long as Pa (x) ~ Pb' which implies that:
This can be rearranged to
Firm a makes a profit as long as Pa(x) ~ C - P(l- k)na. We define X(Pb) as the
location of the marginal consumer served by firm a (located with the furthest distance
from firm a) for a given Pb' Firm a will serve all consumers between O and X. We
may insert for na =x(Pb)and nb =l-x(ph)into equation (4) to find the price
schedule for all consumers located in the interval O~ x < X(Pb):
(5) Pa(x) = Pb +t(l- 2x) +P(l- k)(2x(Pb) -1)
The price to the marginal consumer served by firm a is given by:
(6) Pa(x)=c-P(l-k)x(Pb)'
In order to find X(Pb) we insert equation (6) into equation (5):
(7) x( )=Pb-c+(t-j3(l-k)
Ps (2t-3j3(1-k))
Hence, X(Pb) is increasing in Ps and decreasing in k. As long as Pb>c and/or k<l,
we see that x(Pb»O.5. Analogous to Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) we now show that
there exists a unique Nash-equilibrium where:
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(8) •Pi =C
(9)
. {C + t(l- 2x) +P(l- k)(2x(c) -1) -c, forO ~ x ~ x(c)
Pa(x) = ~
C + t(l- 2x) +P(l- k)(2x(c) -1) + e, for x(c) < x ~ 1
The price schedule for firm a is then as illustrated in figure 1. In figure la we have the
situation discussed by Ulph and Vulkan (2000a), where there are no network effects
(k=1 or p =0). In figure lb we have the situation with network effects (k<l and
p >0). The solid lines indicate the price schedule to the consumers served by firm a,
while the dotted lines indicate the price schedule firm a offers to consumers served by
firm b. In the case without network effects, the price from firm a to the consumer
located atO is c+t (see figure la). The profit for firm a is then the area A, while firm b
has zero profit. In contrast, if there are network effects the profit for firm a is the area
(A-B+C).
Price Figure la: Without network effects Figure lb: With network effects
PaCO)
c+l
A
c+t
Ph =c I--------~ ......:---------i
'" ......... B...._
·······.1It
•••• c-l
1····.
l
!
o 0.5 ).5 x(c)
Figure 1: The price schedule offered by firm A when k=1 (1a) and k<l (1b).
The proof of this equilibrium is straightforward, and is analogous to the case without
network effects given by Ulph and Vulkan (2000a). First, for the price schedule given
by equation (9) for firm a, firm b has no incentives to set Ps >c. The profit will be
zero in any case. Second, we show by contradiction that no price Ph >c can be part of
the equilibrium. If firm a sets p a (x) = Pb + t(l- 2x) +P(1- k)(2x(Pb) -l) where Pb>c
, firm b will always have incentives to set Ph = Ph - e > c and capture the whole
market. Hence Ps >c cannot be part of the equilibrium. A more formal proof is given
by Ulph and Vulkan (2000a) for the case without network effects.
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Without network effects there may obviously be a question of how plausible this
outcome will be. Why should firm a set the price schedule in (9) in the interval served
by firm b (x(c) < x::; l)? From figure la we see that any out-of equilibrium moves
from firm b such that Ph >c implies that the profit to firm a will be zero, since A -B=O.
The same question may be raised with network effects (k<l), but now the
consequences of an out-of-equilibrium move from firm B are less severe. It is now
optimal for firm a to serve some consumers at a price below marginal cost, and then
have a loss equal to area B. If firm b now sets Ph >c, firm a has to serve all
consumers. This implies a loss equal to area D in figure lb. But when X(Ph)
approaches to l, the willingness to pay increases for all consumers of firm a. Hence,
the price schedule illustrated in figure Ib will shift upwards, and this will increase the
area C. Therefore, it seems more plausible that firm a will set a price schedule shown
by the dotted line (see equation (9)) to the consumers served by firm b if we are in
figure Ib than in la.
We then set P; = c and have the following:
(10) x~ (c) = (t - P(l- k))/(2t - 3P(1-k))
Inserting equation (10) into equation (9) gives:
p;(x)=c+t(1-2x)+P(I-k) P(l-k)
21 -3P(I- k)
The price for the consumer located at x (c) is:
*(x)=c-P(l-k) t-P(1-k)
Pa . 2t -3P(1-k)
We find the location of the consumer that buys from firm a at a price equal marginal
cost:
P (x) = c:::?X = 0.5 + [P(1- k)][ P(1- k) ]
a 21 21-3P(I- k)
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All consumers located in the interval (x - x) are buying from firm a at a price below
marginal cost c. We find that
x _x = [f3 (1- k)][ t - fl (1- k) ]
2t 2t-3f3(1-k)
The profit for firm b is obviously zero, and the profit for firm a is:
We illustrate the profit for firm a in figure 2. The first term in equation (11) is equal
to (A+B+C) in figure 2, while the second term in equation (11) is equal to D (such
that Jr a = A + B +C - D). The first term A is equal to the profit level where both firms
use first-degree price discrimination and set k= l. Hence, we have that A =t/4 (see
equation (3)). The second term B is the increased profit from the consumers in the
interval [0,0.5] when x(c) > 0.5 and k < l. The third term C is the profit from the
consumers in the intervalO. 5 < x < x that pay a price above marginal costs. The last
term D is the loss from the consumers in the interval x:S x :Sx (c) that pay below
marginal cost.
Price
Pa(x)=c
p a (X (c)) "".."" " """""""""." """"·················"··1"····"",··········,·················1"""······
c+t
A
o 0'.5 x x(c) 1
Figure 2: Profit for firm A under asymmetric pricing mechanism.
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Stage 1:
Ifwe insert for Pa(O),PaCi(c)),x, and :iCc) into (11) we have:
Jr =~+~where ~=[ /]2(1_k)2 ][3t-4/](l-k)]
a 4 4(2t-3/](l-k))2
We see that if k=l, then ~=O since B=C=D=O. Then the profit offirm a is similar to
the case where the rival uses first-degree price discrimination too. In contrast, we
show in the appendix that ~ >0 as long as k<1. Furthermore we show that a~ / ak < O ,
such that firm a in this case prefers to set k=O.When k=O, the profit level offirm a is:
t /]2 t
Jr (k=O)=-+ (3t-4/])~-
a 44(2t-3/])2 4
Then we see that the degree of compatibility will be lower when the firms use
asymmetric price mechanisms as compared to the case where they use symmetric
price mechanisms:
Proposition 2: If one firm uses first-degree price discrimination and one firm uses a
linear price, the firm that uses price discrimination will set k=O even if compatibility
costs are zero. The firm that sets a linear price will in this case always have zero
profit and is indifferent to the level of compatibility as long as the cost of
compatibility is zero. If there is an e cost of compatibility, the firm that uses a linear
price wishes to set k=O.
Furthermore, when the degree of compatibility is not complete, the firm that uses
first-degree price discrimination will prefer that the rival sets a linear price. The
reason is that if the rival uses a linear price it will not set its price below costs. In
contrast, if the rival is using first-degree price discrimination, it will set price below
costs for the consumers in the middle of the line. This is in contrast to the case
without network effects shown by Ulph and Vulkan (2000a). They show that without
network effects the profit of the firm that chooses to use first-degree pnce
discrimination is independent of the pricing strategy used by its rival.
Proposition 3: When k=1, the firm that is using price discrimination will obtain the
same profit level as in the case where both firms use first-degree price discrimination.
129
This reproduces the results in Ulph and Vulkan (20DDa).In contrast, ifk<l, the profit
of the firm that is using first-degree price discrimination is higher if the rival uses a
linear price compared to the case where the rival uses first-degree price
discrimination too.
The choice of pricing mechanism
In stage 2 in the model we have analysed three different cases - both firms set a linear
price (LP), both firms use first-degree price discrimination (PD), and only one firm
uses first-degree price discrimination. We have assumed that the price mechanism -
LP or PD - is exogenously given. In this section we assume that price mechanism (LP
or PD) is set endogenously by the firms. From the previous section we know that the
firms will set k= 1 or k=O.
Concerning the timing structure we analyse two cases:
1. First, we assume that the choice between LP or PD is taken prior to the
compatibility choice. Put differently, the price mechanism is determined at stage
O.
11. Second, we assume that the firms choose price mechanism (LP or PD) and
compatibility (k= 1 or k=O) simultaneouslyat stage 1.
With respect to the cost of off-net quality we also consider two cases:
1. First, we assume that the cost of a compatibility agreement with respect to off-
net quality is small, i.e. F= G .
11. Second, we assume that the cost of off-net quality, F, is so high that the firms
prefer low off-net quality (k=D) even in the case where both firms use linear
pricing. Then the firms set k=I) independent of timing structure and pricing
mechanism.
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At first glance it may seem reasonable to believe that the choice of compatibility must
be made prior to the choice of pricing mechanism, i.e. whether the firm should use
first-degree price discrimination or a linear price. However, we argue that the opposite
is more realistic. The choice of compatibility in our context, or the quality level of
off-net communication compared to on-net communication quality, is much more a
choice of signing a contract or not with your rival than it is a choice of implementing
a new technology. This will certainly be true when you already have implemented the
on-net quality such as modeled here (i.e. k=1 for on-net communication). For
instance, the degree of off-net quality may be to what extent you give your rival's
consumers access to all the content located on servers in your network at the same
conditions (price and quality) as those given to your own consumers. The choice of
implementing first-degree price discrimination is much more a question of adopting
personalisation technologies or not. But even if the physical costs of implementing
compatibility are low, there may be significant costs of signing a contract (a costly
monitoring system may also be needed). Hence, the total cost of compatibility, F,may
be high.
Then we have three different cases. First, we assume low cost of off-net quality and
the choice of pricing mechanism is taken prior to off-net quality. Second, we assume
low cost of off-net quality and pricing mechanism and off-net quality are set
simultaneously. Third, we assume that F is so high that k=O.
Low cost of compatibility
Price mechanism is set prior to compatibility
We have shown that given low cost of compatibility firms that are using a symmetric
pricing mechanism choose to set the same quality for off-net as for on-net
communication (k= 1). In contrast, they set k=O if they choose asymmetric pricing
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mechanisms. If the choice between LP and PD is taken prior to the choice of k=1 or
k=U we have the following normal-form representation of the game (at stage O):
FirmB
FirmA
LP PD
LP ICf~E~~E tO -+b.,2 '4
PD t cED-+b. O4 ' 4
Figure 3: Normal-form game when price technology is set
prior to the compatibility choice.
In the appendix we show that t 12 ?:. t 14 + /j. as long as Assumption 2 is fulfilled (i.e.
t > 2/3 in this case). Hence, there are two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies, i.e. (LP,
LP) and (PD, PD). Both firms prefer (LP, LP) to (PD, PD), and we may expect that
they will be able to coordinate on (LP, LP).
Price mechanism and compatibility are set simultaneously
Now assumption 3 is binding, and the quality level is equal to the level chosen by the
firm that values off-net quality the least. If the choice between LP or PD and k=1 or
k=O are taken simultaneously at stage 1 we have the following normal-form
representation of the game:
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FirmB
FirmA
LP,k=O LP,k=1 PD, k=O PD, k=1
LP, /f:_p--;:p'" {-fl {-fl t t
-- -- , -- ---& O -+~ O --&, 2 ' 2 '4 '4k=O 2 2 I, ,, "........ _ " ,-------
LP, {-fl {-fl t t t t
---& -- --& --& 0-& -+~ 0-& --&
k=l 2 ' 2 '2 '4 '4
PD, t t ® t-fl t-fl-+~ O -+~ 0-& -- ---&k=O 4 ' 4 ' 4 ' 44
PD, t t t-fl t-fl
~E !_0-+~-& O --& 0-& ---& --
k=l 4 ' 4 ' 4 ' 4 I~ '4
Figure 4: Normal-form game when price technology and compatibility are set
simultaneously.
In this game there are four Nash-equilibria in pure strategies, i.e. (LP(k=O), LP(k=O)),
(LP(k=l), LP(k=l)), (PD(k=O), PD(k=O)) and (PD(k=l), PD(k=l)). Analogous to
the previous case we see that (LP(k=l), LP(k=l)) is Pareto-superior to the other
outcomes.
We see that (LP(k=O), LP(k=O)) IS a Nash-equilibrium only if
:ri (LP( k = O),LP( k = O))~ n, (PD( k = O),LP( k = O)). This condition holds if
t / 4 - fl / 2+~ ~O. In the appendix we show that (LP(k=O), LP(k=O)) is a Nash-
equilibrium only if t ~ (2 +os/i) fl .Furthermore, note that if & =0 then the strategy
(LP(k=O), LP(k=O)) is (weakly) dominated by the strategy (LP(k=l), LP(k=l)). In
equilibrium dominated strategies will never be used. When the costs of compatibility
are negligible, we see that the firms prefer that both firms set linear prices and
complete compatibility both when pricing mechanism is set prior to compatibility,
and when these two choices are taken simultaneously.
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High costs of compatibility
We now assume that the costs of compatibility, F, are so high that k=O is chosen
independent of pricing mechanism. Then we have the following normal-form
representation of the game when the firms choose between LP and PD.
FirmB
FirmA
LP PD
",' --,
LP /'t - f3 t- j}\ t
1-- --I O -+fl
\ 2
,
2 I '4,... ",, ,"'-_ -----
PD t t- fJ t-
-+Ll O --4 ' 4 , 4
Figure 5: Normal-form game when the costs of compatibility
are high.
When (t - fJ) 12~ (t / 4 + fl), we see that both (LP, LP) and (PD, PD) are Nash
equilibria. Above we have shown that (t - f3)/ 2 ~ (t / 4 + fl) if t ~ (2 +O.s-[i)fJ. In
contrast to the previous cases we now have a unique Nash equilibrium (PD, PD) if
2f3 ~ t ~ (2 +O.s-[i)fJ . Hence, in this case we end up in a prisoner's dilemma where
(PD, PD) is a unique equilibrium even if both players would have been better off with
(LP, LP). The intuition for this can be seen from Proposition 3. When k=O the gain
from being the only firm that using price discrimination is high. At the same time, as
long as k=O also when both firms are using linear pricing, there is no loss in
interconnection quality when moving from a symmetric case to an asymmetric case.
We can summarise the results regarding the choice of pricing mechanism in the
following proposition:
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Proposition 4: When the pricing mechanisms are set endogenously by the firms, we
have that:
i) Bothfirms prefer the combination of complete compatibility and linear pricing
to all other possible outcomes as long as the cost of compatibility is not too
high.
ii) Jf there are significant costs of compatibility, the firms will have lower quality
of off-net communication compared to on-net communication. Then there may
be a unique equilibrium where both players use price discrimination. This will
be a prisoner 's dilemma since both players would have been better off if both
players used linear pricing.
Concluding remarks
In the market for digital network services such as Internet services and mobile
telephony, consumers' utility does not only depend on the quality of communication
in the network they are subscribing to (on-net quality). The consumers' utility and,
hence, willingness to pay, also depends on the off-net quality of communication, i.e.
the interconnection quality between different networks. When the firms that are
controlling different networks compete over the same consumers, the off-net quality
of communication becomes an important strategic variable.
In this paper we show that even if the firms do not differ in size, the firms may have
incentives to reduce the off-net quality if they use different pricing mechanisms. We
show that if one of the firms uses first-degree price discrimination, while the rival
uses a linear price, the firms will have lower incentives to be compatible than if they
use similar pricing mechanisms, i.e. both use a linear price or both use first-degree
price discrimination. When the pricing mechanisms are set endogenously by the
firms, we show that both firms prefer the combination of complete compatibility and
linear pricing to all other possible outcomes as long as the cost of compatibility is not
too high. If there are significant costs of compatibility, the firms will have lower
quality of off-net communication compared to on-net communication. In such a
context we show that there may be a unique equilibrium where both players use price
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discrimination. Furthermore, this will be a prisoner' s dilemma since both players
would have been better off if both players used linear pricing.
We have analysed the possibility to use a personalised price (first-degree price
discrimination) in a competitive environment. However, the providers are assumed
not to personalise the services, since they offer only one service each. A potential
extension will be to analyse whether the ability to offer personalised services to each
consumer (mass-customisation) will change the compatibility choice. Ulph and
Vulkan (2000b) analyse a case without network effects, but where the firms have the
ability to locate in an interval of the Hotelling line.
Another potential extension is to analyse the robustness of the equilibrium where only
one of the two firms uses price discrimination. In order to ensure an equilibrium in
pure strategies the price schedule offered by the firm that uses price discrimination
has to force the rival to set the price equal to marginal cost. This seems
counterintuitive since an accommodation strategy implies that the firm would try to
soften the competition. However, price equal to marginal cost of the firm that uses a
linear price is the only candidate for an equilibrium in pure strategies. We have
assumed that the two firms set their prices simultaneously also when they use
different price strategies. In this case, it may be interesting to see what happens if the
prices are set sequentially. Since the equilibrium in our model implies a price equal to
marginal cost for the firm that is using linear pricing, any alternative equilibrium with
price above marginal cost would imply higher profit to both firms. Hence, when we
consider whether the firms choose to use a linear price or first-degree price
discrimination, our results are more robust when the equilibrium strategies imply that
the firms use price discrimination compared to the case where they choose linear
pncmg,
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Appendix
Al: Assumption 2
In assumption 2 we have assumed that there exists one consumer m market
equilibrium located at x, where O< x < I, who is indifferent between consuming the
network service from the two firms. 'Yv'e now show that the condition ensuring this
depends on the pricing schedule set by the firm:
First, if both firms set a linear price, the condition is t - /](l- k) >O. This can be seen
by the following: Assume that almost all consumers along the line buy from B. The
consumer with the longest travelling distance to B is located in x=O. He compares the
offers from A and B and buys from A if: v+ /](0+ I{) - Pa ~ v-t+ fl(l + !s.0) - Ph. For
any given Ph ~ C, firm A will pick up the consumer located in x=O by a price
P a ~ C as long as this condition holds. Hence a sufficient condition to ensure market
sharing is t - /](l-!s.)> Owhen both firms set a linear price
Second, if both' firms use first-degree price discrimination, and for some reason
almost all consumers are buying from B, firm B is willing to set the price
Pb (O)= c - fl(l- k) in order to capture the consumer located in O, while firm A is
willing to set P a (O)= c. The consumer located at x=O buys from A if
v + /](0 +!s.) - c ~ v - t + /](l + !s.0) - c + fl(I-!s.). Hence, now a sufficient condition
that ensures market sharing is t - 2fl(l- !s.).>O.
Third, if only firm A uses first-degree price discrimination, the sufficient condition
that ensures that firm A will not monopolize the market is equivalent to the one above
where both firms are price discriminating. The condition that ensures market sharing
is stronger when at least one of the firms uses first-degree price discrimination
compared to the case where both firms use linear pricing. Hence, a sufficient, but not
necessary, condition to ensure that both firms are active in the market is that
t-2/](I-!s.) > O.
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A2: Show that ~ > O if k<l
To ensure market sharing we have assumed (~2/3 . We now define the following:
~ =[ j32(1_k)2 ]and ~2 =3t-4j3(1-k)
I 4(2t - 3j3(1- k))2
Hence, ~=~1~2' We know that ~=O if k=l, and we see that ~I >0 if k<l. We now
show that ~2 > O since (~2p. QED.
A3: Show that a~! ak < O
a~ =_[( 3j32(1-k) J)~(t-2j3(1-k))+j32(l-k)2)l<0
ak (2t-3j3(1-k)) 'j
This is negative since all terms the bracket are non-negative as long as k E [0,1]. QED.
A4: Show that t! 2 > t !4 + ~ when k=O
It is straightforward to show that a~! aj3 > o. Hence to show that ~ - ~ + ~ :2:O we
2 4
insert the highest possible value for j3 which is (=2 j3 (Assumption 2). Then we have
~-~+~=O. QED.
2 4
AS: The condition for (t - j3)/ 2:2: t! 4 + ~ given that k=O
From A4 we know that we may have (t - j3) _ ~ _ ~ <O. It is straightforward to show
2 4
that (t - j3) _ ~ _ ~ <O when 2j3 ~ t < (2 + o.s.fi)j3. Hence, (t - j3) - ~ - ~ :2:Oas long as
2 4 2 4
t :2: (2 + o.s.fi)j3 . QED.
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Abstract: I~ this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key
feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers
in rurallocations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases
welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the
opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations.
Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase con-
sumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the
market outcome.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Broadband access is the last mile of the high-speed information highway, and it is
an essential component in order to access bandwidth-demanding services such as
interactive video. The costs of providing broadband access are highly convex in the
sense that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in areas with low
population density than in areas with high population density. In a free market
economy this cost structure might imply significantly higher access prices in rural
areas than in urban areas. We have thus seen a political concern that peripherallo-
cations will be harmed unless broadband access providers are required to charge the
same price for the same service in all locations that they cover (uniform prices). 2
However, even though there may be implicit or explicit political requirements of
uniform prices, the actual price level will hardly be regulated. Instead, as in other
industries, governments seek to prevent unduly high prices by inviting several firms
to compete (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). The purpose of the present paper is to inves-
tigate how this policy mix affects welfare and geographical coverage of broadband
access.
When a firm builds a broadband access network it pushes optical fiber closer to
the subscriber. The most common solution has been to build a fiber-optic line that
serves a cluster of homes, and use the existing copper lines for "the last mile" (the
telephone or cable-TV lines). This solution is called" fiber to the curb" , and is much
cheaper than building fiber-optic lines all the way to each subscriber (Clark 1999a,
1999b, Speta 2000a). In order to increase the quality (speed of communication) the
provider has to employ fiber closer to homes. Hence, the cost of broadband access
is increasing in quality. Moreover, within any given geographical radius, there is
generallya lower number of homes in rural areas than in urban areas. Hence, it is
2Universal Service Obligations (USO), for instance in the form of a requirement of uniform prices
or a requirement of geographical coverage, have been imposed particularly on telecommunications
incumbents for a long time (see, e.g., Riordan, 2001, and Valetti, 2000, for overviews).
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more costly to provide a given quality in rural areas than in urban areas.
For low-end broadband technologies, such as ADSL and hybrid fiber-coax (HFC)
networks, the curbs are used to serve a large number of homes." For these technolo-
gies it seems realistic to assume that marginal connection costs are insignificant, but
that there are large fixed costs involved in serving any given geographical area. In
contrast, for high-end broadband technologies, and in particular for "fiber to the
homes" solutions, the real bottleneck is the very last mile. In this case marginal
costs are relatively high, especially in rural areas. We focus on high-end broadband
technologies in this paper, and thus assume that marginal costs per consumer con-
nected are significant, and higher the lower the population density. Moreover, we
abstract from fixed geographical costs. The implications of this are discussed below.
Our model is complementary to those by Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and
Valletti, Hoernig and Barros (2002). Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) develop a
model of competition among facility-based broadband providers, and use engineering
data for an HFC network in a metropolitan area in the US. In contrast to ourselves,
Faulhaber and Hogendorn do not focus on the issue of uniform pricing. Furthermore,
while we assume ~hat marginal connection costs increase when population density
decreases, they assume that there is a fixed cost of serving a given area. As argued
above, their assumption seems realistic when focusing on an HFC network. For the
HFC networks built out by the cable-TV providers in the US in the late 1990's fiber
was typically deployed to serve an area (neighborhood) of about 500-2000 homes
(Gillett, 1997). When US cable providers (e.g., AT&T) are now migrating their HFC
networks to "fiber to the curb", fewer subscribers are allowed to share the access
network - typically from 20-200 homes (Gillett and Tseng, 2001). Therefore, when
we move from low-end broadband technologies to high-end broadband technologies,
the range within which the existing lines can be used is much lower, and it seems
3xDSL are techniques allowing higher speed of access through the existing telephone lines by
installing equipments in the homes and before the first switch. ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Sub-
scriber Line) is the DSL-version that can use existing lines the longest distance. VDSL (Very high
speed digital subscriber line) requires that the fiber line is much closer to homes, but also gives
significantly higher speed of access.
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to be more realistic to assume that a significant part of the cost is marginal per
consumer connected.
Also Valletti et al. (2002) assume that there is a fixed cost per area and not per
consumer connected, and thus focus on the market for low-end broadband technolo-
gies. Moreover, in contrast to ourselves, both Valletti et al. (2002) and Faulhaber et
al. (2000) assume that the network is already installed in the actual area when the
sale of broadband connection takes place. Hence, the investment costs are sunk. At
first glance, it seems obvious that this is the most realistic description of the timing
of the game. However, if this were true, and marginal costs are insignificant, much of
the regulatory authorities' concern that an unregulated monopoly will set a higher
price in rural areas than in urban areas will be needless (see Valletti et al. (2002) for
a formal proof). But it is far from obvious that geographical coverage is set prior to
prices. As long as there is no regulatory constraint on coverage, the coverage may in
fact be set street-by-street, as argued by Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000). In our
context the coverage may even be set consumer-by-consumer. In such a context, the
providers may try to write a contract with the consumers before they actually build
fiber to homes or 'fiber to a curb near the homes. In the Scandinavian countries,
for instance, we have seen that broadband providers advertise their services before
they deploy the fiber. Hence, in our basic model we assume that coverage and prices
are set simultaneously. Thereafter, we compare the basic model with a game where
coverage is set prior to prices.
As a benchmark case we disregard the requirement of uniform pricing, and show
that both a monopolist and oligopolistic firms have incentives to serve the socially
optimal regional coverage. The reason for this result is that it is profitable to serve
new locations until the last (i.e., the most expensive) location exactly breaks even.
This is de facto the same decision as a hypothetical social planner would make.
Abstracting from fixed costs the only effect of higher competition is reduced prices
in all locations, and this unambiguously has a positive welfare effect.
Things change fundamentally when we impose a requirement of uniform pricing.
First, it should be noted that the socially optimal regional coverage falls in this
case. The intuition for this runs as follows: The fact that it is relatively inexpensive
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to serve consumers in locations with a high population density indicates that also
the access price should be low. However, a low price induces too high demand in
peripherallocations, where the real costs of providing broadband access are high.
In order to reduce the magnitude of the latter effect, it is socially optimal not to
serve some of the least populated areas. Thus, it is not certain that uniform pricing
is a good regional policy.
Second, and this is our main result, increased competition need not improve
welfare when we have a requirement of uniform prices. While a monopolist will still
have incentives to set the same regional coverage as the social planner, the coverage
level decreases if there is competition. Competition reduces prices, but herein lies,
in a sense, also the problem: due to the convexity of the cost function, the lower
market price makes it less profitable to serve peripheral locations. Competition
therefore implies that the regional coverage falls to a sub-optimal level, and this
negative welfare effect is more likely to dominate the larger the number of firms
that offer broadband access. Consequently, welfare may be lower with free entry
than if the market is served by a monopolist even when we abstract from possible
duplication of fixed costs.
The fact that it is relatively more expensive to serve rural areas than urban areas
is not unique for the broadband access technology. There is a similar cost structure
also for, e.g., postal services and third generation mobile telephone systems (UMTS
in Europe). In some countries (like France, Norway and Sweden) the governments
have specified a minimum regional coverage by the firms that are granted UMTS
licenses, and proposals have been advanced to specify similar requirements for firms
providing broadband access."
In an extension of the basic model we thus assume that the government is able
to set a binding coverage requirement prior to downstream competition between the
firms, and we show that this has a positive effect on aggregate consumer surplus.
4There has not been raised any requirement of uniform pricing for UMTS. This is also not
necessary, since uniform pricing will probably be the market outcome. The reason is that in the
market for mobile phones arbitrage opportunities strictly reduce the providers' ability to set prices
that vary with where people live.
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More surprisingly, this policy also increases the profit level of the firms. The reason
is that the regulator, by acting as a first-mover, solves a co-ordination problem;
the oligopolistic firms would prefer the same regional coverage as the one chosen
by a hypothetical monopolist, but this does not constitute an equilibrium in a free
market economy.
The regulatory authorities often argue that their goal is a "technologically neu-
tral" regulation. We show that this may not be appropriate in the broadband access
market. By comparing our results with Valletti et al. (2002) we show that the policy
maker should take into account which technology is employed, since this will have
implications for the effects of possible requirements of uniform pricing and coverage.
To bring forward these results we use a highly stylized model where we have
a continuum of locations that differ only with respect to their population density.
Specifically, the distribution of consumer preferences for broadband access is the
same in all locations. This means that the downward-sloping demand curve, ad-
justed for population size, is the same in each location.
In order to focus on the consequences of higher competition and uniform pricing
wemake some simplifying assumptions that are not crucial for our conclusions. First,
we abstract from fixed costs in order to show that competition may be detrimental
to welfare even in the absence of duplication of fixed costs. Including fixed costs at
each location, for instance, means that the socially optimal number of locations to
serve will in general be higher than the one chosen by the market (see also Valletti et
al., 2002). The other results in the paper survive, in particular the one that higher
competition tends to reduce regional coverage when prices are uniform.P
Second, analogous to fixed cost, the existence of network externalities may favor
monopoly to competition (since a monopolist has incentives to internalize the ex-
ternalities). Hence, we abstract from network externalities, since introducing such
effects in the present model would strengthen the result that higher competition
may reduce welfare.
Third, we assume that broadband access is a separate market from current nar-
rowband access. Upgrading of the existing telephone and cable-TV networks to
5Since we abstract from fixed costs we do not explicitly consider entry decisions.
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broadband seems to be the most promising way of broadband implementation (see
e.g. Clark, 1999a, 1999b). Hence, broadband may be seen as a quality improvement
of the existing narrowband access. However, even if broadband may be seen as a su-
perior substitute to current narrowband services, narrowband need not be considered
as a substitute for potential broadband providers simply because narrowband access
cannot deliver bandwidth-demanding services such as real time video, on-demand
video, interactive multiplayer gaming and so forth (Hausman et al., 2001).
Fourth, we assume competition between symmetric facility-based firms, and we
do not open up for non-facility-based firms that rent capacity from facility-based
firms. Similarly to Valletti et al. (2002) we do not consider access pricing prob-
lems. Furthermore, we do not consider the implications of one of the firms having
a first-mover advantage over the others in the choice of coverage. To analyze the
consequences of these kinds of asymmetries seems like an interesting path for future
research (see also Hansen, 1999, and Hoemig. 2001).
There are several informal policy analyses of the broadband industry, in partic-
ular with focus on the US market (e.g. Speta 2000a, 2000b, MacKie-Mason, 1999,
Petkovic and De Coster, 2000). In contrast, there are to our knowledge few papers
explicitly modelling competition in the broadband access market, but Valletti et al.
(2002), Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Hoernig (2001) are notable exceptions.
Additionally, Hausman, Sidak and Singer (2001) analyze the consequences of asym-
metric regulation of telecommunication providers and cable-TV -providers regarding
broadband access.
Since the uniform price constraint implies that the markets (locations) are strate-
gically linked, our paper is related to the theory of multimarket oligopoly, where
Bulowet aL (1985) is the seminal paper. Our paper is also related to the literature
on price discrimination, because uniform pricing in our context de facto discrim-
inates against consumers living in urban areas. Hence, it may be seen as spatial
price discrimination, see, e.g., Varian (1989) for an overview. The main focus of this
literature, however, is to analyze whether an unregulated firm may find it profitable
to charge a uniform price throughout a given territory in order to prevent arbitrage
or deter entry, since consumers located further away from the firm are more likely to
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have alternative suppliers." Arbitrage is not relevant for our paper. Obviously, the
consumers have to buy broadband access where they live, and they are prevented
from buying or reselling their subscription to other areas (locations).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The formal model is presented
in Section 2, and the benchmark model where prices differ between the locations
is analyzed in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we assume uniform pricing. We first
analyze the case where coverage and quantities are set simultaneously, and we
then assume that coverage is set prior to quantities. In section 3 we conclude.
2 THE MODEL
The end-user market consists of a continuum of locations t. In any given location
there is a number of consumers that differ in their willingness to pay for broadband
access. Denote by P(t) the population size in location t, and let p(t) be the price."
We assume that total market demand in location t is given by x(t) = P(t)y(p(t))-,
where
y(p(t)) = a - p(t)
f3
(l)
is the demand from a representative group of consumers. The parameters a, f3 are
positive constants. Note that this formulation implies that the locations do not differ
with respect to the consumers' willingness to pay for broadband access, and that
demand will be proportional to population size if there is a uniform price p(t) = P
in all locations.
Each location has the same geographical size, and we order it such that location O
has the largest population and location N the smallest population. The population
size of location O is, by choice of scale, equal to l; Po = 1. We assume that the
6Phlips (1983) gives a comprehensive discussion and examples of spatial price discrimination in
Europe.
7Note that the consumers usually pay a fixed monthly fee for broadband access, and no usage-
or time dependent price as for conventional narrowband access. We assume that the price p may
be interpreted as the discounted payment for broadband access.
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population size of location t is e-t times the size of location O. This means that
P(t) = e-t, or
x(t) = e-ty(p(t)). (2)
Figure 1, which measures price on the vertical axis and demand in each location
on the horizontal axis, provides a graphical illustration of the demand structure. The
consumer that values broadband access the most in each location has a willingness
to pay equal to a. The intercept with the vertical axis is to thus the same for all
locations, but the demand curve is steeper the smaller the population size (i.e., the
higher the value of t). Location Ohas the largest population, and thus the largest
aggregate demand at any given price, while location N has the smallest population
and the smallest aggregate demand.
p
a
x(t)
(O < t < N)
x(O)
~--------------~------------~~------------~-+x
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the demand structure.
A central feature of providing broadband access is the fact that it is generally
significantly more expensive to connect consumers in locations with a low popu-
lation density than in locations with a high population density. As argued in the
introduction, there are two main reasons for this. First, broadband access providers
typically have to make some fixed investments in each location that they serve. This
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gives rise to fixed costs, which only to a limited extent vary with the population size
in each location. Second, with a low population density it becomes more expensive
to physically connect each single home to the broadband. Thereby the marginal
connection costs per consumer will typically be relatively high in locations with a
low population density. This is particularly true for high-end broadband technolo-
gies like "fiber to the homes", which is our focus. In this paper we will therefore
consider a context where the marginal costs of providing broadband access is higher
the lower the population density. However, we will abstract from fixed costs and
other forms of economies of scale, which have been analyzed by Valletti et al. (2002)
and Hoernig (2001).8
Let the marginal cost of connecting a consumer in location Oto the broadband be
equal to the constant ¢. To capture the fact that it is significantly more expensive to
connect consumers in locations with low population density than in locations with
high population density, we will assume that the cost of providing access to x(t)
consumers in location t is ¢ef.'tx(t), with f-L > O.The cost of servicing ti locations is
consequently
C(n) = ¢in ef.'tx(t)dt. (3)
Throughout we assume that et > ¢; otherwise it will not be profitable to serve any
location. Since it is prohibitively expensive to serve the least populated locations,
it will always be true that n < N. This is also true in the model, since C(t) --t 00
as t --t 00.
The exact size of the parameter f-L does not matter for the qualitative results,
and in the following it proves convenient to choose f-L = 2.
sUnless we consider broadband solutions where each home is directly connected with optical
fiber, it may seem most realistic to specify a model where fixed costs dominate in urban areas (high
population density) and marginal costs dominate in rural areas (low population density). However,
in order to make the model tractable we assume that the costs are marginal per connected consumer
in all locations. This simplification does not affect the qualitative trade-off between prices and
geographical coverage that we focus on below.
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2.1 Benchmark: Prices Differ across Locations
As a benchmark case, we will consider the social optimum and the market equilib-
rium (with monopoly and oligopolistic competition a la Cournot, respectively) when
we allow prices to differ across the locations.
The marginal cost of connecting a consumer in location t is M C = ¢e2t. In social
optimum (denoted with superscript *) the price is equal to the marginal cost:
p*(t) = ¢e2t
This implies that
(4)
The social planner will provide broadband access until demand is equal to zero.
Solving for y*(t) = Oin (4) we thus have
* 1 a
ri, = -ln-.
2 ¢ (5)
But also a monopolist and oligopolistic firms will serve the socially optimal num-
ber of locations (see appendix for a formal proof). It is optimal for a monopolist
to increase ri, until the marginal profit of connecting consumers in a new location
is equal to zero. This is de facto the same decision as the one made by the social
planner. Moreover, no matter how small the profit level of a monopolist is in a
given location, there will still be some profit left also with oligopolistic competition.
Therefore the regional coverage is independent of the number of competing firms in
the market. However, the well-known problem that a monopolist charges too high
prices remains. With a higher number of firms the competitive pressure increases,
and therefore the total quantity offered in each location that is served will also
increase.
We may sum up our results so far in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Suppose that we allow prices to differ between the locations. Then
we have that: (i) both a monopolist and oligopolistic firms will choose the socially
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optimal geographical coverage, and (ii) competition will increase welfare compared to
monopoly, since the consumer prices will be lower the larger the number of competing
firms.
2.2 Uniform Pricing
Suppose that the firms are required to charge the same price in all locations. Let p be
this common price and let y be the corresponding demand from each representative
group of consumers in all the locations that are served. This means that actual
demand in location t equals x(t) = e""'ty. We then find that aggregate market demand
equals Q = Jon P(t)ydt = Y Jon e+dt = y (1 - e-n) and that the costs are equal to
C = ¢ Jon e2tye-tdt = ¢y(en - 1).
2.2.1 Social Optimum with Uniform Prices
The value for society of the broadband is equal to the consumer surplus (CS) plus
revenue (R) minus the costs (C) of providing the service. The regulator's problem
can thus be described as
From this it follows that
(6)
and
* ( ) _ ~ I 20. - (3y
ti y - 2 n 2¢ . (7)
By combining (6) and (7) we have
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and
n*=ln1+V1+8ex/CP4 . (8)
Equations (5) and (8) tell us that:
Proposition 1: Suppose that the price is uniform across the locations. In this
case the socially optimal geographical coverage is lower than when prices are non-
uniform.
The intuition behind the fact that n* is reduced with uniform prices, runs as
follows. The socially optimal uniform price will be somewhere between the marginal
costs of serving consumers in the first location and in the last location. A too low
price will induce too high consumption, while a too high price will induce too low
consumption. If the regional coverage is high, the uniform price must also be high
in order to prevent an excessively high demand in high-cost locations. Since a high
price harms consumers in all the locations that are served, it is optimal to reduce
the regional coverage relative to the case with non-uniform prices.
2.2.2 The Choice of the Monopolist
With uniform prices the optimization problem of the monopolist equals
Ti = max [(ex - j3y)y(l - e-n) - cpy(en - 1)] .
y,n
(9)
From this we find the first order conditions (superscript m for monopoly):
(10)
(11)
Combining equations (10) and (11) yields that the equilibrium quantity for each
representative group of consumers is equal to
155
while the regional coverage is
nm = In 1+ yl1 + 8al cp4 . (12)
Comparing (5) and (12) we thus see that the monopolist will serve fewer locations
when he is forced to charge a uniform price than when prices are non-uniform. The
reason is that it is costly to connect locations that have a low population density,
requiring a relatively high connection price. With uniform prices the monopolist
must therefore charge a higher price from all consumers the larger the regional
coverage. By serving a large number of locations the monopolist will therefore loose
income from the locations with the highest population density."
Intuitivelyone may expect that the monopolist will provide a smaller regional
coverage than the social planner, since a social planner is not concerned about the
profit level per se. However, equations (5) and (8) show that we still have nm = n* :
Proposition 2: Independent of whether we have uniform or non-uniform prices
the monopolist and the social planner will provide the same regional coverage, but
the prices charged by the monopolist are too high.
The fact that the social planner and the monopolist will choose the same coverage.
with uniform prices can be explained as follows.
In each location t the monopolist obtains a revenue equal to R(t) = pmyme-t, or
while the incurred costs are
Obviously, the monopolist will not serve locations that are unprofitable. It must
thus be true that R(n) ~ Cm(n). Likewise, it cannot be optimal not to serve
9Note that we find a similar argument in the literature of price discrimination; without price
discrimination it may well be optimal not to serve some groups of consumers that otherwise have
a sufficiently high willingness to pay.
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locations that generate pure profit. In equilibrium we thus have R(n) = Cm(n) or
pmyme-n = cPymen;
From a social point ofview, however, the benefit from serving location ti is higher
than R(n), since also the consumer surplus enters the welfare function. Denoting
the social benefit (consumer surplus + profit) of serving location t by B, we have
B = [~(a - p)y + py] e-t = (a - ~!3Y) ye-to Since y = 2ym we thus have
The social benefit of serving any given location t is thus twice as large as the revenue
for the monopolist of serving the same location. However, also the cost of serving
location t is twice as large for the social planner;
For the last location it must be true that B(t) = C(t), and we thus see that the
monopolist and social planner will choose the same coverage (nm(ym) = n*(y*)). It
should be noted, though, that the regional coverage provided by the monopolist is
too small from a social point of view, given the quantity chosen by the monopolist.
This can be seen from equation (7), which shows that n*(y*) < n*(ym). The reason
why the social planner would choose a higher regional coverage than the monopolist
for any given quantity, is simply that the monopolist does not care about consumer
surplus. In particular, this means that B(nm) > C(nm) for y = ·ym. Given ym,
the social planner would thus choose a higher regional coverage such that the social
benefit is equal to the cost of serving the last location.!"
10This is analogous to a result found by Spence (1975), who shows that even if a monopolist
should have incentives to underprovide product quality, the actual quality level chosen by a social
planner and a monopolist may be the same. Given the monopolist's output level, however, the
social planner may prefer a higher product quality. yVewould like to thank Kåre P. Hagen for
pointing out this analogy to us.
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2.2.3 Oligopolistic Competition
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) a capacity-constrained price game can be
solved as a one-stage Cournot-game. In the broadband market the suppliers need to
choose the capacity of the transport network prior to the price (see Hansen, 1999, and
Faulhaber and Hogendorn, 2000).The capacity choice consists of building own fiber
nodes or renting transport facilities both in the national and global backbone. The
supplier of access to the Internet typically have long term contracts with suppliers
of connectivity to the global backbone. AOL, for instance, have a five year contract
with WorldCom (Cremer, Rey and Tirole, 2000). Hence, we assume that there is
Cournot competition between m symmetric firms. We further follow Valletti et aL
(2002) and assume that each firm i offers broadband connection from location zero
up to some endogenously given location ni (see also later discussion).
Denote by Yi(t) the quantity supplied by firm i to each representative group of
consumers, and let Y-i(t) denote the analogous quantities from each of the other
(m - 1) firms. With uniform prices and oligopolistic competition the profit level of
firm i equals
(13)
where y = Yi + (m - 1) Y-i. Inserting Yi for x, and maximizing (13) with respect to
Yi and ni give the first order conditions (see appendix)
00- 2{3(m - l)Y-i - (e-ni - l)-l{3(m - 1) JOnix_i(t)dt - cpeni (14)
Yi = 2{3
and
(15)
In a symmetric equilibrium we have X-i(t) = Xi(t) = e-tYi, and thus JOnix_i(t)dt =
Yi (1 - eni). Inserting for this in (14) we find that
yC(n) = (3(1 ~ m) (a - cpen) , (16)
while equation (15) implies
C( ) _ 11 a - {3myn Y - - n .2 cp (17)
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Combining equations (16) and (17) we can express yCand nC in terms of parameters
only:
nC = In m + Jm 2 + (m + 1)4a j cp
2(m + 1) (18)
C 1 [_2_
a
_ mcp + Jm2cp2 + 4acp(m + 1)]
Y =2/3 m+1 (m+1)2 (19)
It is easily verified that dnc j dm < O and d(myC) j dm > o. Put differently, higher
competition reduces both prices and the number of locations that are served. We
thus have the following result:
Proposition 3: Suppose that the telecommunication firms must charge the same
price in all the locations that they serve. In this case a higher number of firms
implies that prices are reduced, while the regional coverage decreases below the social
optimum.
The welfare implications of Proposition 3 are illustrated in figure 2.11 The left-
hand side panel of the figure measures m on the horizontal axis and the Cournot
number of locations served relative to the socially optimal number of locations on
the vertical axis (nC(m)jn*). This figure illustrates that the regional coverage is
decreasing in m. Increased competition will thus clearly harm some peripheral
locations, and this is detrimental to national welfare. On the other hand, increased
competition reduces consumer prices in those locations that are still served, and this
has a positive welfare effect. The right-hand side panel of figure 2, which measures
m on the horizontal axis and W on the vertical axis, therefore shows a curve with
an inverted U-form. The reason why welfare increases initially is that prices are
significantly reduced as we move from monopoly to duopoly. However, as is well
known from microeconomic theory, this effect becomes increasingly dampened as the
lIThe following parameters are used inn all the figures: fr = 5, f3 = 1 and cP = 1. In the left-hand
side panel of Figure 2 and in Figure 3 the number of firms (m) is set equal to 8.
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number of competitors increases. In the figure this means that the negative effect of
a lower regional coverage dominates as the number of firms increases beyond m = 3.
It should be stressed that this negative effect must dominate for sufficiently high
values of m, independent of parameter values. This is most easily understood if we
assume that m -+ 00, in which case n -+ O. If we had also taken into consideration
the fact that there are some fixed costs, the negative effects of increasing m would
have been even larger.12
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Fiqure 2: Competition, regional coverage and welfare.
2.2.4 The Regulator Sets Coverage Prior to Competition
In principle, the government can act as a first-mover with respect to regional cov-
erage. In telecommunications we see that governments often have the ambition to
do so, and that they mandate the firms to provide access to a minimum geograph-
ical coverage. This coverage regulation is typically combined with a requirement
of uniform pricing through Universal Service Obligations (USO), see e.g. Laffont
and Tirole (2000), Riordan (2001), Valletti et al. (2002), and Valletti (2000). In
12If there are fixed costs of serving each location, and the last location served by the monopolist
is relatively large and profitable, it may happen that the same regional coverage will be same also
in a duopoly. However, we should still expect that the regional coverage falls as a sufficient number
of firms enter. This is particularly true since the marginallocations are, just, marginal.
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the mobile telephony market, for instance, we commonly see that the firms that are
being granted a license are required to offer access with a minimum coverage.l"
In this section we assume a two-stage game where the regulator sets the coverage
at stage one and where the firms choose quantities at stage two. As usual in this
kind of game we start with the second stage:
Stage 2 For a given regional coverage, ii, the maximization problem of firm i is
1fi = max r [a - ,By] xi(t)dt _ cp [ni Xi(t)e2tdt.
, y, Jo Jo
The response by the telecommunication firms to this requirement is the same as
that given by equation (14).
Stage 1 The government sets regional coverage such that welfare is maximized.
We use the symmetry of the firms and let yf = yC :
W = m:x [~,Bm2 (yc)2 (1 - e-n) + (a - ,BmyC)myc(1- e-n) - cpmyC(en - 1)]
given
C( ) . 1 ( n)y ri, = ,B(1 +m) a - cpe
From the first order condition it follows that the regional coverage chosen by the
regulator at stage 1 is identical to the social optimum, such that
_ * 1+ ..)1 + 8al cp
ri, = ri, = In 4 .
It should be noted that due to the convexity of the cost function, broadband
(20)
access becomes more expensive when ri, increases. A binding requirement of regional
coverage is thus bad news for consumers in inframarginallocations.
The welfare effects of a regional coverage requirement is illustrated in figure 3.
Here we have assumed that m = 8, in which case welfare is lower with oligopolis-
tic competition than in the equilibrium with a monopoly if there is no coverage
13Regarding the allocation of licenses for the third generation mobile system (UMTS in Europe),
several countries have minimum coverage requirements in their licenses. The governments that
allocate the UMTS-licences through "beauty-contests" seem to give more attention to coverage
requirements than where the licenses are allocated through auctions.
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requirement.l" First, the figure shows that consumer surplus is increasing in the
number of locations that are connected to the broadband for n E (ne, n*). Second,
and perhaps more surprisingly, we also see that the same is true for the profit level.
What the regulator does when specifying a binding lower bound on n, is to solve a
coordination problem. The oligopolistic firms prefer the same price and the same
regional coverage as the one chosen by a monopolist (i.e., n = n*), but individually
it is profitable for each of the firms to reduce the prices they charge and the number
of locations they serve. IS
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Figure 3: Effects of requirements on regional coverage.
Proposition 4: By requiring the telecommunication firms to provide a larger
regional coverage than the Coumot solution both consumer surplus and the profit
level of the firms increase up to the monopoly coverage.
l4See also the right-hand side panel of Figure 2.
15By inserting (16) into the expression for 'Tri it is easily found that profit is maximized when
n =n*.
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2.2.5 The firms set coverage prior to competition
We have compared a solution where the regulator acts as a first-mover and sets
the coverage prior to competition with an unregulated structure where the firms
choose coverage and quantities simultaneously. More realistically, the firms will set
coverage prior to quantities in the unregulated market too. So in order to check
that it is the intervention from the government, and not the timing of the game per
se that solves the coordination problem, we now assume that the firms set coverage
at stage 1 and then compete li la Cournot at stage 2. We assume that the firms
are required to set a uniform price and, for simplicity, we let m = 2. Using that
X_i(t) = e-tY_i it follows from equation (14) that the stage 2 equilibrium is given
by
r-C c c 1 n_" n" .. ..Yi (ni,n_i) = 3,B(a + c/Je '- 2</Je -) where 2, -2 = 1,2 and 2 =J -z. (21)
The cross-partial derivative of firm i's profit-function is negative, i.e. (827ff / 8yi8Y-i) <
o. The quantities set by the firms at stage 2 are therefore strategic substitutes as
in ei. conventional Cournot game (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). We
see that df/f / dn_~ > O, such that firm i may reduce the quantity offered by firm
-i by reducing its own coverage ni. Since the firms' quantities are strategic substi-
tutes, they will actually do so, and the coverage chosen by the firms would be lower
in a two stage game than with simultaneously set coverage and quantity (see also
appendix). Hence, it is the intervention from the government that solves the coor-
dination problem. Indeed, by forcing the firms to provide a larger regional coverage
than the market equilibrium the regulator solves a prisoners' dilemma for the firms.
3 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
Historically, telecommunication incumbents have been required to charge uniform
prices throughout the country, At the same time, governments seek to prevent un-
duly high prices by increasing competition. In this paper we have analyzed the effect
of an implicit or explicit requirement of uniform pricing combined with competition
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in the market for broadband access, which is characterized by the fact that it is con-
siderably more expensive to serve consumers in rural areas than consumers in urban
areas. We have shown that welfare may decrease as the number of firms increases,
since the regional coverage will be reduced. Furthermore, we have also shown that
the government may prevent the negative effect from competition by intervening
and setting a coverage requirement prior to competition. Interestingly, this will also
benefit the firms. In contrast, if the firms set coverage prior to competition, they
will choose an even lower level of coverage than they would have done with simulta-
neous moves. Hence, it is not the timing of the game per se, but the intervention of
the government that may increase welfare. Put differently, if the government wants
uniform prices, it should set a complete Universal Service Obligation (USO) that
requires both a uniform price and a given coverage.
Since our model is very stylized, there may be a need for some comments on our
key assumptions. Most importantly, we have assumed that the competing firms are
symmetric in several dimensions. First, they are symmetric in their timing of the
investment, such that no firm has a first-mover advantage with regard to the invest-
ment in coverage. 'This assumption seems realistic if there is competition between
several facility-based firms that already have conventional narrowband networks in
the given area. Several analysts argue that this is the most likely scenario in the
broadband market for residential users, since it will be controlled by the existing
facility-based firms - telephony providers and cable-TV providers. This is due to the
high up-front investments of new wireline facilities and the possibility of increasing
the capacity of existing networks. The assumption will also be realistic if none of
the firms have existing networks or the existing networks cannot be upgraded to
broadband. This is possibly the current situation regarding investments in third
generation mobile systems (UMTS in Europe). However, in many countries the
coverage of the existing telephone network is higher than the coverage of existing
cable-TV-networks. Hence, the telephone incumbent may have a first-mover advan-
tage, particularly in many rural locations. Thus, there is need for more research
regarding the implications of one firm having a first-mover advantage in the choice
of coverage. When firms set coverage sequentially, the result may be altered, and we
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may expect that firms will be asymmetric with regard to coverage. Some firms may
then concentrate their activities in urban areas, while others concentrate in rural
areas.
Second, we have assumed that there is competition between vertically integrated
facility-based firms that invest in their own broadband access network. With our
assumptions on the cost structure the firms will not gain from sharing the infrastruc-
ture, since there are only marginal costs per consumer (independent of the number
of users). However, there is little doubt that there are also significant fixed costs
in broadband provision, and that this may open up for economies of scale. For
instance, by including fixed costs per region in addition to marginal costs, we could
address the question of access pricing and infrastructure sharing. It is then an open
question whether the market will be dominated by competing vertically integrated
firms or by vertically separated firms that rent access from the facility-based firm as
an input. In the latter case there will be competition between facility-based firms
and non-facility based firms renting access from the former type. Today, we see that
the telecommunication incumbents are obligated to offer access to non-facility-based
rivals, while the cable-TV providers are not.
Third, we have assumed that the firms completely duplicate their network cover-
age. At the first glance, this may be an unrealistic assumption. But if the convexity
of costs is significant, the firms will probably do so. They start with the cheapest
and most populated locations (see also Valletti et al., 2002). In the infancy of the
broadband access market we now see some evidence of this. The broadband up-
grades are concentrated in urban locations. A similar example is the mobile market
in several countries where the firms duplicate their coverage almost completely.
Finally, we have assumed that the uniform price is set in a non-cooperative
environment. This seems like a natural point of departure, since price competition
is in general not allowed in most countries. However, an interesting question is
whether tacit price collusion may actually have positive welfare effects in contexts
like the one that we have considered. The reason why this may be true is that
cooperative price setting will move the price towards the monopoly price and, as
shown in the paper this will tend to increase the geographical coverage.
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4 APPENDIX
Geographical coverage when prices differ between locations
Monopoly:
The optimization problem of the monopolist equals
7r = max [ I" p(x(t))x(t)dt - cp rn e2tx(t)dt]. (22)
x(t),n Jo Jo
Solving (22) we find that 87rj8x(t) = O yields the FOe p'(x(t))x(t) + p(x(t)) -
cpe2t = O. Noting that p(x(t)) = ex- (3x(t)et and p'(x(t)) = -(3et we thus have
x(t) = 2~ (~ - cpet) . This implies that p(t) = ~(ex + cpe2t), or
(23)
where superscript m indicates monopoly.
The second FOe from (22), 87rj8n = O, further implies that p(x(n))x(n) -
cpe2nx(n) = o. By inserting from (23) we thus find that the number of locations
served by the monopolist is equal to
ti" = ~ln ex.
2 cp (24)
Note that consumers in the most populated locations will be most harmed by
monopoly pricing, since
d(p(t) - p*(t)) = _cpe2t < O
dt
Oligopolistic competition:
Denote by Yi (t) the quantity supplied by firm i to each representative group of
consumers, and let Y-i(t) denote the analogous quantities from each of the other
(m - 1) firms. We thus have y(t) = Yi(t) + (m - 1) Y-i(t), so that firm i faces the
inverse demand curve P(Yi(t), Y-i(t)) = ex- (3(Yi(t) + (m -l)Y_i(t)). The profit level
of firm i is thus
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· Defining x(t) = Xi(t) + (m - 1) X-i(t) = e-ty(t) we can state the maximization
problem of firm i as
The first order condition with respect to Xi(t) gives us Xi(t) = [a - (m - l)x_i(t)et - <pet]j(2(3et).
Using that all firms are symmetric in equilibrium, and substituting Yi for Xi, we find
that (superscript c for Cournot)
(25)
We likewise find that the number of locations served equals
(26)
Hence, we have that 71.* = ti" = ne under non-uniform pricing.
Derivations of the FOGs with oligopolistic competition when prices are uniform
Using that x(t) = e-ty = Xi(t) + (m - l)X-i(t) we can write equation (13) as
:ri foni [a - (3y] [e-ty - (m -l)X_:_i(t)] dt
-<p foni [e-ty - (m - l)x_i(t)] e2tdt.
This can further be modified to
ni = (ay - (3y2) foni e-tdt + (3y(m - 1) foni x_i(t)dt
_foni a(m - l)X_i(t)dt - <pfoni [e-ty - (m - l)x_i(t)] e2tdt.
We thus find that and aYi = o implies
which can be rewritten to give equation (14).
From equation (13) we further find that and ani = Oimplies
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which can be written as in equation (15).
Proof that nC < nC
Suppose that we have a two-stage game where the firms simultaneously choose
coverage at stage one and quantities at stage two. The solution to the second stage
is given by iif(n~, n=-i) from equation (21). Inserting for iif(n~, n=-i) into the profit
functions for the firms, we find that the maximization problem at stage one equals
Solving this, and using that the firms are symmetric, we find that
nC = In 3 + J9 + 16a/ø.
8
In the game where quantity and coverage were set simultaneously we have nC =
In 2+y!4;12Q/¢> for m = 2 (c.f. equation (18)). Letting f:).n = iI,C - nC we find that
6.n = O if a/ø = 'l and that d(6.n)/d(a/ø) < O for a/ø> O. Since a/ø> l it
follows that nC < n", Q.E.D.
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